[Medium] A fix was added, but still under review for completeness, for a
Bleichenbacher style attack, leading to being able to decrypt a saved
TLS connection and potentially forge a signature after probing with a
large number of trial connections. This issue is around RSA decryption
and affects static RSA cipher suites on the server side, which are not
recommended to be used and are off by default. Static RSA cipher suites
were also removed from the TLS 1.3 protocol and only present in TLS 1.2
and lower. All padding versions of RSA decrypt are affected since the
code under review is outside of the padding processing. Information
about the private keys is NOT compromised in affected code. It's
recommended to disable static RSA cipher suites and update the version
of wolfSSL used if using RSA private decryption alone outside of TLS.
https://github.com/wolfSSL/wolfssl/releases/tag/v5.6.4-stable
Signed-off-by: Fabrice Fontaine <fontaine.fabrice@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Peter Korsgaard <peter@korsgaard.com>
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