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kumquat-buildroot/boot/grub2/grub2.mk
Stefan Sørensen 1bad507220 boot/grub2: Backport 2021/03/02 securify fixes 
Details: https://lists.gnu.org/archive/html/grub-devel/2021-03/msg00007.html

As detailed in commit 7e64a050fb, it is
difficult to utilize the upstream patches directly, so a number of
patches include changes to generated files so that we don't need invoke
the gentpl.py script.

In addition to the security fixes, these required patches has been
backported:

  f76a27996 efi: Make shim_lock GUID and protocol type public
  04ae030d0 efi: Return grub_efi_status_t from grub_efi_get_variable()
  ac5c93675 efi: Add a function to read EFI variables with attributes
  d7e54b2e5 efi: Add secure boot detection

The following security issues are fixed:

CVE-2020-14372 grub2: The acpi command allows privileged user to load crafted
               ACPI tables when Secure Boot is enabled
CWE-184
7.5/CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:H/PR:H/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:H/A:H

GRUB2 enables the use of the command acpi even when Secure Boot is signaled by
the firmware. An attacker with local root privileges to can drop a small SSDT
in /boot/efi and modify grub.cfg to instruct grub to load said SSDT. The SSDT
then gets run by the kernel and it overwrites the kernel lock down configuration
enabling the attacker to load unsigned kernel modules and kexec unsigned code.

Reported-by: Máté Kukri

*******************************************************************************

CVE-2020-25632 grub2: Use-after-free in rmmod command
CWE-416
7.5/CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:H/PR:H/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:H/A:H

The rmmod implementation for GRUB2 is flawed, allowing an attacker to unload
a module used as dependency without checking if any other dependent module is
still loaded. This leads to an use-after-free scenario possibly allowing an
attacker to execute arbitrary code and by-pass Secure Boot protections.

Reported-by: Chris Coulson (Canonical)

*******************************************************************************

CVE-2020-25647 grub2: Out-of-bound write in grub_usb_device_initialize()
CWE-787
6.9/CVSS:3.1/AV:P/AC:H/PR:H/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:H/A:H

grub_usb_device_initialize() is called to handle USB device initialization. It
reads out the descriptors it needs from the USB device and uses that data to
fill in some USB data structures. grub_usb_device_initialize() performs very
little bounds checking and simply assumes the USB device provides sane values.
This behavior can trigger memory corruption. If properly exploited, this would
lead to arbitrary code execution allowing the attacker to by-pass Secure Boot
mechanism.

Reported-by: Joseph Tartaro (IOActive) and Ilja van Sprundel (IOActive)

*******************************************************************************

CVE-2020-27749 grub2: Stack buffer overflow in grub_parser_split_cmdline
CWE-121
7.5/CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:H/PR:H/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:H/A:H

grub_parser_split_cmdline() expands variable names present in the supplied
command line in to their corresponding variable contents and uses a 1kB stack
buffer for temporary storage without sufficient bounds checking. If the
function is called with a command line that references a variable with a
sufficiently large payload, it is possible to overflow the stack buffer,
corrupt the stack frame and control execution. An attacker may use this to
circumvent Secure Boot protections.

Reported-by: Chris Coulson (Canonical)

*******************************************************************************

CVE-2020-27779 grub2: The cutmem command allows privileged user to remove
               memory regions when Secure Boot is enabled
CWE-285
7.5/CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:H/PR:H/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:H/A:H

The GRUB2's cutmem command does not honor Secure Boot locking. This allows an
privileged attacker to remove address ranges from memory creating an
opportunity to circumvent Secure Boot protections after proper triage about
grub's memory layout.

Reported-by: Teddy Reed

*******************************************************************************

CVE-2021-3418 - grub2: GRUB 2.05 reintroduced CVE-2020-15705
CWE-281
6.4/CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:H/PR:H/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H

The GRUB2 upstream reintroduced the CVE-2020-15705. This refers to a distro
specific flaw which made upstream in the mentioned version.

If certificates that signed GRUB2 are installed into db, GRUB2 can be booted
directly. It will then boot any kernel without signature validation. The booted
kernel will think it was booted in Secure Boot mode and will implement lock
down, yet it could have been tampered.

This flaw only affects upstream and distributions using the shim_lock verifier.

Reported-by: Dimitri John Ledkov (Canonical)

*******************************************************************************

CVE-2021-20225 grub2: Heap out-of-bounds write in short form option parser
CWE-787
7.5/CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:H/PR:H/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:H/A:H

The option parser in GRUB2 allows an attacker to write past the end of
a heap-allocated buffer by calling certain commands with a large number
of specific short forms of options.

Reported-by: Daniel Axtens (IBM)

*******************************************************************************

CVE-2021-20233 grub2: Heap out-of-bound write due to mis-calculation of
               space required for quoting
CWE-787
7.5/CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:H/PR:H/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:H/A:H

There's a flaw on GRUB2 menu rendering code setparam_prefix() in the menu
rendering code performs a length calculation on the assumption that expressing
a quoted single quote will require 3 characters, while it actually requires
4 characters. This allow an attacker to corrupt memory by one byte for each
quote in the input.

Reported-by: Daniel Axtens (IBM)

*******************************************************************************

Signed-off-by: Stefan Sørensen <stefan.sorensen@spectralink.com>
Signed-off-by: Yann E. MORIN <yann.morin.1998@free.fr>
2021-03-14 08:24:24 +01:00

167 lines
5.2 KiB
Makefile
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################################################################################
#
# grub2
#
################################################################################
GRUB2_VERSION = 2.04
GRUB2_SITE = http://ftp.gnu.org/gnu/grub
GRUB2_SOURCE = grub-$(GRUB2_VERSION).tar.xz
GRUB2_LICENSE = GPL-3.0+
GRUB2_LICENSE_FILES = COPYING
GRUB2_DEPENDENCIES = host-bison host-flex host-grub2
HOST_GRUB2_DEPENDENCIES = host-bison host-flex
GRUB2_INSTALL_IMAGES = YES
# 0001-build-Fix-GRUB-i386-pc-build-with-Ubuntu-gcc.patch and 2021/03/02
# security fixes (patches 0029-0149)
define GRUB2_AVOID_AUTORECONF
$(Q)touch $(@D)/Makefile.util.am
$(Q)touch $(@D)/aclocal.m4
$(Q)touch $(@D)/Makefile.in
$(Q)touch $(@D)/configure
endef
GRUB2_POST_PATCH_HOOKS += GRUB2_AVOID_AUTORECONF
HOST_GRUB2_POST_PATCH_HOOKS += GRUB2_AVOID_AUTORECONF
# 0002-yylex-Make-lexer-fatal-errors-actually-be-fatal.patch
GRUB2_IGNORE_CVES += CVE-2020-10713
# 0005-calloc-Use-calloc-at-most-places.patch
GRUB2_IGNORE_CVES += CVE-2020-14308
# 0006-malloc-Use-overflow-checking-primitives-where-we-do-.patch
GRUB2_IGNORE_CVES += CVE-2020-14309 CVE-2020-14310 CVE-2020-14311
# 0019-script-Avoid-a-use-after-free-when-redefining-a-func.patch
GRUB2_IGNORE_CVES += CVE-2020-15706
# 0028-linux-Fix-integer-overflows-in-initrd-size-handling.patch
GRUB2_IGNORE_CVES += CVE-2020-15707
# 2021/03/02 security fixes - patches 0029-0149
GRUB2_IGNORE_CVES += CVE-2020-25632 CVE-2020-25647 CVE-2020-27749 \
CVE-2020-27779 CVE-2021-3418 CVE-2021-20225 CVE-2021-20233
ifeq ($(BR2_TARGET_GRUB2_INSTALL_TOOLS),y)
GRUB2_INSTALL_TARGET = YES
else
GRUB2_INSTALL_TARGET = NO
endif
GRUB2_CPE_ID_VENDOR = gnu
GRUB2_BUILTIN_MODULES = $(call qstrip,$(BR2_TARGET_GRUB2_BUILTIN_MODULES))
GRUB2_BUILTIN_CONFIG = $(call qstrip,$(BR2_TARGET_GRUB2_BUILTIN_CONFIG))
GRUB2_BOOT_PARTITION = $(call qstrip,$(BR2_TARGET_GRUB2_BOOT_PARTITION))
ifeq ($(BR2_TARGET_GRUB2_I386_PC),y)
GRUB2_IMAGE = $(BINARIES_DIR)/grub.img
GRUB2_CFG = $(TARGET_DIR)/boot/grub/grub.cfg
GRUB2_PREFIX = ($(GRUB2_BOOT_PARTITION))/boot/grub
GRUB2_TUPLE = i386-pc
GRUB2_TARGET = i386
GRUB2_PLATFORM = pc
else ifeq ($(BR2_TARGET_GRUB2_I386_EFI),y)
GRUB2_IMAGE = $(BINARIES_DIR)/efi-part/EFI/BOOT/bootia32.efi
GRUB2_CFG = $(BINARIES_DIR)/efi-part/EFI/BOOT/grub.cfg
GRUB2_PREFIX = /EFI/BOOT
GRUB2_TUPLE = i386-efi
GRUB2_TARGET = i386
GRUB2_PLATFORM = efi
else ifeq ($(BR2_TARGET_GRUB2_X86_64_EFI),y)
GRUB2_IMAGE = $(BINARIES_DIR)/efi-part/EFI/BOOT/bootx64.efi
GRUB2_CFG = $(BINARIES_DIR)/efi-part/EFI/BOOT/grub.cfg
GRUB2_PREFIX = /EFI/BOOT
GRUB2_TUPLE = x86_64-efi
GRUB2_TARGET = x86_64
GRUB2_PLATFORM = efi
else ifeq ($(BR2_TARGET_GRUB2_ARM_UBOOT),y)
GRUB2_IMAGE = $(BINARIES_DIR)/boot-part/grub/grub.img
GRUB2_CFG = $(BINARIES_DIR)/boot-part/grub/grub.cfg
GRUB2_PREFIX = ($(GRUB2_BOOT_PARTITION))/boot/grub
GRUB2_TUPLE = arm-uboot
GRUB2_TARGET = arm
GRUB2_PLATFORM = uboot
else ifeq ($(BR2_TARGET_GRUB2_ARM_EFI),y)
GRUB2_IMAGE = $(BINARIES_DIR)/efi-part/EFI/BOOT/bootarm.efi
GRUB2_CFG = $(BINARIES_DIR)/efi-part/EFI/BOOT/grub.cfg
GRUB2_PREFIX = /EFI/BOOT
GRUB2_TUPLE = arm-efi
GRUB2_TARGET = arm
GRUB2_PLATFORM = efi
else ifeq ($(BR2_TARGET_GRUB2_ARM64_EFI),y)
GRUB2_IMAGE = $(BINARIES_DIR)/efi-part/EFI/BOOT/bootaa64.efi
GRUB2_CFG = $(BINARIES_DIR)/efi-part/EFI/BOOT/grub.cfg
GRUB2_PREFIX = /EFI/BOOT
GRUB2_TUPLE = arm64-efi
GRUB2_TARGET = aarch64
GRUB2_PLATFORM = efi
endif
# Grub2 is kind of special: it considers CC, LD and so on to be the
# tools to build the host programs and uses TARGET_CC, TARGET_CFLAGS,
# TARGET_CPPFLAGS, TARGET_LDFLAGS to build the bootloader itself.
#
# NOTE: TARGET_STRIP is overridden by !BR2_STRIP_strip, so always
# use the cross compile variant to ensure grub2 builds
HOST_GRUB2_CONF_ENV = \
CPP="$(HOSTCC) -E"
GRUB2_CONF_ENV = \
CPP="$(TARGET_CC) -E" \
TARGET_CC="$(TARGET_CC)" \
TARGET_CFLAGS="$(TARGET_CFLAGS)" \
TARGET_CPPFLAGS="$(TARGET_CPPFLAGS) -fno-stack-protector" \
TARGET_LDFLAGS="$(TARGET_LDFLAGS)" \
TARGET_NM="$(TARGET_NM)" \
TARGET_OBJCOPY="$(TARGET_OBJCOPY)" \
TARGET_STRIP="$(TARGET_CROSS)strip"
GRUB2_CONF_OPTS = \
--target=$(GRUB2_TARGET) \
--with-platform=$(GRUB2_PLATFORM) \
--prefix=/ \
--exec-prefix=/ \
--disable-grub-mkfont \
--enable-efiemu=no \
ac_cv_lib_lzma_lzma_code=no \
--enable-device-mapper=no \
--enable-libzfs=no \
--disable-werror
HOST_GRUB2_CONF_OPTS = \
--disable-grub-mkfont \
--enable-efiemu=no \
ac_cv_lib_lzma_lzma_code=no \
--enable-device-mapper=no \
--enable-libzfs=no \
--disable-werror
ifeq ($(BR2_TARGET_GRUB2_I386_PC),y)
define GRUB2_IMAGE_INSTALL_ELTORITO
cat $(HOST_DIR)/lib/grub/$(GRUB2_TUPLE)/cdboot.img $(GRUB2_IMAGE) > \
$(BINARIES_DIR)/grub-eltorito.img
endef
endif
define GRUB2_INSTALL_IMAGES_CMDS
mkdir -p $(dir $(GRUB2_IMAGE))
$(HOST_DIR)/usr/bin/grub-mkimage \
-d $(@D)/grub-core/ \
-O $(GRUB2_TUPLE) \
-o $(GRUB2_IMAGE) \
-p "$(GRUB2_PREFIX)" \
$(if $(GRUB2_BUILTIN_CONFIG),-c $(GRUB2_BUILTIN_CONFIG)) \
$(GRUB2_BUILTIN_MODULES)
mkdir -p $(dir $(GRUB2_CFG))
$(INSTALL) -D -m 0644 boot/grub2/grub.cfg $(GRUB2_CFG)
$(GRUB2_IMAGE_INSTALL_ELTORITO)
endef
ifeq ($(GRUB2_PLATFORM),efi)
define GRUB2_EFI_STARTUP_NSH
echo $(notdir $(GRUB2_IMAGE)) > \
$(BINARIES_DIR)/efi-part/startup.nsh
endef
GRUB2_POST_INSTALL_IMAGES_HOOKS += GRUB2_EFI_STARTUP_NSH
endif
$(eval $(autotools-package))
$(eval $(host-autotools-package))
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