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kumquat-buildroot/boot/grub2/0133-kern-efi-Add-initial-stack-protector-implementation.patch
Stefan Sørensen 1bad507220 boot/grub2: Backport 2021/03/02 securify fixes 
Details: https://lists.gnu.org/archive/html/grub-devel/2021-03/msg00007.html

As detailed in commit 7e64a050fb, it is
difficult to utilize the upstream patches directly, so a number of
patches include changes to generated files so that we don't need invoke
the gentpl.py script.

In addition to the security fixes, these required patches has been
backported:

  f76a27996 efi: Make shim_lock GUID and protocol type public
  04ae030d0 efi: Return grub_efi_status_t from grub_efi_get_variable()
  ac5c93675 efi: Add a function to read EFI variables with attributes
  d7e54b2e5 efi: Add secure boot detection

The following security issues are fixed:

CVE-2020-14372 grub2: The acpi command allows privileged user to load crafted
               ACPI tables when Secure Boot is enabled
CWE-184
7.5/CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:H/PR:H/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:H/A:H

GRUB2 enables the use of the command acpi even when Secure Boot is signaled by
the firmware. An attacker with local root privileges to can drop a small SSDT
in /boot/efi and modify grub.cfg to instruct grub to load said SSDT. The SSDT
then gets run by the kernel and it overwrites the kernel lock down configuration
enabling the attacker to load unsigned kernel modules and kexec unsigned code.

Reported-by: Máté Kukri

*******************************************************************************

CVE-2020-25632 grub2: Use-after-free in rmmod command
CWE-416
7.5/CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:H/PR:H/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:H/A:H

The rmmod implementation for GRUB2 is flawed, allowing an attacker to unload
a module used as dependency without checking if any other dependent module is
still loaded. This leads to an use-after-free scenario possibly allowing an
attacker to execute arbitrary code and by-pass Secure Boot protections.

Reported-by: Chris Coulson (Canonical)

*******************************************************************************

CVE-2020-25647 grub2: Out-of-bound write in grub_usb_device_initialize()
CWE-787
6.9/CVSS:3.1/AV:P/AC:H/PR:H/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:H/A:H

grub_usb_device_initialize() is called to handle USB device initialization. It
reads out the descriptors it needs from the USB device and uses that data to
fill in some USB data structures. grub_usb_device_initialize() performs very
little bounds checking and simply assumes the USB device provides sane values.
This behavior can trigger memory corruption. If properly exploited, this would
lead to arbitrary code execution allowing the attacker to by-pass Secure Boot
mechanism.

Reported-by: Joseph Tartaro (IOActive) and Ilja van Sprundel (IOActive)

*******************************************************************************

CVE-2020-27749 grub2: Stack buffer overflow in grub_parser_split_cmdline
CWE-121
7.5/CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:H/PR:H/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:H/A:H

grub_parser_split_cmdline() expands variable names present in the supplied
command line in to their corresponding variable contents and uses a 1kB stack
buffer for temporary storage without sufficient bounds checking. If the
function is called with a command line that references a variable with a
sufficiently large payload, it is possible to overflow the stack buffer,
corrupt the stack frame and control execution. An attacker may use this to
circumvent Secure Boot protections.

Reported-by: Chris Coulson (Canonical)

*******************************************************************************

CVE-2020-27779 grub2: The cutmem command allows privileged user to remove
               memory regions when Secure Boot is enabled
CWE-285
7.5/CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:H/PR:H/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:H/A:H

The GRUB2's cutmem command does not honor Secure Boot locking. This allows an
privileged attacker to remove address ranges from memory creating an
opportunity to circumvent Secure Boot protections after proper triage about
grub's memory layout.

Reported-by: Teddy Reed

*******************************************************************************

CVE-2021-3418 - grub2: GRUB 2.05 reintroduced CVE-2020-15705
CWE-281
6.4/CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:H/PR:H/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H

The GRUB2 upstream reintroduced the CVE-2020-15705. This refers to a distro
specific flaw which made upstream in the mentioned version.

If certificates that signed GRUB2 are installed into db, GRUB2 can be booted
directly. It will then boot any kernel without signature validation. The booted
kernel will think it was booted in Secure Boot mode and will implement lock
down, yet it could have been tampered.

This flaw only affects upstream and distributions using the shim_lock verifier.

Reported-by: Dimitri John Ledkov (Canonical)

*******************************************************************************

CVE-2021-20225 grub2: Heap out-of-bounds write in short form option parser
CWE-787
7.5/CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:H/PR:H/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:H/A:H

The option parser in GRUB2 allows an attacker to write past the end of
a heap-allocated buffer by calling certain commands with a large number
of specific short forms of options.

Reported-by: Daniel Axtens (IBM)

*******************************************************************************

CVE-2021-20233 grub2: Heap out-of-bound write due to mis-calculation of
               space required for quoting
CWE-787
7.5/CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:H/PR:H/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:H/A:H

There's a flaw on GRUB2 menu rendering code setparam_prefix() in the menu
rendering code performs a length calculation on the assumption that expressing
a quoted single quote will require 3 characters, while it actually requires
4 characters. This allow an attacker to corrupt memory by one byte for each
quote in the input.

Reported-by: Daniel Axtens (IBM)

*******************************************************************************

Signed-off-by: Stefan Sørensen <stefan.sorensen@spectralink.com>
Signed-off-by: Yann E. MORIN <yann.morin.1998@free.fr>
2021-03-14 08:24:24 +01:00

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From 133d73079c5771bbf3d8311281b6772846357ec1 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Chris Coulson <chris.coulson@canonical.com>
Date: Tue, 1 Dec 2020 23:03:39 +0000
Subject: [PATCH] kern/efi: Add initial stack protector implementation
It works only on UEFI platforms but can be quite easily extended to
others architectures and platforms if needed.
Signed-off-by: Chris Coulson <chris.coulson@canonical.com>
Signed-off-by: Daniel Kiper <daniel.kiper@oracle.com>
Reviewed-by: Marco A Benatto <mbenatto@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Javier Martinez Canillas <javierm@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Stefan Sørensen <stefan.sorensen@spectralink.com>
---
acinclude.m4 | 38 ++++++++++++++++-
configure | 97 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++---
configure.ac | 44 ++++++++++++++++---
grub-core/Makefile.am | 1 +
grub-core/Makefile.in | 1 +
grub-core/kern/efi/init.c | 54 +++++++++++++++++++++++
include/grub/efi/api.h | 19 +++++++++
include/grub/stack_protector.h | 30 +++++++++++++
po/POTFILES.in | 1 +
9 files changed, 272 insertions(+), 13 deletions(-)
create mode 100644 include/grub/stack_protector.h
diff --git a/acinclude.m4 b/acinclude.m4
index 78cdf6e..6e14bb5 100644
--- a/acinclude.m4
+++ b/acinclude.m4
@@ -305,9 +305,9 @@ fi
])
-dnl Check if the C compiler supports `-fstack-protector'.
+dnl Check if the C compiler supports the stack protector
AC_DEFUN([grub_CHECK_STACK_PROTECTOR],[
-[# Smashing stack protector.
+[# Stack smashing protector.
ssp_possible=yes]
AC_MSG_CHECKING([whether `$CC' accepts `-fstack-protector'])
# Is this a reliable test case?
@@ -324,6 +324,40 @@ else
ssp_possible=no]
AC_MSG_RESULT([no])
[fi]
+[# Strong stack smashing protector.
+ssp_strong_possible=yes]
+AC_MSG_CHECKING([whether `$CC' accepts `-fstack-protector-strong'])
+# Is this a reliable test case?
+AC_LANG_CONFTEST([AC_LANG_SOURCE([[
+void foo (void) { volatile char a[8]; a[3]; }
+]])])
+[# `$CC -c -o ...' might not be portable. But, oh, well... Is calling
+# `ac_compile' like this correct, after all?
+if eval "$ac_compile -S -fstack-protector-strong -o conftest.s" 2> /dev/null; then]
+ AC_MSG_RESULT([yes])
+ [# Should we clear up other files as well, having called `AC_LANG_CONFTEST'?
+ rm -f conftest.s
+else
+ ssp_strong_possible=no]
+ AC_MSG_RESULT([no])
+[fi]
+[# Global stack smashing protector.
+ssp_global_possible=yes]
+AC_MSG_CHECKING([whether `$CC' accepts `-mstack-protector-guard=global'])
+# Is this a reliable test case?
+AC_LANG_CONFTEST([AC_LANG_SOURCE([[
+void foo (void) { volatile char a[8]; a[3]; }
+]])])
+[# `$CC -c -o ...' might not be portable. But, oh, well... Is calling
+# `ac_compile' like this correct, after all?
+if eval "$ac_compile -S -fstack-protector -mstack-protector-guard=global -o conftest.s" 2> /dev/null; then]
+ AC_MSG_RESULT([yes])
+ [# Should we clear up other files as well, having called `AC_LANG_CONFTEST'?
+ rm -f conftest.s
+else
+ ssp_global_possible=no]
+ AC_MSG_RESULT([no])
+[fi]
])
dnl Check if the C compiler supports `-mstack-arg-probe' (Cygwin).
diff --git a/configure b/configure
index 9290ae8..973f702 100755
--- a/configure
+++ b/configure
@@ -1778,6 +1778,7 @@ with_libintl_prefix
with_libpth_prefix
with_included_regex
enable_efiemu
+enable_stack_protector
enable_mm_debug
enable_cache_stats
enable_boot_time
@@ -2459,6 +2460,8 @@ Optional Features:
--disable-rpath do not hardcode runtime library paths
--enable-efiemu build and install the efiemu runtimes
(default=guessed)
+ --enable-stack-protector
+ enable the stack protector
--enable-mm-debug include memory manager debugging
--enable-cache-stats enable disk cache statistics collection
--enable-boot-time enable boot time statistics collection
@@ -32348,9 +32351,9 @@ fi
CFLAGS="$TARGET_CFLAGS"
-# Smashing stack protector.
+# Stack smashing protector.
-# Smashing stack protector.
+# Stack smashing protector.
ssp_possible=yes
{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: checking whether \`$CC' accepts \`-fstack-protector'" >&5
$as_echo_n "checking whether \`$CC' accepts \`-fstack-protector'... " >&6; }
@@ -32373,11 +32376,88 @@ else
{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: no" >&5
$as_echo "no" >&6; }
fi
+# Strong stack smashing protector.
+ssp_strong_possible=yes
+{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: checking whether \`$CC' accepts \`-fstack-protector-strong'" >&5
+$as_echo_n "checking whether \`$CC' accepts \`-fstack-protector-strong'... " >&6; }
+# Is this a reliable test case?
+cat confdefs.h - <<_ACEOF >conftest.$ac_ext
+/* end confdefs.h. */
-# Need that, because some distributions ship compilers that include
-# `-fstack-protector' in the default specs.
-if test "x$ssp_possible" = xyes; then
- TARGET_CFLAGS="$TARGET_CFLAGS -fno-stack-protector"
+void foo (void) { volatile char a[8]; a[3]; }
+
+_ACEOF
+# `$CC -c -o ...' might not be portable. But, oh, well... Is calling
+# `ac_compile' like this correct, after all?
+if eval "$ac_compile -S -fstack-protector-strong -o conftest.s" 2> /dev/null; then
+ { $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: yes" >&5
+$as_echo "yes" >&6; }
+ # Should we clear up other files as well, having called `AC_LANG_CONFTEST'?
+ rm -f conftest.s
+else
+ ssp_strong_possible=no
+ { $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: no" >&5
+$as_echo "no" >&6; }
+fi
+# Global stack smashing protector.
+ssp_global_possible=yes
+{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: checking whether \`$CC' accepts \`-mstack-protector-guard=global'" >&5
+$as_echo_n "checking whether \`$CC' accepts \`-mstack-protector-guard=global'... " >&6; }
+# Is this a reliable test case?
+cat confdefs.h - <<_ACEOF >conftest.$ac_ext
+/* end confdefs.h. */
+
+void foo (void) { volatile char a[8]; a[3]; }
+
+_ACEOF
+# `$CC -c -o ...' might not be portable. But, oh, well... Is calling
+# `ac_compile' like this correct, after all?
+if eval "$ac_compile -S -fstack-protector -mstack-protector-guard=global -o conftest.s" 2> /dev/null; then
+ { $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: yes" >&5
+$as_echo "yes" >&6; }
+ # Should we clear up other files as well, having called `AC_LANG_CONFTEST'?
+ rm -f conftest.s
+else
+ ssp_global_possible=no
+ { $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: no" >&5
+$as_echo "no" >&6; }
+fi
+
+# Check whether --enable-stack-protector was given.
+if test "${enable_stack_protector+set}" = set; then :
+ enableval=$enable_stack_protector;
+else
+ enable_stack_protector=no
+fi
+
+if test "x$enable_stack_protector" = xno; then
+ if test "x$ssp_possible" = xyes; then
+ # Need that, because some distributions ship compilers that include
+ # `-fstack-protector' in the default specs.
+ TARGET_CFLAGS="$TARGET_CFLAGS -fno-stack-protector"
+ fi
+elif test "x$platform" != xefi; then
+ as_fn_error $? "--enable-stack-protector is only supported on EFI platforms" "$LINENO" 5
+elif test "x$ssp_global_possible" != xyes; then
+ as_fn_error $? "--enable-stack-protector is not supported (compiler doesn't support -mstack-protector-guard=global)" "$LINENO" 5
+else
+ TARGET_CFLAGS="$TARGET_CFLAGS -mstack-protector-guard=global"
+ if test "x$enable_stack_protector" = xyes; then
+ if test "x$ssp_possible" != xyes; then
+ as_fn_error $? "--enable-stack-protector is not supported (compiler doesn't support -fstack-protector)" "$LINENO" 5
+ fi
+ TARGET_CFLAGS="$TARGET_CFLAGS -fstack-protector"
+ elif test "x$enable_stack_protector" = xstrong; then
+ if test "x$ssp_strong_possible" != xyes; then
+ as_fn_error $? "--enable-stack-protector=strong is not supported (compiler doesn't support -fstack-protector-strong)" "$LINENO" 5
+ fi
+ TARGET_CFLAGS="$TARGET_CFLAGS -fstack-protector-strong"
+ else
+ # Note, -fstack-protector-all requires that the protector is disabled for
+ # functions that appear in the call stack when the canary is initialized.
+ as_fn_error $? "invalid value $enable_stack_protector for --enable-stack-protector" "$LINENO" 5
+ fi
+ TARGET_CPPFLAGS="$TARGET_CPPFLAGS -DGRUB_STACK_PROTECTOR=1"
fi
CFLAGS="$TARGET_CFLAGS"
@@ -37054,5 +37134,10 @@ echo "Without liblzma (no support for XZ-compressed mips images) ($liblzma_excus
else
echo "With liblzma from $LIBLZMA (support for XZ-compressed mips images)"
fi
+if test "x$enable_stack_protector" != xno; then
+echo "With stack smashing protector: Yes"
+else
+echo "With stack smashing protector: No"
+fi
echo "*******************************************************"
diff --git a/configure.ac b/configure.ac
index 7656f24..bb6b02a 100644
--- a/configure.ac
+++ b/configure.ac
@@ -1285,12 +1285,41 @@ fi]
CFLAGS="$TARGET_CFLAGS"
-# Smashing stack protector.
+# Stack smashing protector.
grub_CHECK_STACK_PROTECTOR
-# Need that, because some distributions ship compilers that include
-# `-fstack-protector' in the default specs.
-if test "x$ssp_possible" = xyes; then
- TARGET_CFLAGS="$TARGET_CFLAGS -fno-stack-protector"
+AC_ARG_ENABLE([stack-protector],
+ AS_HELP_STRING([--enable-stack-protector],
+ [enable the stack protector]),
+ [],
+ [enable_stack_protector=no])
+if test "x$enable_stack_protector" = xno; then
+ if test "x$ssp_possible" = xyes; then
+ # Need that, because some distributions ship compilers that include
+ # `-fstack-protector' in the default specs.
+ TARGET_CFLAGS="$TARGET_CFLAGS -fno-stack-protector"
+ fi
+elif test "x$platform" != xefi; then
+ AC_MSG_ERROR([--enable-stack-protector is only supported on EFI platforms])
+elif test "x$ssp_global_possible" != xyes; then
+ AC_MSG_ERROR([--enable-stack-protector is not supported (compiler doesn't support -mstack-protector-guard=global)])
+else
+ TARGET_CFLAGS="$TARGET_CFLAGS -mstack-protector-guard=global"
+ if test "x$enable_stack_protector" = xyes; then
+ if test "x$ssp_possible" != xyes; then
+ AC_MSG_ERROR([--enable-stack-protector is not supported (compiler doesn't support -fstack-protector)])
+ fi
+ TARGET_CFLAGS="$TARGET_CFLAGS -fstack-protector"
+ elif test "x$enable_stack_protector" = xstrong; then
+ if test "x$ssp_strong_possible" != xyes; then
+ AC_MSG_ERROR([--enable-stack-protector=strong is not supported (compiler doesn't support -fstack-protector-strong)])
+ fi
+ TARGET_CFLAGS="$TARGET_CFLAGS -fstack-protector-strong"
+ else
+ # Note, -fstack-protector-all requires that the protector is disabled for
+ # functions that appear in the call stack when the canary is initialized.
+ AC_MSG_ERROR([invalid value $enable_stack_protector for --enable-stack-protector])
+ fi
+ TARGET_CPPFLAGS="$TARGET_CPPFLAGS -DGRUB_STACK_PROTECTOR=1"
fi
CFLAGS="$TARGET_CFLAGS"
@@ -2103,5 +2132,10 @@ echo "Without liblzma (no support for XZ-compressed mips images) ($liblzma_excus
else
echo "With liblzma from $LIBLZMA (support for XZ-compressed mips images)"
fi
+if test "x$enable_stack_protector" != xno; then
+echo "With stack smashing protector: Yes"
+else
+echo "With stack smashing protector: No"
+fi
echo "*******************************************************"
]
diff --git a/grub-core/Makefile.am b/grub-core/Makefile.am
index 30e23ad..ee88e44 100644
--- a/grub-core/Makefile.am
+++ b/grub-core/Makefile.am
@@ -90,6 +90,7 @@ endif
KERNEL_HEADER_FILES += $(top_srcdir)/include/grub/mm.h
KERNEL_HEADER_FILES += $(top_srcdir)/include/grub/parser.h
KERNEL_HEADER_FILES += $(top_srcdir)/include/grub/partition.h
+KERNEL_HEADER_FILES += $(top_srcdir)/include/grub/stack_protector.h
KERNEL_HEADER_FILES += $(top_srcdir)/include/grub/term.h
KERNEL_HEADER_FILES += $(top_srcdir)/include/grub/time.h
KERNEL_HEADER_FILES += $(top_srcdir)/include/grub/verify.h
diff --git a/grub-core/Makefile.in b/grub-core/Makefile.in
index 1f8133b..50c70b5 100644
--- a/grub-core/Makefile.in
+++ b/grub-core/Makefile.in
@@ -16425,6 +16425,7 @@ KERNEL_HEADER_FILES = $(top_srcdir)/include/grub/cache.h \
$(am__append_5795) $(top_srcdir)/include/grub/mm.h \
$(top_srcdir)/include/grub/parser.h \
$(top_srcdir)/include/grub/partition.h \
+ $(top_srcdir)/include/grub/stack_protector.h \
$(top_srcdir)/include/grub/term.h \
$(top_srcdir)/include/grub/time.h \
$(top_srcdir)/include/grub/verify.h \
diff --git a/grub-core/kern/efi/init.c b/grub-core/kern/efi/init.c
index 1333465..7facacf 100644
--- a/grub-core/kern/efi/init.c
+++ b/grub-core/kern/efi/init.c
@@ -27,6 +27,58 @@
#include <grub/env.h>
#include <grub/mm.h>
#include <grub/kernel.h>
+#include <grub/stack_protector.h>
+
+#ifdef GRUB_STACK_PROTECTOR
+
+static grub_efi_guid_t rng_protocol_guid = GRUB_EFI_RNG_PROTOCOL_GUID;
+
+/*
+ * Don't put this on grub_efi_init()'s local stack to avoid it
+ * getting a stack check.
+ */
+static grub_efi_uint8_t stack_chk_guard_buf[32];
+
+grub_addr_t __stack_chk_guard;
+
+void __attribute__ ((noreturn))
+__stack_chk_fail (void)
+{
+ /*
+ * Assume it's not safe to call into EFI Boot Services. Sorry, that
+ * means no console message here.
+ */
+ do
+ {
+ /* Do not optimize out the loop. */
+ asm volatile ("");
+ }
+ while (1);
+}
+
+static void
+stack_protector_init (void)
+{
+ grub_efi_rng_protocol_t *rng;
+
+ /* Set up the stack canary. Make errors here non-fatal for now. */
+ rng = grub_efi_locate_protocol (&rng_protocol_guid, NULL);
+ if (rng != NULL)
+ {
+ grub_efi_status_t status;
+
+ status = efi_call_4 (rng->get_rng, rng, NULL, sizeof (stack_chk_guard_buf),
+ stack_chk_guard_buf);
+ if (status == GRUB_EFI_SUCCESS)
+ grub_memcpy (&__stack_chk_guard, stack_chk_guard_buf, sizeof (__stack_chk_guard));
+ }
+}
+#else
+static void
+stack_protector_init (void)
+{
+}
+#endif
grub_addr_t grub_modbase;
@@ -38,6 +90,8 @@ grub_efi_init (void)
messages. */
grub_console_init ();
+ stack_protector_init ();
+
/* Initialize the memory management system. */
grub_efi_mm_init ();
diff --git a/include/grub/efi/api.h b/include/grub/efi/api.h
index 13e5715..5517f7e 100644
--- a/include/grub/efi/api.h
+++ b/include/grub/efi/api.h
@@ -339,6 +339,11 @@
{ 0xab, 0xb6, 0x3d, 0xd8, 0x10, 0xdd, 0x8b, 0x23 } \
}
+#define GRUB_EFI_RNG_PROTOCOL_GUID \
+ { 0x3152bca5, 0xeade, 0x433d, \
+ { 0x86, 0x2e, 0xc0, 0x1c, 0xdc, 0x29, 0x1f, 0x44 } \
+ }
+
struct grub_efi_sal_system_table
{
grub_uint32_t signature;
@@ -1700,6 +1705,20 @@ struct grub_efi_shim_lock_protocol
};
typedef struct grub_efi_shim_lock_protocol grub_efi_shim_lock_protocol_t;
+typedef grub_efi_guid_t grub_efi_rng_algorithm_t;
+
+struct grub_efi_rng_protocol
+{
+ grub_efi_status_t (*get_info) (struct grub_efi_rng_protocol *this,
+ grub_efi_uintn_t *rng_algorithm_list_size,
+ grub_efi_rng_algorithm_t *rng_algorithm_list);
+ grub_efi_status_t (*get_rng) (struct grub_efi_rng_protocol *this,
+ grub_efi_rng_algorithm_t *rng_algorithm,
+ grub_efi_uintn_t rng_value_length,
+ grub_efi_uint8_t *rng_value);
+};
+typedef struct grub_efi_rng_protocol grub_efi_rng_protocol_t;
+
#if (GRUB_TARGET_SIZEOF_VOID_P == 4) || defined (__ia64__) \
|| defined (__aarch64__) || defined (__MINGW64__) || defined (__CYGWIN__) \
|| defined(__riscv)
diff --git a/include/grub/stack_protector.h b/include/grub/stack_protector.h
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..c88dc00
--- /dev/null
+++ b/include/grub/stack_protector.h
@@ -0,0 +1,30 @@
+/*
+ * GRUB -- GRand Unified Bootloader
+ * Copyright (C) 2021 Free Software Foundation, Inc.
+ *
+ * GRUB is free software: you can redistribute it and/or modify
+ * it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as published by
+ * the Free Software Foundation, either version 3 of the License, or
+ * (at your option) any later version.
+ *
+ * GRUB is distributed in the hope that it will be useful,
+ * but WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of
+ * MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE. See the
+ * GNU General Public License for more details.
+ *
+ * You should have received a copy of the GNU General Public License
+ * along with GRUB. If not, see <http://www.gnu.org/licenses/>.
+ */
+
+#ifndef GRUB_STACK_PROTECTOR_H
+#define GRUB_STACK_PROTECTOR_H 1
+
+#include <grub/symbol.h>
+#include <grub/types.h>
+
+#ifdef GRUB_STACK_PROTECTOR
+extern grub_addr_t EXPORT_VAR (__stack_chk_guard);
+extern void __attribute__ ((noreturn)) EXPORT_FUNC (__stack_chk_fail) (void);
+#endif
+
+#endif /* GRUB_STACK_PROTECTOR_H */
diff --git a/po/POTFILES.in b/po/POTFILES.in
index 7753ab4..ef42c7d 100644
--- a/po/POTFILES.in
+++ b/po/POTFILES.in
@@ -1319,6 +1319,7 @@
./include/grub/sparc64/time.h
./include/grub/sparc64/types.h
./include/grub/speaker.h
+./include/grub/stack_protector.h
./include/grub/symbol.h
./include/grub/syslinux_parse.h
./include/grub/term.h
--
2.14.2
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