e1af92592e
Fix the following CVEs: - CVE-2019-17533: Mat_VarReadNextInfo4 in mat4.c in MATIO 1.5.17 omits a certain '\0' character, leading to a heap-based buffer over-read in strdup_vprintf when uninitialized memory is accessed. - CVE-2019-20017: A stack-based buffer over-read was discovered in Mat_VarReadNextInfo5 in mat5.c in matio 1.5.17. - CVE-2019-20018: A stack-based buffer over-read was discovered in ReadNextCell in mat5.c in matio 1.5.17. - CVE-2019-20020: A stack-based buffer over-read was discovered in ReadNextStructField in mat5.c in matio 1.5.17. - CVE-2019-20052: A memory leak was discovered in Mat_VarCalloc in mat.c in matio 1.5.17 because SafeMulDims does not consider the rank==0 case. Signed-off-by: Fabrice Fontaine <fontaine.fabrice@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: Peter Korsgaard <peter@korsgaard.com>
48 lines
2.0 KiB
Diff
48 lines
2.0 KiB
Diff
From 7b4699854cc65874e13a8e6944cd8e62fa981068 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
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From: tbeu <tbeu@users.noreply.github.com>
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Date: Mon, 11 Nov 2019 21:58:41 +0100
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Subject: [PATCH] Fix illegal memory access
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As reported by https://github.com/tbeu/matio/issues/128
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Signed-off-by: Fabrice Fontaine <fontaine.fabrice@gmail.com>
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[Retrieved from:
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https://github.com/tbeu/matio/commit/7b4699854cc65874e13a8e6944cd8e62fa981068]
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---
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src/mat5.c | 19 +++++++++++++++++--
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1 file changed, 17 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
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diff --git a/src/mat5.c b/src/mat5.c
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index 7f50da4..b76a331 100644
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--- a/src/mat5.c
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+++ b/src/mat5.c
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@@ -1380,11 +1380,26 @@ ReadNextStructField( mat_t *mat, matvar_t *matvar )
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/* Rank and dimension */
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if ( uncomp_buf[0] == MAT_T_INT32 ) {
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int j;
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+ size_t size;
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fields[i]->rank = uncomp_buf[1];
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nbytes -= fields[i]->rank;
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fields[i]->rank /= 4;
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- fields[i]->dims = (size_t*)malloc(fields[i]->rank*
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- sizeof(*fields[i]->dims));
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+ if ( 0 == do_clean && fields[i]->rank > 13 ) {
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+ int rank = fields[i]->rank;
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+ fields[i]->rank = 0;
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+ Mat_Critical("%d is not a valid rank", rank);
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+ continue;
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+ }
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+ err = SafeMul(&size, fields[i]->rank, sizeof(*fields[i]->dims));
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+ if ( err ) {
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+ if ( do_clean )
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+ free(dims);
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+ Mat_VarFree(fields[i]);
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+ fields[i] = NULL;
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+ Mat_Critical("Integer multiplication overflow");
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+ continue;
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+ }
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+ fields[i]->dims = (size_t*)malloc(size);
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if ( mat->byteswap ) {
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for ( j = 0; j < fields[i]->rank; j++ )
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fields[i]->dims[j] = Mat_uint32Swap(dims+j);
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