Fix the following security vulnerabilities:
- [Low] Fault injection attack on RAM via Rowhammer leads to ECDSA key
disclosure. Users doing operations with private ECC keys such as
server side TLS connections and creating ECC signatures, who also
have hardware that could be targeted with a sophisticated Rowhammer
attack should update the version of wolfSSL and compile using the
macro WOLFSSL_CHECK_SIG_FAULTS.
- [Low] In wolfSSL version 5.3.0 if compiled with
--enable-session-ticket and the client has non-empty session cache,
with TLS 1.2 there is the possibility oàf a man in the middle passing
a large session ticket to the client and causing a crash due to an
invalid free. There is also the potential for a malicious TLS 1.3
server to crash a client in a similar manner except in TLS 1.3 it is
not susceptible to a man in the middle attack. Users on the client
side with –enable-session-ticket compiled in and using wolfSSL
version 5.3.0 should update their version of wolfSSL.
- [Low] If using wolfSSL_clear to reset a WOLFSSL object (vs the normal
wolfSSL_free/wolfSSL_new) it can result in runtime issues. This
exists with builds using the wolfSSL compatibility layer
(--enable-opnesslextra) and only when the application is making use
of wolfSSL_clear instead of SSL_free/SSL_new. In the case of a TLS
1.3 resumption, after continuing to use the WOLFSSH object after
having called wolfSSL_clear, an application could crash. It is
suggested that users calling wolfSSL_clear update the version of
wolfSSL used.
- Potential DoS attack on DTLS 1.2. In the case of receiving a
malicious plaintext handshake message at epoch 0 the connection will
enter an error state reporting a duplicate message. This affects both
server and client side. Users that have DTLS enabled and in use
should update their version of wolfSSL to mitigate the potential for
a DoS attack.
https://github.com/wolfSSL/wolfssl/releases/tag/v5.5.0-stable
Signed-off-by: Fabrice Fontaine <fontaine.fabrice@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Yann E. MORIN <yann.morin.1998@free.fr>