- Remove second patch (already in version)
- Fix a missing error detection in ECJPAKE. This could have caused a
predictable shared secret if a hardware accelerator failed and the
other side of the key exchange had a similar bug.
- When writing a private EC key, use a constant size for the private
value, as specified in RFC 5915. Previously, the value was written as
an ASN.1 INTEGER, which caused the size of the key to leak about 1 bit
of information on average and could cause the value to be 1 byte too
large for the output buffer.
- The deterministic ECDSA calculation reused the scheme's HMAC-DRBG to
implement blinding. Because of this for the same key and message the
same blinding value was generated. This reduced the effectiveness of
the countermeasure and leaked information about the private key
through side channels. Reported by Jack Lloyd.
Signed-off-by: Fabrice Fontaine <fontaine.fabrice@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Peter Korsgaard <peter@korsgaard.com>
6bab018ee8