After the staging installation, we replace a number of paths in libtool
.la files so that those paths point to STAGING_DIR instead of a location
in the build machine.
However, we replace only paths that start with /usr. And it turns out
that the linux-pam package is configured with --libdir=/lib (linux-pam
seems to always be installed in /lib rather than /usr/lib).
Due to this, libpam.la contains the following line:
libdir='/lib'
When building a configuration that has:
- BR2_ROOTFS_MERGED_USR=y
- BR2_PACKAGE_LINUX_PAM=y
- BR2_PACKAGE_POLKIT=y
on a system that has its system-wide PAM library installed in /lib,
the build fails with:
/lib/libpam.so: file not recognized: File format not recognized
For some reason, libtool searches only in STAGING_DIR/usr/lib, but
when BR2_ROOTFS_MERGED_USR=y, STAGING_DIR/lib points to
STAGING_DIR/usr/lib, so libtool finds libpam.la. And this libpam.la
contains a bogus libdir='/lib' path. libtool then goes on, finds
/lib/libpam.so, and links with it, causing the build failure.
By doing the proper replacement of libdir='/lib', we have a correct
libpam.la, and solve the build issue.
There is no autobuilder failure associated to this issue, as it
requires /lib/libpam.so to exist. This is the case on ArchLinux, on
which Xogium reported the issue, which can also be reproduced in an
ArchLinux container.
Reported-by: Xogium <contact@xogium.me>
Cc: Xogium <contact@xogium.me>
Signed-off-by: Thomas Petazzoni <thomas.petazzoni@bootlin.com>
Tested-by: Yann E. MORIN <yann.morin.1998@free.fr>
[yann.morin.1998@free.fr:
- tested by manually creating a symlink to libpam.so in /lib
]
Signed-off-by: Yann E. MORIN <yann.morin.1998@free.fr>
Currently, the dependencies for the init system choice, and the
dependencies for the package, are slightly different, and not in the
same order, the latter making it difficult to assess consistency between
the two.
Fix all that, by cross-duplicating dependencies from the init choice and
the package, and order the dependencies according to the manual (arch
first, toolchain, then the others).
Note that some dependencies are redundant, but kept nonetheless for
correctness:
- BR2_USE_MMU is implied by BR2_TOOLCHAIN_USES_GLIBC, but systemd does
use fork();
- !BR2_STATIC_LIBS is also implied by BR2_TOOLCHAIN_USES_GLIBC, but it
is also inherited from kmod which we select;
- BR2_TOOLCHAIN_HAS_THREADS is also implied by BR2_TOOLCHAIN_USES_GLIBC,
but systemd does use pthread_*() functions.
Signed-off-by: Yann E. MORIN <yann.morin.1998@free.fr>
Kodi plays these files through ffmpeg and does not link to libtheora
anymore, see PR 9686.
Signed-off-by: Bernd Kuhls <bernd.kuhls@t-online.de>
Signed-off-by: Thomas Petazzoni <thomas.petazzoni@bootlin.com>
unbound open-codes the detection of libexpat, and as all packages doing
so, look in host paths (/usr/local /opt/local /usr/lib /usr/pkg /usr/sfw
/usr). Obviously this is wrong for cross-compilation.
Do for libexpat as we do for openssl, and point unbound to staging dir,
when we know expat is.
Fixes:
http://autobuild.buildroot.org/results/a89ea6aa1cd8c253b1260ea227fea3dc9b095fe8/
Signed-off-by: Yann E. MORIN <yann.morin.1998@free.fr>
Cc: Stefan Ott <stefan@ott.net>
Signed-off-by: Thomas Petazzoni <thomas.petazzoni@bootlin.com>
Fix CVE-2020-5291: Bubblewrap (bwrap) before version 0.4.1, if installed
in setuid mode and the kernel supports unprivileged user namespaces,
then the `bwrap --userns2` option can be used to make the setuid process
keep running as root while being traceable. This can in turn be used to
gain root permissions. Note that this only affects the combination of
bubblewrap in setuid mode (which is typically used when unprivileged
user namespaces are not supported) and the support of unprivileged user
namespaces.
Also update indentation of hash file (two spaces)
Signed-off-by: Fabrice Fontaine <fontaine.fabrice@gmail.com>
Reviewed-by: Adrian Perez de Castro <aperez@igalia.com>
Signed-off-by: Thomas Petazzoni <thomas.petazzoni@bootlin.com>
Configure options should be passed via CONF_OPTS not CONF_OTPS.
Signed-off-by: Bartosz Bilas <b.bilas@grinn-global.com>
[yann.morin.1998@free.fr: also fix the epoxy ones]
Signed-off-by: Yann E. MORIN <yann.morin.1998@free.fr>
Unbound: validating, recursive & caching DNS resolver with
DNSSEC, QNAME minimisation, DNSCrypt and DNS-over-TLS support.
Signed-off-by: Stefan Ott <stefan@ott.net>
Signed-off-by: Thomas Petazzoni <thomas.petazzoni@bootlin.com>
This commit adds four new tests for the syslinux bootloader:
- Building on x86, for legacy BIOS
- Building on x86, for EFI BIOS
- Building on x86-64, for legacy BIOS
- Building on x86-64, for EFI BIOS
Runtime testing in Qemu would certainly be possible, but is left as a
future addition to these tests.
Signed-off-by: Thomas Petazzoni <thomas.petazzoni@bootlin.com>
The following defconfig:
BR2_x86_i686=y
BR2_TOOLCHAIN_EXTERNAL=y
BR2_TOOLCHAIN_EXTERNAL_DOWNLOAD=y
BR2_TOOLCHAIN_EXTERNAL_URL="http://toolchains.bootlin.com/downloads/releases/toolchains/x86-i686/tarballs/x86-i686--glibc--bleeding-edge-2018.11-1.tar.bz2"
BR2_TOOLCHAIN_EXTERNAL_GCC_8=y
BR2_TOOLCHAIN_EXTERNAL_HEADERS_4_14=y
BR2_TOOLCHAIN_EXTERNAL_CUSTOM_GLIBC=y
BR2_TOOLCHAIN_EXTERNAL_CXX=y
BR2_INIT_NONE=y
BR2_TARGET_SYSLINUX=y
BR2_TARGET_SYSLINUX_EFI=y
fails to build due to missing setjmp/longjmp definitions, which is a
consequence of a change introduced between gnu-efi 3.0.9 and 3.0.10.
This build failure is fixed by adding another syslinux paytch, which
has been submitted upstream.
Signed-off-by: Thomas Petazzoni <thomas.petazzoni@bootlin.com>
This new version is mandatory to allow the glibc package bump to version 2.31.
Otherwise it's not possible to connect to the remote host, as reported by [1] [2].
Upstream commit [3][4] fixes the issue.
[1] https://bugs.archlinux.org/task/65386
[2] https://bugs.gentoo.org/708224
[3] beee0ef618
[4] 69298ebfc2
Release Note:
https://www.openssh.com/txt/release-8.2
Signed-off-by: Romain Naour <romain.naour@smile.fr>
Reviewed-by: David Pierret <david.pierret@smile.fr>
Tested-by: David Pierret <david.pierret@smile.fr>
Signed-off-by: Thomas Petazzoni <thomas.petazzoni@bootlin.com>
When the swupdate SYSTEMD option is enabled, systemd needs to be built
before swupdate, otherwise the build fails with:
core/notifier.c:27:10: fatal error: systemd/sd-daemon.h: No such file or directory
27 | #include <systemd/sd-daemon.h>
| ^~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
Of course, it remains up to the user to make sure that the systemd
package is enabled when systemd support is enabled in the swupdate
configuration.
Signed-off-by: James Hilliard <james.hilliard1@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Thomas Petazzoni <thomas.petazzoni@bootlin.com>
Update the toolchain being used by the testsuite infra.
The new toolchain 2018.11-1 is based on gcc 8.2, uClibc-ng 1.0.30,
linux-headers 4.14 and binutils 2.31.1.
Enable BR2_TOOLCHAIN_HAS_THREADS_DEBUG that is now required.
The old toolchain 2017.05 is based on gcc 4.9, uClibc-ng 1.0.25,
linux-headers 3.10 and binutils 2.27.
Tested with gitlab
https://gitlab.com/kubu93/buildroot/pipelines/132376578
Signed-off-by: Romain Naour <romain.naour@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Thomas Petazzoni <thomas.petazzoni@bootlin.com>
NSS assumes that every neon arm32 build is an armv7, but this is
not always true(i.e. build arm32 for armv8), so let's add a patch to
remove -march=armv7 flag when building gcm-arm32-neon.c
Fixes:
http://autobuild.buildroot.net/results/464/464044fda2850123339de6c8071374e380636ee0/
Signed-off-by: Giulio Benetti <giulio.benetti@benettiengineering.com>
Reviewed-by: Peter Seiderer <ps.report@gmx.net>
Signed-off-by: Thomas Petazzoni <thomas.petazzoni@bootlin.com>
This package has been tested on Nitrogen8M with the following commands:
# modprobe galcore
# cd /usr/share/examples/viv_samples/vdk/
# ./tutorial7
Also update the help text as we shouldn't specify a kernel revision. It
is just that this module isn't meant for mainline kernel, only its NXP
forked version.
Signed-off-by: Gary Bisson <gary.bisson@boundarydevices.com>
Signed-off-by: Thomas Petazzoni <thomas.petazzoni@bootlin.com>
Removed patch which was applied upstream:
bd01ba5a6b
Switched to github helper, upstream does not provide a tarball for this
release.
Signed-off-by: Bernd Kuhls <bernd.kuhls@t-online.de>
Signed-off-by: Peter Korsgaard <peter@korsgaard.com>
Switched to github helper, upstream does not provide a tarball for this
release.
Signed-off-by: Bernd Kuhls <bernd.kuhls@t-online.de>
Signed-off-by: Peter Korsgaard <peter@korsgaard.com>
Fixes the following security issues:
*) SECURITY: CVE-2020-1934 (cve.mitre.org)
mod_proxy_ftp: Use of uninitialized value with malicious backend FTP
server. [Eric Covener]
*) SECURITY: CVE-2020-1927 (cve.mitre.org)
rewrite, core: Set PCRE_DOTALL flag by default to avoid unpredictable
matches and substitutions with encoded line break characters.
The fix for CVE-2019-10098 was not effective. [Ruediger Pluem]
The LICENSE file has been updated to fix a s/waranties/warranties/ typo, so
update the hash to match and adjust the spacing to match recent agreements:
-This software is provided "as is" and any express or implied waranties,
+This software is provided "as is" and any express or implied warranties,
Signed-off-by: Peter Korsgaard <peter@korsgaard.com>
The cgit URL is a mirror of the gitlab repository.
The README.md file of the kmscube project also points
to the gitlab repository, so switch the URL accordingly.
Signed-off-by: Fabio Estevam <festevam@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Yann E. MORIN <yann.morin.1998@free.fr>
The sysdig homepage we have points to an "on-sale" domain, that is
purportedly serving malware while at it. Update to point to the wiki on
github instead.
Fixes#12746.
Signed-off-by: Peter Seiderer <ps.report@gmx.net>
[yann.morin.1998@free.fr:
- use wiki instead of git repo
- expand commit log
]
Signed-off-by: Yann E. MORIN <yann.morin.1998@free.fr>
"This release fixes three security issues in ntpd and provides 46
bugfixes and addresses 4 other issues." [1]
NONE: Sec 3610: process_control() should bail earlier on short packets.
MEDIUM: Sec 3596: Unauthenticated ntpd may be susceptible to IPv4 spoof
attack from highly predictable transmit timestamps.
MEDIUM: Sec 3592: DoS Attack on unauthenticated client.
The fix for https://bugs.ntp.org/3445 introduced a bug whereby a system that
is running ntp-4.2.8p12 (possibly earlier) or p13 that only has one
unauthenticated time source can be attacked in a way that causes the
victim's next poll to its source to be delayed, for as long as the attack is
maintained.
[1] http://support.ntp.org/bin/view/Main/SecurityNotice#March_2020_ntp_4_2_8p14_NTP_Rele
The copyright year has changed in the COPYRIGHT file, so adjust the hash to
match and adjust the spacing to match recent agreements:
@@ -3,7 +3,7 @@
jpg "Clone me," says Dolly sheepishly.
- Last update: 2-Jan-2017 11:58 UTC
+ Last update: 4-Feb-2020 23:47 UTC
__________________________________________________________________
The following copyright notice applies to all files collectively called
@@ -32,7 +32,7 @@
Burnicki is:
***********************************************************************
* *
-* Copyright (c) Network Time Foundation 2011-2017 *
+* Copyright (c) Network Time Foundation 2011-2020 *
* *
* All Rights Reserved *
* *
Signed-off-by: Sébastien Szymanski <sebastien.szymanski@armadeus.com>
[Peter: clarify security impact, document COPYRIGHT change]
Signed-off-by: Peter Korsgaard <peter@korsgaard.com>
Drop patches that are now upstream.
Signed-off-by: James Hilliard <james.hilliard1@gmail.com>
Reviewed-by: Adrian Perez de Castro <aperez@igalia.com>
Signed-off-by: Peter Korsgaard <peter@korsgaard.com>
The help text of BR2_LINUX_KERNEL_IMAGE_NAME is somewhat incomplete,
in the sense that it assumes just a filename can be passed, while it
can be a relative path, such as 'compressed/vmlinux.bin.z'. So make it
clear that such paths are relative to arch/ARCH/boot/.
Also, drop the part about this being only useful for Xtensa as this is
not true: on MIPS it might be needed as well for some specific image
types.
Reported-by: Paul Cercueil <paul@crapouillou.net>
Cc: Paul Cercueil <paul@crapouillou.net>
Signed-off-by: Thomas Petazzoni <thomas.petazzoni@bootlin.com>
Signed-off-by: Peter Korsgaard <peter@korsgaard.com>
The Linux kernel image is typically found in arch/ARCH/boot/, which is
why LINUX_IMAGE_PATH is defined as:
LINUX_IMAGE_PATH = $(LINUX_ARCH_PATH)/boot/$(LINUX_IMAGE_NAME)
However, on MIPS, some kernel image types are available from
arch/mips/boot/compressed, or even at the top-level directory. For
such cases, LINUX_IMAGE_NAME might be set (using
BR2_LINUX_KERNEL_IMAGE_NAME) to values such as:
compressed/vmlinux.bin.z
or
../../../uzImage.bin
Except that the line:
$(INSTALL) -m 0644 -D $(LINUX_IMAGE_PATH) $(1)/$(LINUX_IMAGE_NAME)
will lead to such images be installed in:
$(TARGET_DIR)/boot/compressed/vmlinux.bin.z
$(BINARIES_DIR)/compressed/vmlinux.bin.z
and:
$(TARGET_DIR)/boot/../../../uzImage.bin
$(BINARIES_DIR)/../../../uzImage.bin
which of course is completely bogus.
So let's install them under their name, not their full relative path
to arch/ARCH/boot/.
Reported-by: Paul Cercueil <paul@crapouillou.net>
Cc: Paul Cercueil <paul@crapouillou.net>
Signed-off-by: Thomas Petazzoni <thomas.petazzoni@bootlin.com>
Signed-off-by: Peter Korsgaard <peter@korsgaard.com>
Fixes the following security issues (1.1.1e):
CVE-2019-1551 [Low severity]: There is an overflow bug in the x64_64
Montgomery squaring procedure used in exponentiation with 512-bit moduli.
No EC algorithms are affected. Analysis suggests that attacks against
2-prime RSA1024, 3-prime RSA1536, and DSA1024 as a result of this defect
would be very difficult to perform and are not believed likely. Attacks
against DH512 are considered just feasible. However, for an attack the
target would have to re-use the DH512 private key, which is not recommended
anyway. Also applications directly using the low level API BN_mod_exp may
be affected if they use BN_FLG_CONSTTIME. Reported by OSS-Fuzz and Guido
Vranken.
https://www.openssl.org/news/secadv/20191206.txt
CVE-2019-1563 [Low severity]: In situations where an attacker receives
automated notification of the success or failure of a decryption attempt an
attacker, after sending a very large number of messages to be decrypted, can
recover a CMS/PKCS7 transported encryption key or decrypt any RSA encrypted
message that was encrypted with the public RSA key, using a Bleichenbacher
padding oracle attack. Applications are not affected if they use a
certificate together with the private RSA key to the CMS_decrypt or
PKCS7_decrypt functions to select the correct recipient info to decrypt.
Reported by Bernd Edlinger.
https://www.openssl.org/news/secadv/20190910.txt
Signed-off-by: Sébastien Szymanski <sebastien.szymanski@armadeus.com>
[Peter: mention security impact]
Signed-off-by: Peter Korsgaard <peter@korsgaard.com>
Following commit eee96b0f0a that adds a
gcc patch for OpenRISC, the OpenRISC pre-built toolchain was
rebuilt. Let's use this new toolchain version for the autobuilders.
Signed-off-by: Thomas Petazzoni <thomas.petazzoni@bootlin.com>
Signed-off-by: Peter Korsgaard <peter@korsgaard.com>
Other changes:
- Change the site URL as the upstream project has migrated to Github
Signed-off-by: Adam Duskett <Aduskett@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Peter Korsgaard <peter@korsgaard.com>
hostapd before 2.10 and wpa_supplicant before 2.10 allow an incorrect
indication of disconnection in certain situations because source address
validation is mishandled. This is a denial of service that should have
been prevented by PMF (aka management frame protection). The attacker
must send a crafted 802.11 frame from a location that is within the
802.11 communications range.
Signed-off-by: Fabrice Fontaine <fontaine.fabrice@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Peter Korsgaard <peter@korsgaard.com>
hostapd before 2.10 and wpa_supplicant before 2.10 allow an incorrect
indication of disconnection in certain situations because source address
validation is mishandled. This is a denial of service that should have
been prevented by PMF (aka management frame protection). The attacker
must send a crafted 802.11 frame from a location that is within the
802.11 communications range.
Signed-off-by: Fabrice Fontaine <fontaine.fabrice@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Peter Korsgaard <peter@korsgaard.com>