Security fixes: #562 CVE-2022-25235 -- Passing malformed 2- and 3-byte UTF-8 sequences (e.g. from start tag names) to the XML processing application on top of Expat can cause arbitrary damage (e.g. code execution) depending on how invalid UTF-8 is handled inside the XML processor; validation was not their job but Expat's. Exploits with code execution are known to exist. #561 CVE-2022-25236 -- Passing (one or more) namespace separator characters in "xmlns[:prefix]" attribute values made Expat send malformed tag names to the XML processor on top of Expat which can cause arbitrary damage (e.g. code execution) depending on such unexpectable cases are handled inside the XML processor; validation was not their job but Expat's. Exploits with code execution are known to exist. #558 CVE-2022-25313 -- Fix stack exhaustion in doctype parsing that could be triggered by e.g. a 2 megabytes file with a large number of opening braces. Expected impact is denial of service or potentially arbitrary code execution. #560 CVE-2022-25314 -- Fix integer overflow in function copyString; only affects the encoding name parameter at parser creation time which is often hardcoded (rather than user input), takes a value in the gigabytes to trigger, and a 64-bit machine. Expected impact is denial of service. #559 CVE-2022-25315 -- Fix integer overflow in function storeRawNames; needs input in the gigabytes and a 64-bit machine. Expected impact is denial of service or potentially arbitrary code execution. https://blog.hartwork.org/posts/expat-2-4-5-released/ https://github.com/libexpat/libexpat/blob/R_2_4_5/expat/Changes Signed-off-by: Fabrice Fontaine <fontaine.fabrice@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: Yann E. MORIN <yann.morin.1998@free.fr> |
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Config.in | ||
expat.hash | ||
expat.mk |