When grub2 (i386-pc) is built with -O2 or -O3 it is unable to boot
and the system will reboot in a loop.
Tony Battersby has bisected [0] the error down to this security bugfix:
boot/grub2/0132-kern-parser-Fix-a-stack-buffer-overflow.patch
There is also a bug report by Peter Seiderer about this [1].
As discussed on the mailing list [2], this patch introduces a workaround
in the grub2.mk overriding the global optimization settings with -Os
which results in a booting system.
References:
[0] https://savannah.gnu.org/bugs/?60458
[1] https://bugs.busybox.net/show_bug.cgi?id=13586
[2] http://lists.busybox.net/pipermail/buildroot/2021-May/311524.html
Signed-off-by: Andreas Hilse <andreas.hilse@googlemail.com>
Signed-off-by: Yann E. MORIN <yann.morin.1998@free.fr>
The make all command run the tools/makefile on the process.
This makefile use "pkg-config" command to support static link.
The issue is the use of pkg-config configured for crosscompiling
to build binaries tools for host architecture.
To fix it, I add pkg-config environment variable to configure it for host.
Add a test to avoid future regress on the build of U-boot.
Signed-off-by: Kory Maincent <kory.maincent@bootlin.com>
[yann.morin.1998@free.fr:
- fix mixed space-TAB indentation
- fix check-package
]
Signed-off-by: Yann E. MORIN <yann.morin.1998@free.fr>
Buildroot sets appropriate ENABLE_STACK_PROTECTOR build flag value based
on the toolchain global BR2_SSP_* options, and all packages are built
with that setting.
However it might not be always convenient to automatically infer TF-A
stack protection from the toolchain features. For instance, secure
memory constraints may become an issue and all the extra TF-A features
need to be tuned or disabled in order to shrink TF-A firmware image.
Besides, for any value other than "none", TF-A platform specific hook
'plat_get_stack_protector_canary' must be implemented. However this hook
is not implemented by all the platforms supported by TF-A. For instance,
Allwinner currently does not provide such a hook.
Add an new option that a user can toggle to enable or disable SSP in
their ATF build. If enabled, the SSP level is automatically inherited
from the global setting.
Signed-off-by: Sergey Matyukevich <geomatsi@gmail.com>
[yann.morin.1998@free.fr: simplify logic with a single boolean]
Signed-off-by: Yann E. MORIN <yann.morin.1998@free.fr>
Update commit ID to include recent upstream fixes:
- Fix I and D cache synchronization issue (2e2f6faaf105)
- Add carriage return to correct menu formatting (2f6ea51dbb51)
- Add copyright info (7d3413d2ffd9)
- Expand the limit on the size of uboot when update it (623888127a0e)
Signed-off-by: Drew Fustini <drew@beagleboard.org>
Signed-off-by: Yann E. MORIN <yann.morin.1998@free.fr>
Update the commit id to include upstream fixes:
- Fix print format in load_and_run_ddr(e976d186e69a)
- Update copyright info (f2b049b7fff2)
- Avoid chiplink address exception (86664be28e5d)
Signed-off-by: Drew Fustini <drew@beagleboard.org>
Signed-off-by: Yann E. MORIN <yann.morin.1998@free.fr>
Release notes:
https://trustedfirmware-a.readthedocs.io/en/latest/change-log.html#version-2-5
The existing qemu_aarch64_sbsa_defconfig was using an unpinned version
of ATF, so to avoid any regression, it is pinned to the previous
version, 2.4.
Signed-off-by: Heiko Thiery <heiko.thiery@gmail.com>
[yann.morin.1998@free.fr: pin ATF version in qemu_aarch64_sbsa_defconfig]
Signed-off-by: Yann E. MORIN <yann.morin.1998@free.fr>
As spotted by Eugen, BR2_TARGET_AT91BOOTSTRAP3_NEEDS_PYTHON3 currently
is outside the at91bootstrap section, because it was inccorectly added
after the 'endif' statement rather than before, which makes the
menuconfig layout weird.
Move it around.
Reported-by: Eugen Hristev <eugen.hristev@microchip.com>
Signed-off-by: Yann E. MORIN <yann.morin.1998@free.fr>
Some at91bootstrap3 configurations now use Python scripts on the host
for NAND/PMEC related utilities. In order to be able to use those
scripts, this commit adds a new
BR2_TARGET_AT91BOOTSTRAP3_NEEDS_PYTHON3 which allows to express the
need for host-python3 as a dependency to build at91bootstrap3.
Signed-off-by: Eugen Hristev <eugen.hristev@microchip.com>
[Thomas: this was extracted from a patch from Eugen adding
at91bootstrap 4.x support.]
Signed-off-by: Thomas Petazzoni <thomas.petazzoni@bootlin.com>
Signed-off-by: Yann E. MORIN <yann.morin.1998@free.fr>
The project at https://github.com/linux4sam/at91bootstrap was until
now releasing 3.x versions, which were packaged using
boot/at91bootstrap3/ in Buildroot. Microchip has now started a new
branch of at91bootstrap, called 4.x, which will only support the
following devices: sam9x60, sama5d2, sama5d3, sama5d4, sama7g5. A
number of older devices from Microchip will only be supported by the
existing 3.x series.
Therefore, we cannot simply remove support for the 3.x series, and
allow using only the 4.x series.
So what this commit does is extend the boot/at91bootstrap3 package to
support building both 3.x and 4.x versions. In detail, this implies:
* Having the BR2_TARGET_AT91BOOTSTRAP3_LATEST_VERSION symbol point to
the latest 4.x version. Indeed, we want
BR2_TARGET_AT91BOOTSTRAP3_LATEST_VERSION to really point to the
latest upstream version, even if that means potential breakage for
users. Users who want to use a fixed version of at91bootstrap
should anyway not be using
BR2_TARGET_AT91BOOTSTRAP3_LATEST_VERSION.
* Introduce BR2_TARGET_AT91BOOTSTRAP3_LATEST_VERSION_3X for users who
would like to use the latest 3.x series.
* Adjust the installation logic, as images to install are now in
build/binaries/*.bin instead of binaries/*.bin. In order to not
have to differentiate 3.x and 4.x, we simply use $(wildcard ...) to
expand the list of files to install.
* To make it clear that boot/at91bootstrap3 supports both 3.x and
4.x, we also update the prompt of the package.
at911bootstrap does not carry a license file; so far we were using
main.c as the license file, as it carries the license blurb. Now that we
have a known alternate version, we would need a per-version hash for
that file. However, this is a bit too cumbersome to handle, so just drop
using main.c as the license file. When upstream introduces a proper
license file, we can revisit the situation.
Update the two defconfigs that were using the upstream 3.9.3 version;
all other defconfigs are using custom tarballs or custom git trees.
Signed-off-by: Eugen Hristev <eugen.hristev@microchip.com>
[Thomas: while this patch is based on previous work by Eugen, it was
reworked quite significantly.]
Signed-off-by: Thomas Petazzoni <thomas.petazzoni@bootlin.com>
[yann.morin.1998@free.fr:
- drop main.c as license file, explain why
- update the two defconfigs
]
Signed-off-by: Yann E. MORIN <yann.morin.1998@free.fr>
EDK2 is a modern, feature-rich, cross-platform firmware development
environment for the UEFI and PI specifications.
The initial version of this bootloader package makes it possible to
build firmware for the following seven configurations:
* QEMU x86-64 pc machine
* QEMU aarch64 virt machine, booting directly from flash
* QEMU aarch64 virt machine, booting via the kernel protocol
* QEMU aarch64 sbsa-ref machine
* ARM FVP vexpress machine
* Socionext SynQuacer Developerbox
* SolidRun MacchiatoBin
Support the use of EDK2 UEFI payloads as BL33 in ARM Trusted Firmware.
Signed-off-by: Dick Olsson <hi@senzilla.io>
[yann.morin.1998@free.fr:
- duplicate defaults in Config.in
]
Signed-off-by: Yann E. MORIN <yann.morin.1998@free.fr>
With the addition of support for custom opensbi version in commit
5c7166d387 (boot/opensbi: add support for version configuration), we can no
longer be sure that the license file name / hash will be correct in all
cases, so only specify COPYING.BSD when _LATEST_VERSION is used, similar to
how we do it for the Linux kernel.
Signed-off-by: Peter Korsgaard <peter@korsgaard.com>
With the addition of support for custom opensbi version in commit
5c7166d387 (boot/opensbi: add support for version configuration), we can no
longer be sure that the Buildroot patches can be applied - So move them to a
0.9 subdir to ensure they are only applied when the _LATEST_VERSION is used.
Signed-off-by: Peter Korsgaard <peter@korsgaard.com>
Commit 3b551f68a5 (boot/beaglev-ddrlnit: rename to beaglev-ddrinit to
match renamed upstream repo) forgot to update the include in boot/Config.in,
breaking menuconfig.
Signed-off-by: Peter Korsgaard <peter@korsgaard.com>
This packages allows to build the first stage bootloader used on the
BeagleV, which is used even before the DDR initialization and
OpenSBI/U-Boot. Yes, "secondboot" is strange for what is the first
stage bootloader, but that's the upstream name.
Signed-off-by: Thomas Petazzoni <thomas.petazzoni@bootlin.com>
Reviewed-by: Bin Meng <bmeng.cn@gmail.com>
[yann.morin.1998@free.fr:
- add hash file
- commit is HEAD only right now, so don't reference HEAD
]
Signed-off-by: Yann E. MORIN <yann.morin.1998@free.fr>
This commit adds a package for the DDR initialization code used on the
BeagleV platform.
The typo in the package name is upstream's typo, and we just keep it.
Signed-off-by: Thomas Petazzoni <thomas.petazzoni@bootlin.com>
Reviewed-by: Bin Meng <bmeng.cn@gmail.com>
[yann.morin.1998@free.fr:
- upstream name is beaglev_ddrlnit, not *init (keep their typo)
- rename package and variables accordingly
- the referenced commit is no longer the HEAD of said branch
- add a hash file
]
Signed-off-by: Yann E. MORIN <yann.morin.1998@free.fr>
Until now, whenever a BR2_TARGET_OPENSBI_PLAT value was specified,
opensbi.mk was assuming that both fw_jump and fw_dynamic would be
produced. However, this is not the case: the OpenSBI per-platform
config.mk can decide which image to build.
As an example, the config.mk for VIC7100-based BeagleV only enables
producing the fw_payload image.
This commit adds three options to enable the installation of images:
one for fw_jump, one for fw_dynamic, one for fw_payload.
The options for fw_jump and fw_dynamic are "default y" when
BR2_TARGET_OPENSBI_PLAT is not empty, to preserve existing behavior.
The option for fw_payload is forcefully selected when either Linux or
U-Boot are selected as payloads.
Signed-off-by: Thomas Petazzoni <thomas.petazzoni@bootlin.com>
Reviewed-by: Alistair Francis <alistair.francis@wdc.com>
Signed-off-by: Yann E. MORIN <yann.morin.1998@free.fr>
The opensbi package already allows to use Linux as a payload for
OpenSBI, but in some cases, U-Boot as payload is useful. This commit
adds a BR2_TARGET_OPENSBI_UBOOT_PAYLOAD option, modeled after the
existing BR2_TARGET_OPENSBI_LINUX_PAYLOAD.
Signed-off-by: Thomas Petazzoni <thomas.petazzoni@bootlin.com>
Reviewed-by: Bin Meng <bmeng.cn@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Peter Korsgaard <peter@korsgaard.com>
OpenSBI contains platform-specific code, so very much like Linux,
U-Boot or other bootloaders, using the upstream version of OpenSBI
will very often not be sufficient.
This commit therefore adds the possibility of specifying a custom
version of OpenSBI, either custom from upstream, custom tarball, or
custom from Git. Support for other version control systems has not
been implemented for now, but could be added later if needed.
Signed-off-by: Thomas Petazzoni <thomas.petazzoni@bootlin.com>
Reviewed-by: Bin Meng <bmeng.cn@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Peter Korsgaard <peter@korsgaard.com>
The old at91bootstrap version (1.x) uses a strange variant of the BSD
license, called "BSD Source Code Attribution" and referenced by SPDX
as BSD-Source-Code.
Signed-off-by: Thomas Petazzoni <thomas.petazzoni@bootlin.com>
shim 15.4 builds just fine on ARM32.
Signed-off-by: Thomas Petazzoni <thomas.petazzoni@bootlin.com>
Signed-off-by: Peter Korsgaard <peter@korsgaard.com>
- Use the tarball provided by upstream developers instead of the one
generated by Github. Indeed
https://github.com/rhboot/shim/releases/tag/15.4 indicates "As
usual, please use the shim-15.4.tar.bz2 tarball, rather than the
other two archives github automatically produces."
- The tarball now includes the gnu-efi code, so we no longer need to
select gnu-efi and have it as a build dependency. We continue to use
BR2_PACKAGE_GNU_EFI_ARCH_SUPPORTS as we still only build for those
architectures that have gnu-efi support. We also drop the
EFI_INCLUDE, EFI_PATH and LIBDIR variables, as gnu-efi no longer
needs to be searched in STAGING_DIR.
- Drop all four patches, which were backports from upstream.
Signed-off-by: Thomas Petazzoni <thomas.petazzoni@bootlin.com>
Signed-off-by: Peter Korsgaard <peter@korsgaard.com>
Backport a set of upstream patches to fix:
MokManager.c: In function ‘write_back_mok_list’:
MokManager.c:1081:19: error: taking address of packed member of ‘struct <anonymous>’ may result in an unaligned pointer value [-Werror=address-of-packed-member]
1081 | if (CompareGuid(&(list[i].Type), &X509_GUID) == 0)
| ^~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
MokManager.c:1103:19: error: taking address of packed member of ‘struct <anonymous>’ may result in an unaligned pointer value [-Werror=address-of-packed-member]
1103 | if (CompareGuid(&(list[i].Type), &X509_GUID) == 0) {
| ^~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
MokManager.c: In function ‘delete_cert’:
MokManager.c:1144:19: error: taking address of packed member of ‘struct <anonymous>’ may result in an unaligned pointer value [-Werror=address-of-packed-member]
1144 | if (CompareGuid(&(mok[i].Type), &X509_GUID) != 0)
| ^~~~~~~~~~~~~~
MokManager.c: In function ‘delete_hash_in_list’:
MokManager.c:1195:20: error: taking address of packed member of ‘struct <anonymous>’ may result in an unaligned pointer value [-Werror=address-of-packed-member]
1195 | if ((CompareGuid(&(mok[i].Type), &Type) != 0) ||
| ^~~~~~~~~~~~~~
MokManager.c: In function ‘delete_keys’:
MokManager.c:1359:19: error: taking address of packed member of ‘struct <anonymous>’ may result in an unaligned pointer value [-Werror=address-of-packed-member]
1359 | if (CompareGuid(&(del_key[i].Type), &X509_GUID) == 0) {
| ^~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
cc1: all warnings being treated as errors
make[1]: *** [<builtin>: MokManager.o] Error 1
Signed-off-by: Thomas Petazzoni <thomas.petazzoni@bootlin.com>
Signed-off-by: Peter Korsgaard <peter@korsgaard.com>
shim fails to build with:
console.c:448:5: error: ‘EFI_WARN_UNKOWN_GLYPH’ undeclared here (not in a function); did you mean ‘EFI_WARN_UNKNOWN_GLYPH’?
448 | { EFI_WARN_UNKOWN_GLYPH, L"Warning Unknown Glyph"},
| ^~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
| EFI_WARN_UNKNOWN_GLYPH
make[2]: *** [<builtin>: console.o] Error 1
make[2]: *** Waiting for unfinished jobs....
Backport upstream commit d230d02f990f02293736dca78b108f86c86d1bd0 to
resolve this issue.
Signed-off-by: Thomas Petazzoni <thomas.petazzoni@bootlin.com>
Signed-off-by: Peter Korsgaard <peter@korsgaard.com>
An analysis of the last 3 remaining CVEs that are reported to affect
the grub2 package has allowed to ensure that we can safely ignore
them:
* CVE-2020-14372 is already fixed by a patch we have in our patch
stack for grub2
* CVE-2019-14865 and CVE-2020-15705 are both distro-specific and do
not affect grub2 upstream, nor grub2 with the stack of patches we
have in Buildroot
Signed-off-by: Thomas Petazzoni <thomas.petazzoni@bootlin.com>
Signed-off-by: Peter Korsgaard <peter@korsgaard.com>
The BR2_TOOLCHAIN_HAS_BINUTILS_BUG_19615 and
BR2_TOOLCHAIN_HAS_BINUTILS_BUG_20006 options were last selected by the
BR2_TOOLCHAIN_EXTERNAL_CODESOURCERY_AMD64 toolchain, but this
toolchain has been removed as part of commit
d87e114a8f in August 2020.
It's time to get rid of those two options that are never enabled.
Signed-off-by: Thomas Petazzoni <thomas.petazzoni@bootlin.com>
Signed-off-by: Yann E. MORIN <yann.morin.1998@free.fr>
Details: https://lists.gnu.org/archive/html/grub-devel/2021-03/msg00007.html
As detailed in commit 7e64a050fb, it is
difficult to utilize the upstream patches directly, so a number of
patches include changes to generated files so that we don't need invoke
the gentpl.py script.
In addition to the security fixes, these required patches has been
backported:
f76a27996 efi: Make shim_lock GUID and protocol type public
04ae030d0 efi: Return grub_efi_status_t from grub_efi_get_variable()
ac5c93675 efi: Add a function to read EFI variables with attributes
d7e54b2e5 efi: Add secure boot detection
The following security issues are fixed:
CVE-2020-14372 grub2: The acpi command allows privileged user to load crafted
ACPI tables when Secure Boot is enabled
CWE-184
7.5/CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:H/PR:H/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:H/A:H
GRUB2 enables the use of the command acpi even when Secure Boot is signaled by
the firmware. An attacker with local root privileges to can drop a small SSDT
in /boot/efi and modify grub.cfg to instruct grub to load said SSDT. The SSDT
then gets run by the kernel and it overwrites the kernel lock down configuration
enabling the attacker to load unsigned kernel modules and kexec unsigned code.
Reported-by: Máté Kukri
*******************************************************************************
CVE-2020-25632 grub2: Use-after-free in rmmod command
CWE-416
7.5/CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:H/PR:H/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:H/A:H
The rmmod implementation for GRUB2 is flawed, allowing an attacker to unload
a module used as dependency without checking if any other dependent module is
still loaded. This leads to an use-after-free scenario possibly allowing an
attacker to execute arbitrary code and by-pass Secure Boot protections.
Reported-by: Chris Coulson (Canonical)
*******************************************************************************
CVE-2020-25647 grub2: Out-of-bound write in grub_usb_device_initialize()
CWE-787
6.9/CVSS:3.1/AV:P/AC:H/PR:H/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:H/A:H
grub_usb_device_initialize() is called to handle USB device initialization. It
reads out the descriptors it needs from the USB device and uses that data to
fill in some USB data structures. grub_usb_device_initialize() performs very
little bounds checking and simply assumes the USB device provides sane values.
This behavior can trigger memory corruption. If properly exploited, this would
lead to arbitrary code execution allowing the attacker to by-pass Secure Boot
mechanism.
Reported-by: Joseph Tartaro (IOActive) and Ilja van Sprundel (IOActive)
*******************************************************************************
CVE-2020-27749 grub2: Stack buffer overflow in grub_parser_split_cmdline
CWE-121
7.5/CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:H/PR:H/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:H/A:H
grub_parser_split_cmdline() expands variable names present in the supplied
command line in to their corresponding variable contents and uses a 1kB stack
buffer for temporary storage without sufficient bounds checking. If the
function is called with a command line that references a variable with a
sufficiently large payload, it is possible to overflow the stack buffer,
corrupt the stack frame and control execution. An attacker may use this to
circumvent Secure Boot protections.
Reported-by: Chris Coulson (Canonical)
*******************************************************************************
CVE-2020-27779 grub2: The cutmem command allows privileged user to remove
memory regions when Secure Boot is enabled
CWE-285
7.5/CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:H/PR:H/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:H/A:H
The GRUB2's cutmem command does not honor Secure Boot locking. This allows an
privileged attacker to remove address ranges from memory creating an
opportunity to circumvent Secure Boot protections after proper triage about
grub's memory layout.
Reported-by: Teddy Reed
*******************************************************************************
CVE-2021-3418 - grub2: GRUB 2.05 reintroduced CVE-2020-15705
CWE-281
6.4/CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:H/PR:H/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H
The GRUB2 upstream reintroduced the CVE-2020-15705. This refers to a distro
specific flaw which made upstream in the mentioned version.
If certificates that signed GRUB2 are installed into db, GRUB2 can be booted
directly. It will then boot any kernel without signature validation. The booted
kernel will think it was booted in Secure Boot mode and will implement lock
down, yet it could have been tampered.
This flaw only affects upstream and distributions using the shim_lock verifier.
Reported-by: Dimitri John Ledkov (Canonical)
*******************************************************************************
CVE-2021-20225 grub2: Heap out-of-bounds write in short form option parser
CWE-787
7.5/CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:H/PR:H/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:H/A:H
The option parser in GRUB2 allows an attacker to write past the end of
a heap-allocated buffer by calling certain commands with a large number
of specific short forms of options.
Reported-by: Daniel Axtens (IBM)
*******************************************************************************
CVE-2021-20233 grub2: Heap out-of-bound write due to mis-calculation of
space required for quoting
CWE-787
7.5/CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:H/PR:H/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:H/A:H
There's a flaw on GRUB2 menu rendering code setparam_prefix() in the menu
rendering code performs a length calculation on the assumption that expressing
a quoted single quote will require 3 characters, while it actually requires
4 characters. This allow an attacker to corrupt memory by one byte for each
quote in the input.
Reported-by: Daniel Axtens (IBM)
*******************************************************************************
Signed-off-by: Stefan Sørensen <stefan.sorensen@spectralink.com>
Signed-off-by: Yann E. MORIN <yann.morin.1998@free.fr>
If PER_PACKAGE_DIRECTORIES=Y and using host-make package (because
BR2_FORCE_HOST_BUILD=Y or local make is too old) .stamp_dotconfig
target needs per-package/uboot/host/bin/host-make that doesn't
exist yet.
Add host-make into UBOOT_KCONFIG_DEPENDENCIES.
Signed-off-by: Nicolas Toromanoff <nicolas.toromanoff@foss.st.com>
Signed-off-by: Yann E. MORIN <yann.morin.1998@free.fr>
Commit ca1604388a updated the checksum of
the tarball, but failed to update the one of main.c, which serves as a
license file.
Signed-off-by: Edgar Bonet <bonet@grenoble.cnrs.fr>
Signed-off-by: Yann E. MORIN <yann.morin.1998@free.fr>
Bump OP-TEE OS package version to OP-TEE release 3.12.0.
Signed-off-by: Etienne Carriere <etienne.carriere@linaro.org>
Signed-off-by: Thomas Petazzoni <thomas.petazzoni@bootlin.com>
since 2021.01, tools/binman is broken.
tools/binman/control.py imports pkg_resources
the module pkg_resources is supplied by setuptools,
so this new dependency is required.
Signed-off-by: Francois Perrad <francois.perrad@gadz.org>
Signed-off-by: Peter Korsgaard <peter@korsgaard.com>
Commit 5b95a5dc2 (support/download: change format of archives generated
from git) changed the way the archives generated from git repositories
are named, adding a "format-version" identifier right between the
package version and the file extension.
Commit c043ecb20 (support/download: change format of archives generated
from svn) did so for archives generated from a subversion checkout.
However, for a few packages, we manually force the _SOURCE variable,
because we want to share the archive with another package, to avoid
downloading and storing those archives twice. This is the case for:
- linux-headers and linux
- barebox-aux and barebox
When the generated tarballs were renamed with the aforementioned
commits, those packages were not updated accordingly.
Fix that by manually propagating the per-site-method format-version.
Reported-by: "Stephane Viau (OSS)" <stephane.viau@oss.nxp.com>
Signed-off-by: Yann E. MORIN <yann.morin.1998@free.fr>
Cc: "Stephane Viau (OSS)" <stephane.viau@oss.nxp.com>
Cc: Arnout Vandecappelle <arnout@mind.be>
Cc: Thomas Petazzoni <thomas.petazzoni@bootlin.com>
Cc: Peter Korsgaard <peter@korsgaard.com>
Signed-off-by: Thomas Petazzoni <thomas.petazzoni@bootlin.com>
Some RISC-V platforms (such as SiFive HiFive Unleashed) encapsulate
the OpenSBI firmware image inside U-Boot.
Signed-off-by: Bin Meng <bin.meng@windriver.com>
Reviewed-by: Alistair Francis <alistair.francis@wdc.com>
Signed-off-by: Thomas Petazzoni <thomas.petazzoni@bootlin.com>
