The opensbi package already allows to use Linux as a payload for
OpenSBI, but in some cases, U-Boot as payload is useful. This commit
adds a BR2_TARGET_OPENSBI_UBOOT_PAYLOAD option, modeled after the
existing BR2_TARGET_OPENSBI_LINUX_PAYLOAD.
Signed-off-by: Thomas Petazzoni <thomas.petazzoni@bootlin.com>
Reviewed-by: Bin Meng <bmeng.cn@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Peter Korsgaard <peter@korsgaard.com>
OpenSBI contains platform-specific code, so very much like Linux,
U-Boot or other bootloaders, using the upstream version of OpenSBI
will very often not be sufficient.
This commit therefore adds the possibility of specifying a custom
version of OpenSBI, either custom from upstream, custom tarball, or
custom from Git. Support for other version control systems has not
been implemented for now, but could be added later if needed.
Signed-off-by: Thomas Petazzoni <thomas.petazzoni@bootlin.com>
Reviewed-by: Bin Meng <bmeng.cn@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Peter Korsgaard <peter@korsgaard.com>
The old at91bootstrap version (1.x) uses a strange variant of the BSD
license, called "BSD Source Code Attribution" and referenced by SPDX
as BSD-Source-Code.
Signed-off-by: Thomas Petazzoni <thomas.petazzoni@bootlin.com>
shim 15.4 builds just fine on ARM32.
Signed-off-by: Thomas Petazzoni <thomas.petazzoni@bootlin.com>
Signed-off-by: Peter Korsgaard <peter@korsgaard.com>
- Use the tarball provided by upstream developers instead of the one
generated by Github. Indeed
https://github.com/rhboot/shim/releases/tag/15.4 indicates "As
usual, please use the shim-15.4.tar.bz2 tarball, rather than the
other two archives github automatically produces."
- The tarball now includes the gnu-efi code, so we no longer need to
select gnu-efi and have it as a build dependency. We continue to use
BR2_PACKAGE_GNU_EFI_ARCH_SUPPORTS as we still only build for those
architectures that have gnu-efi support. We also drop the
EFI_INCLUDE, EFI_PATH and LIBDIR variables, as gnu-efi no longer
needs to be searched in STAGING_DIR.
- Drop all four patches, which were backports from upstream.
Signed-off-by: Thomas Petazzoni <thomas.petazzoni@bootlin.com>
Signed-off-by: Peter Korsgaard <peter@korsgaard.com>
Backport a set of upstream patches to fix:
MokManager.c: In function ‘write_back_mok_list’:
MokManager.c:1081:19: error: taking address of packed member of ‘struct <anonymous>’ may result in an unaligned pointer value [-Werror=address-of-packed-member]
1081 | if (CompareGuid(&(list[i].Type), &X509_GUID) == 0)
| ^~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
MokManager.c:1103:19: error: taking address of packed member of ‘struct <anonymous>’ may result in an unaligned pointer value [-Werror=address-of-packed-member]
1103 | if (CompareGuid(&(list[i].Type), &X509_GUID) == 0) {
| ^~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
MokManager.c: In function ‘delete_cert’:
MokManager.c:1144:19: error: taking address of packed member of ‘struct <anonymous>’ may result in an unaligned pointer value [-Werror=address-of-packed-member]
1144 | if (CompareGuid(&(mok[i].Type), &X509_GUID) != 0)
| ^~~~~~~~~~~~~~
MokManager.c: In function ‘delete_hash_in_list’:
MokManager.c:1195:20: error: taking address of packed member of ‘struct <anonymous>’ may result in an unaligned pointer value [-Werror=address-of-packed-member]
1195 | if ((CompareGuid(&(mok[i].Type), &Type) != 0) ||
| ^~~~~~~~~~~~~~
MokManager.c: In function ‘delete_keys’:
MokManager.c:1359:19: error: taking address of packed member of ‘struct <anonymous>’ may result in an unaligned pointer value [-Werror=address-of-packed-member]
1359 | if (CompareGuid(&(del_key[i].Type), &X509_GUID) == 0) {
| ^~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
cc1: all warnings being treated as errors
make[1]: *** [<builtin>: MokManager.o] Error 1
Signed-off-by: Thomas Petazzoni <thomas.petazzoni@bootlin.com>
Signed-off-by: Peter Korsgaard <peter@korsgaard.com>
shim fails to build with:
console.c:448:5: error: ‘EFI_WARN_UNKOWN_GLYPH’ undeclared here (not in a function); did you mean ‘EFI_WARN_UNKNOWN_GLYPH’?
448 | { EFI_WARN_UNKOWN_GLYPH, L"Warning Unknown Glyph"},
| ^~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
| EFI_WARN_UNKNOWN_GLYPH
make[2]: *** [<builtin>: console.o] Error 1
make[2]: *** Waiting for unfinished jobs....
Backport upstream commit d230d02f990f02293736dca78b108f86c86d1bd0 to
resolve this issue.
Signed-off-by: Thomas Petazzoni <thomas.petazzoni@bootlin.com>
Signed-off-by: Peter Korsgaard <peter@korsgaard.com>
An analysis of the last 3 remaining CVEs that are reported to affect
the grub2 package has allowed to ensure that we can safely ignore
them:
* CVE-2020-14372 is already fixed by a patch we have in our patch
stack for grub2
* CVE-2019-14865 and CVE-2020-15705 are both distro-specific and do
not affect grub2 upstream, nor grub2 with the stack of patches we
have in Buildroot
Signed-off-by: Thomas Petazzoni <thomas.petazzoni@bootlin.com>
Signed-off-by: Peter Korsgaard <peter@korsgaard.com>
The BR2_TOOLCHAIN_HAS_BINUTILS_BUG_19615 and
BR2_TOOLCHAIN_HAS_BINUTILS_BUG_20006 options were last selected by the
BR2_TOOLCHAIN_EXTERNAL_CODESOURCERY_AMD64 toolchain, but this
toolchain has been removed as part of commit
d87e114a8f in August 2020.
It's time to get rid of those two options that are never enabled.
Signed-off-by: Thomas Petazzoni <thomas.petazzoni@bootlin.com>
Signed-off-by: Yann E. MORIN <yann.morin.1998@free.fr>
Details: https://lists.gnu.org/archive/html/grub-devel/2021-03/msg00007.html
As detailed in commit 7e64a050fb, it is
difficult to utilize the upstream patches directly, so a number of
patches include changes to generated files so that we don't need invoke
the gentpl.py script.
In addition to the security fixes, these required patches has been
backported:
f76a27996 efi: Make shim_lock GUID and protocol type public
04ae030d0 efi: Return grub_efi_status_t from grub_efi_get_variable()
ac5c93675 efi: Add a function to read EFI variables with attributes
d7e54b2e5 efi: Add secure boot detection
The following security issues are fixed:
CVE-2020-14372 grub2: The acpi command allows privileged user to load crafted
ACPI tables when Secure Boot is enabled
CWE-184
7.5/CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:H/PR:H/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:H/A:H
GRUB2 enables the use of the command acpi even when Secure Boot is signaled by
the firmware. An attacker with local root privileges to can drop a small SSDT
in /boot/efi and modify grub.cfg to instruct grub to load said SSDT. The SSDT
then gets run by the kernel and it overwrites the kernel lock down configuration
enabling the attacker to load unsigned kernel modules and kexec unsigned code.
Reported-by: Máté Kukri
*******************************************************************************
CVE-2020-25632 grub2: Use-after-free in rmmod command
CWE-416
7.5/CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:H/PR:H/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:H/A:H
The rmmod implementation for GRUB2 is flawed, allowing an attacker to unload
a module used as dependency without checking if any other dependent module is
still loaded. This leads to an use-after-free scenario possibly allowing an
attacker to execute arbitrary code and by-pass Secure Boot protections.
Reported-by: Chris Coulson (Canonical)
*******************************************************************************
CVE-2020-25647 grub2: Out-of-bound write in grub_usb_device_initialize()
CWE-787
6.9/CVSS:3.1/AV:P/AC:H/PR:H/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:H/A:H
grub_usb_device_initialize() is called to handle USB device initialization. It
reads out the descriptors it needs from the USB device and uses that data to
fill in some USB data structures. grub_usb_device_initialize() performs very
little bounds checking and simply assumes the USB device provides sane values.
This behavior can trigger memory corruption. If properly exploited, this would
lead to arbitrary code execution allowing the attacker to by-pass Secure Boot
mechanism.
Reported-by: Joseph Tartaro (IOActive) and Ilja van Sprundel (IOActive)
*******************************************************************************
CVE-2020-27749 grub2: Stack buffer overflow in grub_parser_split_cmdline
CWE-121
7.5/CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:H/PR:H/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:H/A:H
grub_parser_split_cmdline() expands variable names present in the supplied
command line in to their corresponding variable contents and uses a 1kB stack
buffer for temporary storage without sufficient bounds checking. If the
function is called with a command line that references a variable with a
sufficiently large payload, it is possible to overflow the stack buffer,
corrupt the stack frame and control execution. An attacker may use this to
circumvent Secure Boot protections.
Reported-by: Chris Coulson (Canonical)
*******************************************************************************
CVE-2020-27779 grub2: The cutmem command allows privileged user to remove
memory regions when Secure Boot is enabled
CWE-285
7.5/CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:H/PR:H/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:H/A:H
The GRUB2's cutmem command does not honor Secure Boot locking. This allows an
privileged attacker to remove address ranges from memory creating an
opportunity to circumvent Secure Boot protections after proper triage about
grub's memory layout.
Reported-by: Teddy Reed
*******************************************************************************
CVE-2021-3418 - grub2: GRUB 2.05 reintroduced CVE-2020-15705
CWE-281
6.4/CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:H/PR:H/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H
The GRUB2 upstream reintroduced the CVE-2020-15705. This refers to a distro
specific flaw which made upstream in the mentioned version.
If certificates that signed GRUB2 are installed into db, GRUB2 can be booted
directly. It will then boot any kernel without signature validation. The booted
kernel will think it was booted in Secure Boot mode and will implement lock
down, yet it could have been tampered.
This flaw only affects upstream and distributions using the shim_lock verifier.
Reported-by: Dimitri John Ledkov (Canonical)
*******************************************************************************
CVE-2021-20225 grub2: Heap out-of-bounds write in short form option parser
CWE-787
7.5/CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:H/PR:H/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:H/A:H
The option parser in GRUB2 allows an attacker to write past the end of
a heap-allocated buffer by calling certain commands with a large number
of specific short forms of options.
Reported-by: Daniel Axtens (IBM)
*******************************************************************************
CVE-2021-20233 grub2: Heap out-of-bound write due to mis-calculation of
space required for quoting
CWE-787
7.5/CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:H/PR:H/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:H/A:H
There's a flaw on GRUB2 menu rendering code setparam_prefix() in the menu
rendering code performs a length calculation on the assumption that expressing
a quoted single quote will require 3 characters, while it actually requires
4 characters. This allow an attacker to corrupt memory by one byte for each
quote in the input.
Reported-by: Daniel Axtens (IBM)
*******************************************************************************
Signed-off-by: Stefan Sørensen <stefan.sorensen@spectralink.com>
Signed-off-by: Yann E. MORIN <yann.morin.1998@free.fr>
If PER_PACKAGE_DIRECTORIES=Y and using host-make package (because
BR2_FORCE_HOST_BUILD=Y or local make is too old) .stamp_dotconfig
target needs per-package/uboot/host/bin/host-make that doesn't
exist yet.
Add host-make into UBOOT_KCONFIG_DEPENDENCIES.
Signed-off-by: Nicolas Toromanoff <nicolas.toromanoff@foss.st.com>
Signed-off-by: Yann E. MORIN <yann.morin.1998@free.fr>
Commit ca1604388a updated the checksum of
the tarball, but failed to update the one of main.c, which serves as a
license file.
Signed-off-by: Edgar Bonet <bonet@grenoble.cnrs.fr>
Signed-off-by: Yann E. MORIN <yann.morin.1998@free.fr>
Bump OP-TEE OS package version to OP-TEE release 3.12.0.
Signed-off-by: Etienne Carriere <etienne.carriere@linaro.org>
Signed-off-by: Thomas Petazzoni <thomas.petazzoni@bootlin.com>
since 2021.01, tools/binman is broken.
tools/binman/control.py imports pkg_resources
the module pkg_resources is supplied by setuptools,
so this new dependency is required.
Signed-off-by: Francois Perrad <francois.perrad@gadz.org>
Signed-off-by: Peter Korsgaard <peter@korsgaard.com>
Commit 5b95a5dc2 (support/download: change format of archives generated
from git) changed the way the archives generated from git repositories
are named, adding a "format-version" identifier right between the
package version and the file extension.
Commit c043ecb20 (support/download: change format of archives generated
from svn) did so for archives generated from a subversion checkout.
However, for a few packages, we manually force the _SOURCE variable,
because we want to share the archive with another package, to avoid
downloading and storing those archives twice. This is the case for:
- linux-headers and linux
- barebox-aux and barebox
When the generated tarballs were renamed with the aforementioned
commits, those packages were not updated accordingly.
Fix that by manually propagating the per-site-method format-version.
Reported-by: "Stephane Viau (OSS)" <stephane.viau@oss.nxp.com>
Signed-off-by: Yann E. MORIN <yann.morin.1998@free.fr>
Cc: "Stephane Viau (OSS)" <stephane.viau@oss.nxp.com>
Cc: Arnout Vandecappelle <arnout@mind.be>
Cc: Thomas Petazzoni <thomas.petazzoni@bootlin.com>
Cc: Peter Korsgaard <peter@korsgaard.com>
Signed-off-by: Thomas Petazzoni <thomas.petazzoni@bootlin.com>
Some RISC-V platforms (such as SiFive HiFive Unleashed) encapsulate
the OpenSBI firmware image inside U-Boot.
Signed-off-by: Bin Meng <bin.meng@windriver.com>
Reviewed-by: Alistair Francis <alistair.francis@wdc.com>
Signed-off-by: Thomas Petazzoni <thomas.petazzoni@bootlin.com>
Switch to using the tarball helper, that can generate reproducible
archives whatever the tar version >= 1.27.
However, those archives are not identical to the previous ones generated
in the (now-broken) gnu format.
To avoid any clashing between old and new archives, and new and old
Buildroot versions, we need to name the new generated archives
differently from the existing ones.
So, we bump the git-specific format-version to -br1.
The %ci date has been supported by git back to 1.6.0, released August
2008); it is not strictly ISO8601, but is still accepted as a PAX date
header. The strict ISO8601 placeholder, %cI, was only introduced with
2.2.0, release in November 2014, so too recent to be widely available.
As the format and the names of the archives changes, we need to update
all the hash files with the new names and hashes.
Of all the bootloaders that have a git download method, vexpress-firmware
is the only one to have a hash. Others have no hash files, or they have
explicitly set BR_NO_CHECK_HASH_FOR.
For the packages, linux-headers is the special snowflake, as the git
download is only for custom git tree, so it is excluded from the hash
verification with BR_NO_CHECK_HASH_FOR.
Signed-off-by: Yann E. MORIN <yann.morin.1998@free.fr>
Cc: Vincent Fazio <vfazio@xes-inc.com>
Cc: Thomas Petazzoni <thomas.petazzoni@bootlin.com>
Reviewed-by: Arnout Vandecappelle (Essensium/Mind) <arnout@mind.be>
Reviewed-by: Vincent Fazio <vfazio@xes-inc.com>
---8<------8<------8<------8<---
#!/bin/sh
# Find and download all packages using git as backend.
# Manually fix hashes for affected packages.
# Packages that only have a host variant
HOST_ONLY='imx-mkimage|mxsldr|netsurf-buildsystem|opkg-utils|prelink-cross|qoriq-rcw|vboot-utils'
# Packages that have a non-git main _SOURCE, and/or which
# have BR_NO_CHECK_HASH_FOR for the git _SOURCE
NOT_GIT='aufs|aufs-util|xenomai|linux-headers'
export BR2_DL_DIR=$(pwd)/temp-dl-dir
make defconfig
make $( git grep -l -E 'SITE_METHOD[[:space:]]*:?=[[:space:]]*git\>|_SITE[[:space:]]*:?=[[:space:]]*git:' \
boot/vexpress-firmware/ package/ \
|sed -r -e 's,.*/([^/]+)\.mk,\1,' \
|sed -r -e '/^('"${NOT_GIT}"')$/d;' \
-e 's/^('"${HOST_ONLY}"')/host-\1/;' \
-e 's/$/-legal-info/;'
)
---8<------8<------8<------8<---
This patch adds CPE ID information for a significant number of
packages.
Signed-off-by: Matthew Weber <matthew.weber@rockwellcollins.com>
Signed-off-by: Thomas Petazzoni <thomas.petazzoni@bootlin.com>
Bump bootwrapper to the latest version.
Signed-off-by: Vincent Stehlé <vincent.stehle@laposte.net>
Cc: Thomas Petazzoni <thomas.petazzoni@bootlin.com>
Signed-off-by: Thomas Petazzoni <thomas.petazzoni@bootlin.com>
Rebase on the mv-ddr-devel branch as the release branches are no longer
maintained.
Signed-off-by: Dick Olsson <hi@senzilla.io>
Signed-off-by: Yann E. MORIN <yann.morin.1998@free.fr>
Required in order to build properly with the latest stable release of
EDK2 UEFI firmware.
Signed-off-by: Dick Olsson <hi@senzilla.io>
Signed-off-by: Yann E. MORIN <yann.morin.1998@free.fr>
In barebox v2020.09.0, kconfig has been updated to a newer version
based on Linux 5.9-rc2. As in linux, kconfig can call the compiler
to test its capabilities.
We have no way to know if a custom version would require it or not,
so we just unconditionally depend on the toolchain
Signed-off-by: Jules Maselbas <jmaselbas@kalray.eu>
Signed-off-by: Yann E. MORIN <yann.morin.1998@free.fr>
The upstream git tree has disappeared, but a ZIP file is still hosted
somewhere at NXP. The content of that zip file has been verified to be
100% identical to the tarball we hosted on s.b.o.
As this is a zip file, we can't use the generic extract commands, and
must come up with our own. As such, it no longer makes sense to fix the
CRLF as a post-extract hook; this is moved to the extract command.
Add a hash file while at it.
Signed-off-by: Yann E. MORIN <yann.morin.1998@free.fr>
TF-A supports stack smashing protection (-fstack-protector-*).
However, that feature is currently silently disabled because
ENABLE_STACK_PROTECTOR is not set during build time.
As documented in the TF-A user guide, the flag ENABLE_STACK_PROTECTOR
is required to enable stack protection support. When enabled the symbols
for the stack protector (e.g. __stack_chk_guard) are built.
This needs to be done because TF-A does not link against an external
library that provides that symbols (e.g. libc).
So in case we see that BR2_SSP_* is enabled, let's enable the corresponding
ENABLE_STACK_PROTECTOR build flag for TF-A as documented in the TF-A user guide.
This patch also fixes a the following linker errors with older TF-A versions
if BR2_SSP_* is enabled (i.e. -fstack-protector-* is used as compiler flag)
and ENABLE_STACK_PROTECTOR is not set, which are caused by the missing
stack protector symbols:
[...]
params_setup.c:(.text.params_early_setup+0xc): undefined reference to `__stack_chk_guard'
aarch64-none-linux-gnu-ld: params_setup.c:(.text.params_early_setup+0x14): undefined reference to `__stack_chk_guard'
aarch64-none-linux-gnu-ld: params_setup.c:(.text.params_early_setup+0x104): undefined reference to `__stack_chk_guard'
aarch64-none-linux-gnu-ld: params_setup.c:(.text.params_early_setup+0x118): undefined reference to `__stack_chk_fail'
aarch64-none-linux-gnu-ld: ./build/px30/release/bl31/pmu.o: in function `rockchip_soc_sys_pwr_dm_suspend':
pmu.c:(.text.rockchip_soc_sys_pwr_dm_suspend+0xc): undefined reference to `__stack_chk_guard'
[...]
TF-A releases after Nov 2019, that include 7af195e29a4, will circumvent
these issue by explicitliy and silently disabling the stack protector
by appending '-fno-stack-protector' to the compiler flags in case
ENABLE_STACK_PROTECTOR is not set.
Tested on a Rockchip PX30 based system (TF-A v2.2 and upstream/master).
Signed-off-by: Christoph Müllner <christoph.muellner@theobroma-systems.com>
Reviewed-by: Baruch Siach <baruch@tkos.co.il>
Signed-off-by: Arnout Vandecappelle (Essensium/Mind) <arnout@mind.be>
When using a custom git or mercurial repository for u-boot the error message
indicating a version had not been provided incorrectly stated that the URL was
missing. Update the error message to indicate that it's the version that's
missing.
Signed-off-by: Garret Kelly <garret.kelly@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Peter Korsgaard <peter@korsgaard.com>
Bump OP-TEE OS package version to OP-TEE release 3.11.0.
Remove patches since merged in OP-TEE OS 3.11.0
Signed-off-by: Etienne Carriere <etienne.carriere@linaro.org>
Signed-off-by: Thomas Petazzoni <thomas.petazzoni@bootlin.com>
Add `.stm32` binary format that U-Boot generates for the trusted
configuration of STM32MP platforms.
Signed-off-by: Shlomi Vaknin <shlomi.39sd@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Thomas Petazzoni <thomas.petazzoni@bootlin.com>
For consistancy and dependencies between uboot and uboot-tools,
this patch migrates the script creation over in a similar way as
the env image creation.
Cc: Arnout Vandecappelle <arnout@mind.be>
Signed-off-by: Matthew Weber <matthew.weber@rockwellcollins.com>
Signed-off-by: Arnout Vandecappelle (Essensium/Mind) <arnout@mind.be>
Migrating the support for this feature to uboot-tools to gain the
ability to build env files when BR2_TARGET_UBOOT isn't selected.
When _ENVIMAGE_SOURCE is not set, we generate a default environment.
However, this default depends on the U-Boot configuration. Therefore,
this can only be done if uboot itself is built as well, and
host-uboot-tools needs to depend on uboot.
For the same reason, the commands for creating the environment have to
be adapted a little. Take this occasion to drastically simplify them.
Note: This patch creates a circular dependency with uboot until the
similar migration patch is merged for uboot scripts
Cc: Arnout Vandecappelle <arnout@mind.be>
Signed-off-by: Matthew Weber <matthew.weber@rockwellcollins.com>
Signed-off-by: Arnout Vandecappelle (Essensium/Mind) <arnout@mind.be>
It's easier to locate given format when it's sorted.
Signed-off-by: Bartosz Bilas <b.bilas@grinn-global.com>
Signed-off-by: Thomas Petazzoni <thomas.petazzoni@bootlin.com>
The buildroot custom bareboxenv compile command misses the additional
include path 'scripts/include' to gain access to the local copy of the
kernel header files (which leads to compile error when using an older
toolchain).
This could be fixed by enhancing the custom bareboxenv compile command
(see [1]) or by using the barebox build system by simply enabling the
CONFIG_BAREBOXENV_TARGET option (available since April 2012, see [2])
instead (as suggested by Yann E. MORIN).
Fixes (with BR2_TARGET_BAREBOX_BAREBOXENV enabled):
build/barebox-2019.12.0/scripts/bareboxenv.c💯10: fatal error: linux/list.h: No such file or directory
[1] http://lists.busybox.net/pipermail/buildroot/2020-January/270942.html
[2] https://git.pengutronix.de/cgit/barebox/commit/?id=afb03d7a554a2911a3742e316f011319fcb416f1
Note: a user who would previously provide a barebox config file which
had CONFIG_BAREBOXENV_TARGET=y, but a Buildroot config file which did
not have BR2_TARGET_BAREBOX_BAREBOXENV=y, would have bareboxenv-target
built, but it would not be installed in the target. Now, and unset
BR2_TARGET_BAREBOX_BAREBOXENV will not even build it, but his is not a
regression: it was anyway previously not installed.
Reported-by: Frederick Gotham <cauldwell.thomas@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Peter Seiderer <ps.report@gmx.net>
[yann.morin.1998@free.fr:
- also explicitly disable it when not selected
- rewrap commit log
]
Signed-off-by: Yann E. MORIN <yann.morin.1998@free.fr>
This commit adds a patch that passes -fno-builtin to fix the build
with gcc 10. The patch has been submitted upstream.
There are no autobuilder failures, since it's a bootloader package,
and therefore not tested by the autobuilders. However, a build failure
was detected when building toolchains and a minimal ARMv7-M system at
https://gitlab.com/bootlin/toolchains-builder/-/jobs/729359529.
Signed-off-by: Thomas Petazzoni <thomas.petazzoni@bootlin.com>
Signed-off-by: Peter Korsgaard <peter@korsgaard.com>
Recent versions of OP-TEE depend on Python 3. Currently, OP-TEE is
building with the Python interpreter provided by the user. This patch
includes an upstream patch that makes the interpreter configurable,
and makes use of this configuration with host-python3.
Signed-off-by: Dick Olsson <hi@senzilla.io>
Signed-off-by: Thomas Petazzoni <thomas.petazzoni@bootlin.com>
U-Boot must use $(BR2_MAKE) as it uses a Make feature from v4.0. We
already use $(BR2_MAKE) in the BUILD_CMDS, but the kconfig commands
still uses $(MAKE). Without this fix, building U-Boot with kconfig will
fail with the following cryptic error.
> Makefile:37: *** missing separator. Stop.
Signed-off-by: Brandon Maier <brandon.maier@rockwellcollins.com>
Signed-off-by: Yann E. MORIN <yann.morin.1998@free.fr>
Enable this bootloader for cortex a7 based SoCs: support for the
sama7g5 SoC is now in upstream at91bootstrap3, and it is a Cortex-A7
based SoC.
Signed-off-by: Eugen Hristev <eugen.hristev@microchip.com>
Signed-off-by: Thomas Petazzoni <thomas.petazzoni@bootlin.com>
Details: https://lists.gnu.org/archive/html/grub-devel/2020-07/msg00034.html
Fixes the following security issues:
* CVE-2020-10713
A flaw was found in grub2, prior to version 2.06. An attacker may
use the GRUB 2 flaw to hijack and tamper the GRUB verification
process. This flaw also allows the bypass of Secure Boot
protections. In order to load an untrusted or modified kernel, an
attacker would first need to establish access to the system such as
gaining physical access, obtain the ability to alter a pxe-boot
network, or have remote access to a networked system with root
access. With this access, an attacker could then craft a string to
cause a buffer overflow by injecting a malicious payload that leads
to arbitrary code execution within GRUB. The highest threat from
this vulnerability is to data confidentiality and integrity as well
as system availability.
* CVE-2020-14308
In grub2 versions before 2.06 the grub memory allocator doesn't
check for possible arithmetic overflows on the requested allocation
size. This leads the function to return invalid memory allocations
which can be further used to cause possible integrity,
confidentiality and availability impacts during the boot process.
* CVE-2020-14309
There's an issue with grub2 in all versions before 2.06 when
handling squashfs filesystems containing a symbolic link with name
length of UINT32 bytes in size. The name size leads to an
arithmetic overflow leading to a zero-size allocation further
causing a heap-based buffer overflow with attacker controlled data.
* CVE-2020-14310
An integer overflow in read_section_from_string may lead to a heap
based buffer overflow.
* CVE-2020-14311
An integer overflow in grub_ext2_read_link may lead to a heap-based
buffer overflow.
* CVE-2020-15706
GRUB2 contains a race condition in grub_script_function_create()
leading to a use-after-free vulnerability which can be triggered by
redefining a function whilst the same function is already
executing, leading to arbitrary code execution and secure boot
restriction bypass
* CVE-2020-15707
Integer overflows were discovered in the functions grub_cmd_initrd
and grub_initrd_init in the efilinux component of GRUB2, as shipped
in Debian, Red Hat, and Ubuntu (the functionality is not included
in GRUB2 upstream), leading to a heap-based buffer overflow. These
could be triggered by an extremely large number of arguments to the
initrd command on 32-bit architectures, or a crafted filesystem
with very large files on any architecture. An attacker could use
this to execute arbitrary code and bypass UEFI Secure Boot
restrictions. This issue affects GRUB2 version 2.04 and prior
versions.
Signed-off-by: Stefan Sørensen <stefan.sorensen@spectralink.com>
Signed-off-by: Peter Korsgaard <peter@korsgaard.com>
