riscv32 is (surprise!) a 32-bit architecture. But it has been Y2038-safe from its inception. As such, there are no legacy binaries that may use the 32-bit time syscalls, and thus they are not available on riscv32. Code that directly calls to the syscalls without using the C libraries wrappers thus need to handle this case by themselves. That's what upstream tried to do with:5b5e2985f3
We initially carried that patch with2bb26c1a1d
(package/libopenssl: fix build on riscv32). However, as Arnd Bergmann puts it [0]: The patch looks wrong to me: __NR_io_pgetevents_time64 must be used whenever time_t is 64-bit wide on a 32-bit architecture, while __NR_io_getevents/__NR_io_pgetevents must be used when time_t is the same width as 'long'. Checking whether __NR_io_getevents is defined is wrong for all architectures other than riscv And Arnd agrees that patch should be reverted [1] [2] (there are further comments in that stream, that are worth reading). As such, we've reverted2bb26c1a1d
with6cfb4ad7f7
. This means we have no working solution to enable openssl on riscv32 for now. So, rather than fail the build, or backport a dysfunctional patch, let's just forbid openssl on riscv32. Drop the default from the choice selection; it was anyway superfluous: the default of a choice, if left unspecified, is the first entry of the choice. Also, having a default means we'd have to also propagate the dependencies of the defaulted-to symbol, which is yet a little bit more maintenance. Since the chances we get a third implementation of openssl are pretty slim (very, very slim), reasoning about what is the default is still very easy. When propagating dependencies to tpm2-tss' users, we've tried to keep the architecture dependency toward the top when possible, and otherwise we've added it together with existing arch dependencies (MMU). While at it, drop a useless redundant comment in ibm-sw-tpm2: if we select FORCE_LIBOPENSSL, it is obvious that's because libressl is not supported... Besides none of the other users of FORCE_LIBOPENSSL have such a comment. Fixes: http://autobuild.buildroot.org/results/eb9/eb9a64d4ffae8569b5225083f282cf87ffa7c681/ ... http://autobuild.buildroot.org/results/07e/07e413b24ba8adc9558c80267ce16dda339bf032/ [0]5b5e2985f3 (commitcomment-44782859)
[1]5b5e2985f3 (commitcomment-47826509)
[2]5b5e2985f3 (commitcomment-47830530)
Signed-off-by: Yann E. MORIN <yann.morin.1998@free.fr> Reviewed-by: Arnout Vandecappelle (Essensium/Mind) <arnout@mind.be> Cc: Peter Korsgaard <peter@korsgaard.com> Cc: Matthew Weber <matthew.weber@rockwellcollins.com> Cc: Mark Corbin <mark@dibsco.co.uk>
26 lines
1.1 KiB
Plaintext
26 lines
1.1 KiB
Plaintext
config BR2_PACKAGE_TPM2_TOTP
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bool "tpm2-totp"
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depends on BR2_PACKAGE_LIBOPENSSL_ARCH_SUPPORTS # tpm2-tss
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depends on !BR2_STATIC_LIBS # tpm2-tss
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depends on !BR2_TOOLCHAIN_EXTERNAL_CODESOURCERY_ARM # glibc < 2.20
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select BR2_PACKAGE_LIBQRENCODE
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select BR2_PACKAGE_TPM2_TSS
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help
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This is a reimplementation of Matthew Garrett's tpmtotp
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software for TPM 2.0 using the tpm2-tss software stack. Its
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purpose is to attest the trustworthiness of a device against
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a human using time-based one-time passwords (TOTP),
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facilitating the Trusted Platform Module (TPM) to bind the
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TOTP secret to the known trustworthy system state. In
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addition to the original tpmtotp, given the new capabilities
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of in-TPM hmac calculation, the tpm2-totp's secret HMAC keys
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do not have to be exported from the TPM to the CPU's RAM on
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boot anymore.
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https://github.com/tpm2-software/tpm2-totp
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comment "tpm2-totp needs a toolchain w/ dynamic library"
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depends on BR2_PACKAGE_LIBOPENSSL_ARCH_SUPPORTS
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depends on BR2_STATIC_LIBS
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depends on !BR2_TOOLCHAIN_EXTERNAL_CODESOURCERY_ARM
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