From 09e8fc02f59f16e2583b34fe1a270c238bd9ffec Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: =?UTF-8?q?Petr=20P=C3=ADsa=C5=99?= Date: Mon, 7 Jan 2019 10:40:01 +0100 Subject: [PATCH] Limit lenght to INT_MAX bytes in rfbProcessFileTransferReadBuffer() This ammends 15bb719c03cc70f14c36a843dcb16ed69b405707 fix for a heap out-of-bound write access in rfbProcessFileTransferReadBuffer() when reading a transfered file content in a server. The former fix did not work on platforms with a 32-bit int type (expected by rfbReadExact()). CVE-2018-15127 [Retrieved from: https://github.com/LibVNC/libvncserver/commit/09e8fc02f59f16e2583b34fe1a270c238bd9ffec] Signed-off-by: Fabrice Fontaine --- libvncserver/rfbserver.c | 7 ++++++- 1 file changed, 6 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-) diff --git a/libvncserver/rfbserver.c b/libvncserver/rfbserver.c index 7af84906..f2edbeea 100644 --- a/libvncserver/rfbserver.c +++ b/libvncserver/rfbserver.c @@ -88,6 +88,8 @@ #include /* strftime() */ #include +/* INT_MAX */ +#include #ifdef LIBVNCSERVER_WITH_WEBSOCKETS #include "rfbssl.h" @@ -1472,8 +1474,11 @@ char *rfbProcessFileTransferReadBuffer(rfbClientPtr cl, uint32_t length) 0XFFFFFFFF, i.e. SIZE_MAX for 32-bit systems. On 64-bit systems, a length of 0XFFFFFFFF will safely be allocated since this check will never trigger and malloc() can digest length+1 without problems as length is a uint32_t. + We also later pass length to rfbReadExact() that expects a signed int type and + that might wrap on platforms with a 32-bit int type if length is bigger + than 0X7FFFFFFF. */ - if(length == SIZE_MAX) { + if(length == SIZE_MAX || length > INT_MAX) { rfbErr("rfbProcessFileTransferReadBuffer: too big file transfer length requested: %u", (unsigned int)length); rfbCloseClient(cl); return NULL;