kumquat-buildroot/toolchain/toolchain-external/ext-toolchain-wrapper.c
Thomas Petazzoni 5aa205eba4 toolchain-external: instrument wrapper to warn about unsafe paths
The CodeSourcery toolchains have a very interesting feature: they warn
the user when an unsafe header or library path is used, i.e a path
that will lead host headers or libraries to leak into the build.

This commit adds a similar functionality into our external toolchain
wrapper, so that it can be used with all external toolchains, and can
also be tuned as needed. By default, the external toolchain wrapper
now gives warnings such as:

  arm-linux-gcc: WARNING: unsafe header/library path used in cross-compilation: '-I /usr/foo'
  arm-linux-gcc: WARNING: unsafe header/library path used in cross-compilation: '-L /usr/bleh'

but the compilation continues successfully. One can then easily grep
in his build log to search for occurences of this message.

Optionally, if BR_COMPILER_PARANOID_UNSAFE_PATH is defined in the
environment to a non empty value, the external wrapper will instead
error out and abort the compilation.

Signed-off-by: Thomas Petazzoni <thomas.petazzoni@free-electrons.com>
Reviewed-by: Romain Naour <romain.naour@openwide.fr>
Tested-by: Romain Naour <romain.naour@openwide.fr>
2014-12-11 00:05:52 +01:00

258 lines
6.3 KiB
C

/**
* Buildroot wrapper for external toolchains. This simply executes the real
* toolchain with a number of arguments (sysroot/arch/..) hardcoded,
* to ensure the external toolchain uses the correct configuration.
* The hardcoded path arguments are defined relative to the actual location
* of the binary.
*
* (C) 2011 Peter Korsgaard <jacmet@sunsite.dk>
* (C) 2011 Daniel Nyström <daniel.nystrom@timeterminal.se>
* (C) 2012 Arnout Vandecappelle (Essensium/Mind) <arnout@mind.be>
* (C) 2013 Spenser Gilliland <spenser@gillilanding.com>
*
* This file is licensed under the terms of the GNU General Public License
* version 2. This program is licensed "as is" without any warranty of any
* kind, whether express or implied.
*/
#define _GNU_SOURCE
#include <stdio.h>
#include <string.h>
#include <limits.h>
#include <unistd.h>
#include <stdlib.h>
#include <errno.h>
static char path[PATH_MAX];
static char sysroot[PATH_MAX];
/**
* GCC errors out with certain combinations of arguments (examples are
* -mfloat-abi={hard|soft} and -m{little|big}-endian), so we have to ensure
* that we only pass the predefined one to the real compiler if the inverse
* option isn't in the argument list.
* This specifies the worst case number of extra arguments we might pass
* Currently, we have:
* -mfloat-abi=
* -march=
* -mcpu=
*/
#define EXCLUSIVE_ARGS 3
static char *predef_args[] = {
path,
"--sysroot", sysroot,
#ifdef BR_ABI
"-mabi=" BR_ABI,
#endif
#ifdef BR_FPU
"-mfpu=" BR_FPU,
#endif
#ifdef BR_SOFTFLOAT
"-msoft-float",
#endif /* BR_SOFTFLOAT */
#ifdef BR_MODE
"-m" BR_MODE,
#endif
#ifdef BR_64
"-m64",
#endif
#ifdef BR_BINFMT_FLAT
"-Wl,-elf2flt",
#endif
#ifdef BR_MIPS_TARGET_LITTLE_ENDIAN
"-EL",
#endif
#ifdef BR_MIPS_TARGET_BIG_ENDIAN
"-EB",
#endif
#ifdef BR_ADDITIONAL_CFLAGS
BR_ADDITIONAL_CFLAGS
#endif
};
static void check_unsafe_path(const char *path, int paranoid)
{
char **c;
static char *unsafe_paths[] = {
"/lib", "/usr/include", "/usr/lib", "/usr/local/include", "/usr/local/lib", NULL,
};
for (c = unsafe_paths; *c != NULL; c++) {
if (!strncmp(path, *c, strlen(*c))) {
fprintf(stderr, "%s: %s: unsafe header/library path used in cross-compilation: '%s'\n",
program_invocation_short_name,
paranoid ? "ERROR" : "WARNING", path);
if (paranoid)
exit(1);
continue;
}
}
}
int main(int argc, char **argv)
{
char **args, **cur;
char *relbasedir, *absbasedir;
char *progpath = argv[0];
char *basename;
char *env_debug;
char *paranoid_wrapper;
int paranoid;
int ret, i, count = 0, debug;
/* Calculate the relative paths */
basename = strrchr(progpath, '/');
if (basename) {
*basename = '\0';
basename++;
relbasedir = malloc(strlen(progpath) + 7);
if (relbasedir == NULL) {
perror(__FILE__ ": malloc");
return 2;
}
sprintf(relbasedir, "%s/../..", argv[0]);
absbasedir = realpath(relbasedir, NULL);
} else {
basename = progpath;
absbasedir = malloc(PATH_MAX + 1);
ret = readlink("/proc/self/exe", absbasedir, PATH_MAX);
if (ret < 0) {
perror(__FILE__ ": readlink");
return 2;
}
absbasedir[ret] = '\0';
for (i = ret; i > 0; i--) {
if (absbasedir[i] == '/') {
absbasedir[i] = '\0';
if (++count == 3)
break;
}
}
}
if (absbasedir == NULL) {
perror(__FILE__ ": realpath");
return 2;
}
/* Fill in the relative paths */
#ifdef BR_CROSS_PATH_REL
ret = snprintf(path, sizeof(path), "%s/" BR_CROSS_PATH_REL "/%s", absbasedir, basename);
#else /* BR_CROSS_PATH_ABS */
ret = snprintf(path, sizeof(path), BR_CROSS_PATH_ABS "/%s", basename);
#endif
if (ret >= sizeof(path)) {
perror(__FILE__ ": overflow");
return 3;
}
ret = snprintf(sysroot, sizeof(sysroot), "%s/" BR_SYSROOT, absbasedir);
if (ret >= sizeof(sysroot)) {
perror(__FILE__ ": overflow");
return 3;
}
cur = args = malloc(sizeof(predef_args) +
(sizeof(char *) * (argc + EXCLUSIVE_ARGS)));
if (args == NULL) {
perror(__FILE__ ": malloc");
return 2;
}
/* start with predefined args */
memcpy(cur, predef_args, sizeof(predef_args));
cur += sizeof(predef_args) / sizeof(predef_args[0]);
#ifdef BR_FLOAT_ABI
/* add float abi if not overridden in args */
for (i = 1; i < argc; i++) {
if (!strncmp(argv[i], "-mfloat-abi=", strlen("-mfloat-abi=")) ||
!strcmp(argv[i], "-msoft-float") ||
!strcmp(argv[i], "-mhard-float"))
break;
}
if (i == argc)
*cur++ = "-mfloat-abi=" BR_FLOAT_ABI;
#endif
#if defined(BR_ARCH) || \
defined(BR_CPU)
/* Add our -march/cpu/abi flags, but only if none are
* already specified on the commandline
*/
for (i = 1; i < argc; i++) {
if (!strncmp(argv[i], "-march=", strlen("-march=")) ||
!strncmp(argv[i], "-mcpu=", strlen("-mcpu=" )))
break;
}
if (i == argc) {
#ifdef BR_ARCH
*cur++ = "-march=" BR_ARCH;
#endif
#ifdef BR_CPU
*cur++ = "-mcpu=" BR_CPU;
#endif
}
#endif /* ARCH || CPU */
paranoid_wrapper = getenv("BR_COMPILER_PARANOID_UNSAFE_PATH");
if (paranoid_wrapper && strlen(paranoid_wrapper) > 0)
paranoid = 1;
else
paranoid = 0;
/* Check for unsafe library and header paths */
for (i = 1; i < argc; i++) {
/* Skip options that do not start with -I and -L */
if (strncmp(argv[i], "-I", 2) && strncmp(argv[i], "-L", 2))
continue;
/* We handle two cases: first the case where -I/-L and
* the path are separated by one space and therefore
* visible as two separate options, and then the case
* where they are stuck together forming one single
* option.
*/
if (argv[i][2] == '\0') {
i++;
if (i == argc)
continue;
check_unsafe_path(argv[i], paranoid);
} else {
check_unsafe_path(argv[i] + 2, paranoid);
}
}
/* append forward args */
memcpy(cur, &argv[1], sizeof(char *) * (argc - 1));
cur += argc - 1;
/* finish with NULL termination */
*cur = NULL;
/* Debug the wrapper to see actual arguments passed to
* the compiler:
* unset, empty, or 0: do not trace
* set to 1 : trace all arguments on a single line
* set to 2 : trace one argument per line
*/
if ((env_debug = getenv("BR2_DEBUG_WRAPPER"))) {
debug = atoi(env_debug);
if (debug > 0) {
fprintf(stderr, "Toolchain wrapper executing:");
for (i = 0; args[i]; i++)
fprintf(stderr, "%s'%s'",
(debug == 2) ? "\n " : " ", args[i]);
fprintf(stderr, "\n");
}
}
if (execv(path, args))
perror(path);
free(args);
return 2;
}