Details: https://lists.gnu.org/archive/html/grub-devel/2021-03/msg00007.html
As detailed in commit 7e64a050fb, it is
difficult to utilize the upstream patches directly, so a number of
patches include changes to generated files so that we don't need invoke
the gentpl.py script.
In addition to the security fixes, these required patches has been
backported:
f76a27996 efi: Make shim_lock GUID and protocol type public
04ae030d0 efi: Return grub_efi_status_t from grub_efi_get_variable()
ac5c93675 efi: Add a function to read EFI variables with attributes
d7e54b2e5 efi: Add secure boot detection
The following security issues are fixed:
CVE-2020-14372 grub2: The acpi command allows privileged user to load crafted
ACPI tables when Secure Boot is enabled
CWE-184
7.5/CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:H/PR:H/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:H/A:H
GRUB2 enables the use of the command acpi even when Secure Boot is signaled by
the firmware. An attacker with local root privileges to can drop a small SSDT
in /boot/efi and modify grub.cfg to instruct grub to load said SSDT. The SSDT
then gets run by the kernel and it overwrites the kernel lock down configuration
enabling the attacker to load unsigned kernel modules and kexec unsigned code.
Reported-by: Máté Kukri
*******************************************************************************
CVE-2020-25632 grub2: Use-after-free in rmmod command
CWE-416
7.5/CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:H/PR:H/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:H/A:H
The rmmod implementation for GRUB2 is flawed, allowing an attacker to unload
a module used as dependency without checking if any other dependent module is
still loaded. This leads to an use-after-free scenario possibly allowing an
attacker to execute arbitrary code and by-pass Secure Boot protections.
Reported-by: Chris Coulson (Canonical)
*******************************************************************************
CVE-2020-25647 grub2: Out-of-bound write in grub_usb_device_initialize()
CWE-787
6.9/CVSS:3.1/AV:P/AC:H/PR:H/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:H/A:H
grub_usb_device_initialize() is called to handle USB device initialization. It
reads out the descriptors it needs from the USB device and uses that data to
fill in some USB data structures. grub_usb_device_initialize() performs very
little bounds checking and simply assumes the USB device provides sane values.
This behavior can trigger memory corruption. If properly exploited, this would
lead to arbitrary code execution allowing the attacker to by-pass Secure Boot
mechanism.
Reported-by: Joseph Tartaro (IOActive) and Ilja van Sprundel (IOActive)
*******************************************************************************
CVE-2020-27749 grub2: Stack buffer overflow in grub_parser_split_cmdline
CWE-121
7.5/CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:H/PR:H/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:H/A:H
grub_parser_split_cmdline() expands variable names present in the supplied
command line in to their corresponding variable contents and uses a 1kB stack
buffer for temporary storage without sufficient bounds checking. If the
function is called with a command line that references a variable with a
sufficiently large payload, it is possible to overflow the stack buffer,
corrupt the stack frame and control execution. An attacker may use this to
circumvent Secure Boot protections.
Reported-by: Chris Coulson (Canonical)
*******************************************************************************
CVE-2020-27779 grub2: The cutmem command allows privileged user to remove
memory regions when Secure Boot is enabled
CWE-285
7.5/CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:H/PR:H/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:H/A:H
The GRUB2's cutmem command does not honor Secure Boot locking. This allows an
privileged attacker to remove address ranges from memory creating an
opportunity to circumvent Secure Boot protections after proper triage about
grub's memory layout.
Reported-by: Teddy Reed
*******************************************************************************
CVE-2021-3418 - grub2: GRUB 2.05 reintroduced CVE-2020-15705
CWE-281
6.4/CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:H/PR:H/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H
The GRUB2 upstream reintroduced the CVE-2020-15705. This refers to a distro
specific flaw which made upstream in the mentioned version.
If certificates that signed GRUB2 are installed into db, GRUB2 can be booted
directly. It will then boot any kernel without signature validation. The booted
kernel will think it was booted in Secure Boot mode and will implement lock
down, yet it could have been tampered.
This flaw only affects upstream and distributions using the shim_lock verifier.
Reported-by: Dimitri John Ledkov (Canonical)
*******************************************************************************
CVE-2021-20225 grub2: Heap out-of-bounds write in short form option parser
CWE-787
7.5/CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:H/PR:H/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:H/A:H
The option parser in GRUB2 allows an attacker to write past the end of
a heap-allocated buffer by calling certain commands with a large number
of specific short forms of options.
Reported-by: Daniel Axtens (IBM)
*******************************************************************************
CVE-2021-20233 grub2: Heap out-of-bound write due to mis-calculation of
space required for quoting
CWE-787
7.5/CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:H/PR:H/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:H/A:H
There's a flaw on GRUB2 menu rendering code setparam_prefix() in the menu
rendering code performs a length calculation on the assumption that expressing
a quoted single quote will require 3 characters, while it actually requires
4 characters. This allow an attacker to corrupt memory by one byte for each
quote in the input.
Reported-by: Daniel Axtens (IBM)
*******************************************************************************
Signed-off-by: Stefan Sørensen <stefan.sorensen@spectralink.com>
Signed-off-by: Yann E. MORIN <yann.morin.1998@free.fr>
This patch adds CPE ID information for a significant number of
packages.
Signed-off-by: Matthew Weber <matthew.weber@rockwellcollins.com>
Signed-off-by: Thomas Petazzoni <thomas.petazzoni@bootlin.com>
Details: https://lists.gnu.org/archive/html/grub-devel/2020-07/msg00034.html
Fixes the following security issues:
* CVE-2020-10713
A flaw was found in grub2, prior to version 2.06. An attacker may
use the GRUB 2 flaw to hijack and tamper the GRUB verification
process. This flaw also allows the bypass of Secure Boot
protections. In order to load an untrusted or modified kernel, an
attacker would first need to establish access to the system such as
gaining physical access, obtain the ability to alter a pxe-boot
network, or have remote access to a networked system with root
access. With this access, an attacker could then craft a string to
cause a buffer overflow by injecting a malicious payload that leads
to arbitrary code execution within GRUB. The highest threat from
this vulnerability is to data confidentiality and integrity as well
as system availability.
* CVE-2020-14308
In grub2 versions before 2.06 the grub memory allocator doesn't
check for possible arithmetic overflows on the requested allocation
size. This leads the function to return invalid memory allocations
which can be further used to cause possible integrity,
confidentiality and availability impacts during the boot process.
* CVE-2020-14309
There's an issue with grub2 in all versions before 2.06 when
handling squashfs filesystems containing a symbolic link with name
length of UINT32 bytes in size. The name size leads to an
arithmetic overflow leading to a zero-size allocation further
causing a heap-based buffer overflow with attacker controlled data.
* CVE-2020-14310
An integer overflow in read_section_from_string may lead to a heap
based buffer overflow.
* CVE-2020-14311
An integer overflow in grub_ext2_read_link may lead to a heap-based
buffer overflow.
* CVE-2020-15706
GRUB2 contains a race condition in grub_script_function_create()
leading to a use-after-free vulnerability which can be triggered by
redefining a function whilst the same function is already
executing, leading to arbitrary code execution and secure boot
restriction bypass
* CVE-2020-15707
Integer overflows were discovered in the functions grub_cmd_initrd
and grub_initrd_init in the efilinux component of GRUB2, as shipped
in Debian, Red Hat, and Ubuntu (the functionality is not included
in GRUB2 upstream), leading to a heap-based buffer overflow. These
could be triggered by an extremely large number of arguments to the
initrd command on 32-bit architectures, or a crafted filesystem
with very large files on any architecture. An attacker could use
this to execute arbitrary code and bypass UEFI Secure Boot
restrictions. This issue affects GRUB2 version 2.04 and prior
versions.
Signed-off-by: Stefan Sørensen <stefan.sorensen@spectralink.com>
Signed-off-by: Peter Korsgaard <peter@korsgaard.com>
Backport a patch from upstream to fix the build on certain versions of
gsc, notably:
Ubuntu 19.10 with gcc (Ubuntu 8.3.0-26ubuntu1~19.10) 8.3.0
Ubuntu 19.10 with gcc (Ubuntu 9.2.1-9ubuntu2) 9.2.1 20191008
The upstream patch is simply a change in the gentpl.py script, which is
used to generate parts of the automake machinery, so if we just backport
the upstream patch, we need to call the script to regenerate those files.
However, the modified script is a python script, so we would need to add
a dependency on host-python (2 or 3), which is not so nice.
Furthermore, calling the script is not enough: it needs a specific set
of optionss for each file it is to generate. That set of options is not
static; it is constructed in the convoluted autogen.sh. Calling
autogen.sh is usally not so good an idea in the Buildroot context, and
indeed this fails becasue it calls to autoreconf, but without our
carefuly crafted options and environment variables.
There was a little light in the tunnel, in that autogen.sh can be told
not to run autoreconf, by setting the environemnt variable
FROM_BOOTSTRAP to an non-=empty string, but this is fraught with various
other side-effects, as in that cause, autogen.sh expects to be valled by
an upper sciopt, bootstrap, which is not provided in the tarball
distribution...
So, between all those issues, autogen, bootstrap, and a host-python (2
or 3) dependency, we choose another route: path the script *and* the one
generated file affected by the change. Since that patched file is a .am
file, we also patch the corresponding .in file
However, we're faced with another issue: the other generated file is
now older than the script, so the automake machinery will now want to
re-run autoconf et al during the build step, which is still not a good
idea for us. So we touch the other generated file so it is mopre recent
than the script.
This is still not sufficient, because the patched file also has a
dependency on the generated file, so we need to touch as well.
Fixes:
- https://bugs.buildroot.org/show_bug.cgi?id=12946
Signed-off-by: Fabrice Fontaine <fontaine.fabrice@gmail.com>
[yann.morin.1998@free.fr:
- keep the hunk about patching gentpl.py
- make it a git-formatted patch
- add the touch
- drastically expand the commit log
]
Signed-off-by: Yann E. MORIN <yann.morin.1998@free.fr>
Add notes to test grub2 running on ARM using qemu. The arm section
describes how to run it using u-boot and aarch64 shows how to do it
using efi, which is similar to what has to be done for x86_64.
The source for OVMF builds is also changed to
https://www.kraxel.org/repos/jenkins/edk2/ which is the source for
nightly builds (as rpms but which can be extracted in any distribution),
as the sourceforge link provided only very old builds.
Signed-off-by: Erico Nunes <nunes.erico@gmail.com>
[Thomas:
- formatting fixes
- simplify the AArch64/EFI example by using the aarch64_efi_defconfig]
Signed-off-by: Thomas Petazzoni <thomas.petazzoni@bootlin.com>
This commit enables the arm-uboot, arm-efi and aarch64-efi grub2
platforms in Buildroot.
With the uboot platform, the grub2 image gets built as a u-boot image
and is loaded from u-boot through a regular "bootm". The only
requirement from the u-boot side in order to allow this is that u-boot
is built with CONFIG_API enabled. CONFIG_API seems to not be enabled
by default in most in-tree configurations, however, it seems to be
available for quite some time now. So it might be possible to use this
even on older u-boot versions. This is available only for arm
(32-bit).
With the efi platform, grub2 gets built as an EFI executable. This
allows EFI firmware to find and load it similarly as it can be done
for x86_64. Also, since u-boot v2016.05, u-boot is able to load and
boot an EFI executable, so the uboot efi platform can also be used
from u-boot in recent versions. This has been enabled (mostly) by
default for ARM u-boot. efi platform is available for both arm and
aarch64.
Signed-off-by: Erico Nunes <nunes.erico@gmail.com>
[Thomas: move the BR2_USE_MMU dependency in
BR2_TARGET_GRUB2_ARCH_SUPPORTS]
Signed-off-by: Thomas Petazzoni <thomas.petazzoni@bootlin.com>
Add an option to install grub2 support tools to the target.
In the context of Buildroot, some useful target tools provided are
grub2-editenv, grub2-reboot, which provide means to manage the grub2,
environment, boot order, and others.
Signed-off-by: Erico Nunes <nunes.erico@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Thomas Petazzoni <thomas.petazzoni@bootlin.com>
grub2 requires the host grub2-mkimage tool to build some of its target
images. The current way of building this tool in the grub2 package is
to perform a simultaneous host-tools/target-bootloader build during
the grub2 build step.
This method makes the recipe complex to understand, and proved to be a
complication during the work to enable grub2 support for architectures
other than x86.
This patch tries to do a better separation between the build of grub2
host tools and target boot loader image, as a partial step to enable
grub2 to build for other architectures.
Signed-off-by: Erico Nunes <nunes.erico@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Thomas Petazzoni <thomas.petazzoni@bootlin.com>
In commit 2a27294e9a ("grub2: force
-fno-stack-protector in CFLAGS"), a fix was made to the grub2 package
to make it build properly even when SSP support is enabled.
However, commit 20a4583ebf ("security
hardening: add RELFO, FORTIFY options") reworked how SSP options are
passed, and they are now passed in CPPFLAGS instead of CFLAGS, making
the fix introduced by 2a27294e9a no
longer operating.
This commit will force no-stack-protector in CPPFLAGS instead of
CFLAGS.
Fixes bug #10961.
Signed-off-by: Tarek El-Sherbiny <tarek_el-sherbiny@waters.com>
Signed-off-by: Thomas Petazzoni <thomas.petazzoni@bootlin.com>
grub2 fails to configure when BR2_SSP_ALL is enabled, with the following
configure error:
checking whether -fno-asynchronous-unwind-tables works... yes
checking whether -fno-unwind-tables works... yes
checking for target linking format... unknown
configure: error: no suitable link format found
This can be worked around by enforcing -fno-stack-protector in the
package CFLAGS in a way that overrides the SSP flag, as is already done
for the valgrind package.
Fixes bug #10261.
Signed-off-by: Erico Nunes <nunes.erico@gmail.com>
Reported-by: Dr I J Ormshaw <ian_ormshaw@waters.com>
Signed-off-by: Thomas Petazzoni <thomas.petazzoni@free-electrons.com>
As discussed in the mailing list, grub2 usage notes were growing too big
for a Config.in documentation, and so it was agreed that a readme.txt in
the package directory is a better place to put them.
This commit simply moves the documentation as-is to preserve the
original contents as they were in Config.in which can be worked on in
further commits.
Signed-off-by: Erico Nunes <nunes.erico@gmail.com>
Cc: Thomas Petazzoni <thomas.petazzoni@free-electrons.com>
Signed-off-by: Thomas Petazzoni <thomas.petazzoni@free-electrons.com>
After many years since the last release and a long time with grub 2.02
in beta, there is finally a release and it brings many bug fixes and
interesting features such as support for ARM.
Patch boot/grub2/0001-remove-gets.patch doesn't seem to be required
anymore as grub-core/gnulib/stdio.in.h has changed significantly since
"053cfcd Import new gnulib." and has another treatment for gets.
Patch
boot/grub2/0002-grub-core-gettext-gettext.c-main_context-secondary_c.patch
was a backport which is present after the bump and therefore is also no
longer necessary.
Since we're adding a Config.in comment, we also introduce a
BR2_TARGET_GRUB2_ARCH_SUPPORTS hidden boolean, in order to avoid
repeating the architecture dependencies.
Signed-off-by: Erico Nunes <nunes.erico@gmail.com>
Cc: Thomas Petazzoni <thomas.petazzoni@free-electrons.com>
[Thomas: add BR2_TARGET_GRUB2_ARCH_SUPPORTS, remove bogus dependencies
on ARM and AArch64, since enabling Grub2 on those architectures is
done in another commit.]
Signed-off-by: Thomas Petazzoni <thomas.petazzoni@free-electrons.com>
grub2 builds for the target but installs with DESTDIR=$(HOST_DIR). Since
we set prefix to /usr in TARGET_CONF_OPTS, this results in installing
things in $(HOST_DIR)/usr.
To make sure we don't install in $(HOST_DIR)/usr, override --prefix and
--exec-prefix.
Signed-off-by: Arnout Vandecappelle (Essensium/Mind) <arnout@mind.be>
Signed-off-by: Thomas Petazzoni <thomas.petazzoni@free-electrons.com>
Since things are no longer installed in $(HOST_DIR)/usr, the callers
should also not refer to it.
This is a mechanical change with
git grep -l '$(HOST_DIR)/usr/lib' | xargs sed -i 's%$(HOST_DIR)/usr/lib%$(HOST_DIR)/lib%g'
Signed-off-by: Arnout Vandecappelle (Essensium/Mind) <arnout@mind.be>
Signed-off-by: Thomas Petazzoni <thomas.petazzoni@free-electrons.com>
Since things are no longer installed in $(HOST_DIR)/usr, the callers
should also not refer to it.
This is a mechanical change with
git grep -l '$(HOST_DIR)/usr/bin' | xargs sed -i 's%$(HOST_DIR)/usr/bin%$(HOST_DIR)/bin%g'
Signed-off-by: Arnout Vandecappelle (Essensium/Mind) <arnout@mind.be>
Signed-off-by: Thomas Petazzoni <thomas.petazzoni@free-electrons.com>
Curently, we have a choice to select between stripping and not
stripping. This is legacy code from back when we had a third option,
sstrip (super-strip).
Since we removed sstrip, stripping or not stripping is now just a
boolean rather than a choice.
Make it so.
We make BR2_STRIP_strip default to 'y' to keep the current behaviour of
defaulting to stripping.
Move BR2_STIP_none to legacy, and instruct the user to review the new
setting.
Drop any reference to BR2_STRIP_none in comments.
Signed-off-by: "Yann E. MORIN" <yann.morin.1998@free.fr>
Cc: Arnout Vandecappelle <arnout@mind.be>
Cc: Thomas Petazzoni <thomas.petazzoni@free-electrons.com>
Signed-off-by: Thomas Petazzoni <thomas.petazzoni@free-electrons.com>
We want to use SPDX identifier for license string as much as possible.
SPDX short identifier for GPLv3/GPLv3+ is GPL-3.0/GPL-3.0+.
This change is done using following command.
find . -name "*.mk" | xargs sed -ri '/LICENSE( )?[\+:]?=/s/\<GPLv3\>/GPL-3.0/g'
Signed-off-by: Rahul Bedarkar <rahulbedarkar89@gmail.com>
Acked-by: Arnout Vandecappelle (Essensium/Mind) <arnout@mind.be>
Signed-off-by: Thomas Petazzoni <thomas.petazzoni@free-electrons.com>
grub2 assumes the strip command will generate output and the output should
always be stripped - so, just use the $(TARGET_CROSS)strip to make sure that
the build succeeds regardless of the buildroot strip configuration.
Signed-off-by: Charles Hardin <ckhardin@exablox.com>
Reviewed-by: "Yann E. MORIN" <yann.morin.1998@free.fr>
Signed-off-by: Peter Korsgaard <peter@korsgaard.com>
This commit backports a patch from upstream grub2 that fixes a build
issue occuring at least with recent gcc versions:
gettext/gettext.c:37:36: error: storage size of 'main_context' isn't known
static struct grub_gettext_context main_context, secondary_context;
Fixes bug #8991.
Bug reproduced with:
BR2_x86_64=y
BR2_PACKAGE_HOST_LINUX_HEADERS_CUSTOM_4_5=y
BR2_TOOLCHAIN_BUILDROOT_GLIBC=y
BR2_GCC_VERSION_6_X=y
BR2_TARGET_GRUB2=y
BR2_TARGET_GRUB2_X86_64_EFI=y
BR2_TARGET_GRUB2_BUILTIN_MODULES="boot linux ext2 fat squash4 part_msdos part_gpt normal efi_gop terminal"
and verified fixed after adding this patch.
Signed-off-by: Thomas Petazzoni <thomas.petazzoni@free-electrons.com>
There is no option --enable-liblzma=no in grub2's configure script, so
the only way to disable liblzma support is to pass
ac_cv_lib_lzma_lzma_code=no.
Signed-off-by: Gilles Chanteperdrix <gilles.chanteperdrix@xenomai.org>
Tested-by: "Yann E. MORIN" <yann.morin.1998@free.fr>
Reviewed-by: "Yann E. MORIN" <yann.morin.1998@free.fr>
[Thomas: expand commit log, as suggested by Yann E. Morin.]
Signed-off-by: Thomas Petazzoni <thomas.petazzoni@free-electrons.com>
Size growth is minimal and generally a non-issue for x86-based
platforms.
Signed-off-by: Gustavo Zacarias <gustavo@zacarias.com.ar>
Signed-off-by: Thomas Petazzoni <thomas.petazzoni@free-electrons.com>
It doesn't hurt, and is useful for removable boot media like a pendrive
that may depend on usb enumeration and isn't available immediately.
Signed-off-by: Gustavo Zacarias <gustavo@zacarias.com.ar>
Reviewed-by: Thomas Petazzoni <thomas.petazzoni@free-electrons.com>
Signed-off-by: Peter Korsgaard <peter@korsgaard.com>
Fixes https://bugs.busybox.net/show_bug.cgi?id=8256
grub2's build system interprets CC, CFLAGS and CPPFLAGS as for the host
and uses TARGET_CC etc. for the target. However, NM, OBJCOPY and STRIP
are used for the target. We currently pass the host-versions of these
tools as part of $(HOST_CONFIGURE_OPTS).
While we're at it, also pass TARGET_LDFLAGS.
This problem had not been noticed up to now because usually we build on
an x86 machine for the x86 architecture, so the binutils are compatible.
However, this is not true on an i386 when building for x86_64.
Cc: Christophe Bricout <christophebricout@yahoo.fr>
Signed-off-by: Arnout Vandecappelle (Essensium/Mind) <arnout@mind.be>
Signed-off-by: Thomas Petazzoni <thomas.petazzoni@free-electrons.com>
Building Grub2 El Torito for i386 EFI errors complaining it cannot
find cdboot.img
cdboot.img: No such file or directory
This commit builds El Torito for i386 PC only.
[Thomas: fix installation ordering.]
Signed-off-by: Ray Kinsella <ray.kinsella@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Thomas Petazzoni <thomas.petazzoni@free-electrons.com>
In order to support ISO9660 bootable images that rely on Grub 2, this
commit modifies thr Grub 2 makefile to generate and install an El
Torito image. Such an image is simply produced by concatenating the
cdboot.img provided by Grub 2, and the Grub 2 image generated by
Buildroot using grub-mkimage.
Since this action is so simple and cost-free, we don't bother adding a
Grub 2 sub-option for that, and simply generate the El Torito image
unconditionally.
Signed-off-by: Thomas Petazzoni <thomas.petazzoni@free-electrons.com>
Acked-by: "Yann E. MORIN" <yann.morin.1998@free.fr>
When x86-64-efi platform is selected, grub2 automatically adds -m64 to the
CFLAGS. This makes the configure script failed when the toolchain does not
have multilib support (like the Buildroot ones).
Reported-by: Noe Rubinstein <nrubinstein@aldebaran-robotics.com>
Signed-off-by: Samuel Martin <s.martin49@gmail.com>
Acked-by: "Yann E. MORIN" <yann.morin.1998@free.fr>
Signed-off-by: Thomas Petazzoni <thomas.petazzoni@free-electrons.com>
This is the location where buildroot install the image if requested,
so this should be the default search path for the bootloader.
Signed-off-by: Alvaro G. M <alvaro.gamez@hazent.com>
Acked-by: Thomas Petazzoni <thomas.petazzoni@free-electrons.com>
Signed-off-by: Peter Korsgaard <peter@korsgaard.com>
To be consistent with the recent change of FOO_MAKE_OPT into FOO_MAKE_OPTS,
make the same change for FOO_CONF_OPT.
Sed command used:
find * -type f | xargs sed -i 's#_CONF_OPT\>#&S#g'
Signed-off-by: Thomas De Schampheleire <thomas.de.schampheleire@gmail.com>
Reviewed-by: "Yann E. MORIN" <yann.morin.1998@free.fr>
Signed-off-by: Thomas Petazzoni <thomas.petazzoni@free-electrons.com>
To be consistent with the recent change of FOO_MAKE_OPT into FOO_MAKE_OPTS,
make the same change for FOO_INSTALL_TARGET_OPT.
Sed command used:
find * -type f | xargs sed -i 's#_INSTALL_TARGET_OPT\>#&S#g'
Signed-off-by: Thomas De Schampheleire <thomas.de.schampheleire@gmail.com>
Reviewed-by: "Yann E. MORIN" <yann.morin.1998@free.fr>
Signed-off-by: Thomas Petazzoni <thomas.petazzoni@free-electrons.com>
Since the trailing slash is stripped from $($(PKG)_SITE) by pkg-generic.mk:
$(call DOWNLOAD,$($(PKG)_SITE:/=)/$($(PKG)_SOURCE))
so it is redundant.
This patch removes it from $(PKG)_SITE variable for BR consistency.
Signed-off-by: Jerzy Grzegorek <jerzy.grzegorek@trzebnica.net>
Signed-off-by: Thomas Petazzoni <thomas.petazzoni@free-electrons.com>
The help text of grub2 explains the detailed steps to create a disk
image with grub2 installed on it. However, the steps for the
BIOS-based systems have a few minor issues fixed by this patch:
- When calling partx to get the partitions detected, we should do it
on the /dev/loop0 block device, and not on the underlying disk.img
image file.
- The grub-bios-setup utility must be called as root to work properly
on /dev/loop0.
- The steps to cleanup the partx and loop device were missing.
Signed-off-by: Thomas Petazzoni <thomas.petazzoni@free-electrons.com>
Since boot partition was not specified, grub tools try to detect it
automatically. This patch add an option to force it.
Signed-off-by: Jérôme Pouiller <jezz@sysmic.org>
Acked-by: Thomas Petazzoni <thomas.petazzoni@free-electrons.com>
Tested-by: Thomas Petazzoni <thomas.petazzoni@free-electrons.com>
Signed-off-by: Peter Korsgaard <peter@korsgaard.com>
Add an option for embedding a config file directly in grub.
Signed-off-by: Dima Zavin <dmitriyz@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Thomas Petazzoni <thomas.petazzoni@free-electrons.com>
Grub 2 has been marked BROKEN in June 2010, and nobody cared to fix it
since then.
At that time, it was marked broken because the build process needed a
Ruby interpreter available on the host, and it's really a pain that
building a bootloader needs such a thing.
I've tried to upgrade the package to Grub2 1.99-rcX, and now it does
not need a Ruby interpreter anymore, but instead requires a tool
called "autogen", which itself needs the Guile Scheme interpreter.
Since we haven't heard any complaints about Grub2 being marked broken,
and since it's such a pain to package, let's get rid of it. Of course,
anybody interested in Grub2 is invited to contribute a working
package.
Signed-off-by: Thomas Petazzoni <thomas.petazzoni@free-electrons.com>
Signed-off-by: Peter Korsgaard <jacmet@sunsite.dk>
Now that TARGET_CC contains several space-separated words, it must be
used quoted everywhere.
Signed-off-by: Thomas Petazzoni <thomas.petazzoni@free-electrons.com>
The build process of grub2 breaks the compilation. It breaks with:
./configure: line 4766: syntax error near unexpected token `external'
./configure: line 4766: `AM_GNU_GETTEXT(external)'
In addition to this, it later requires Ruby. Do we really want to make
Buildroot depend on Ruby being installed on the host ? Do we really
want to build our own Ruby ? Do we even care about Grub2 ?
Signed-off-by: Thomas Petazzoni <thomas.petazzoni@free-electrons.com>
Much of the grub2.mk seems to have been copy/pasted from
grub.mk. However, all the network/splashimage related ./configure
options do not exist in grub2.
Signed-off-by: Thomas Petazzoni <thomas.petazzoni@free-electrons.com>
grub2 now builds fine, but some work remains to make it usable. What
should be installed exactly in the TARGET_DIR ? What is the
installation procedure and what should Buildroot do ?
Signed-off-by: Thomas Petazzoni <thomas.petazzoni@free-electrons.com>
