4de7e07e6e
Fixes the following security issues: CVE-2018-6767: A stack-based buffer over-read in the ParseRiffHeaderConfig function of cli/riff.c file of WavPack 5.1.0 allows a remote attacker to cause a denial-of-service attack or possibly have unspecified other impact via a maliciously crafted RF64 file. CVE-2018-7253: The ParseDsdiffHeaderConfig function of the cli/dsdiff.c file of WavPack 5.1.0 allows a remote attacker to cause a denial-of-service (heap-based buffer over-read) or possibly overwrite the heap via a maliciously crafted DSDIFF file. CVE-2018-7254: The ParseCaffHeaderConfig function of the cli/caff.c file of WavPack 5.1.0 allows a remote attacker to cause a denial-of-service (global buffer over-read), or possibly trigger a buffer overflow or incorrect memory allocation, via a maliciously crafted CAF file. Signed-off-by: Peter Korsgaard <peter@korsgaard.com>
39 lines
1.4 KiB
Diff
39 lines
1.4 KiB
Diff
From 36a24c7881427d2e1e4dc1cef58f19eee0d13aec Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
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From: David Bryant <david@wavpack.com>
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Date: Sat, 10 Feb 2018 16:01:39 -0800
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Subject: [PATCH] issue #28, do not overwrite heap on corrupt DSDIFF file
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Fixes CVE-2018-7253
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Signed-off-by: Peter Korsgaard <peter@korsgaard.com>
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---
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cli/dsdiff.c | 12 +++++++++++-
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1 file changed, 11 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
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diff --git a/cli/dsdiff.c b/cli/dsdiff.c
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index 410dc1c..c016df9 100644
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--- a/cli/dsdiff.c
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+++ b/cli/dsdiff.c
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@@ -153,7 +153,17 @@ int ParseDsdiffHeaderConfig (FILE *infile, char *infilename, char *fourcc, Wavpa
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error_line ("dsdiff file version = 0x%08x", version);
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}
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else if (!strncmp (dff_chunk_header.ckID, "PROP", 4)) {
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- char *prop_chunk = malloc ((size_t) dff_chunk_header.ckDataSize);
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+ char *prop_chunk;
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+
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+ if (dff_chunk_header.ckDataSize < 4 || dff_chunk_header.ckDataSize > 1024) {
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+ error_line ("%s is not a valid .DFF file!", infilename);
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+ return WAVPACK_SOFT_ERROR;
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+ }
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+
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+ if (debug_logging_mode)
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+ error_line ("got PROP chunk of %d bytes total", (int) dff_chunk_header.ckDataSize);
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+
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+ prop_chunk = malloc ((size_t) dff_chunk_header.ckDataSize);
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if (!DoReadFile (infile, prop_chunk, (uint32_t) dff_chunk_header.ckDataSize, &bcount) ||
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bcount != dff_chunk_header.ckDataSize) {
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--
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2.11.0
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