6e3f7fbc07
The vulnerability allows a malicious container to (with minimal user interaction) overwrite the host runc binary and thus gain root-level code execution on the host. The level of user interaction is being able to run any command (it doesn't matter if the command is not attacker-controlled) as root within a container in either of these contexts: * Creating a new container using an attacker-controlled image. * Attaching (docker exec) into an existing container which the attacker had previous write access to. For more details, see the advisory: https://www.openwall.com/lists/oss-security/2019/02/11/2 The fix for this issue uses fexecve(3), which isn't available on uClibc, so add a dependency on !uclibc to runc and propagate to the reverse dependencies (containerd/docker-engine). Signed-off-by: Peter Korsgaard <peter@korsgaard.com> |
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0001-nsenter-clone-proc-self-exe-to-avoid-exposing-host-b.patch | ||
Config.in | ||
runc.hash | ||
runc.mk |