Fixes CVE-2018-10906 - In fuse before versions 2.9.8 and 3.x before 3.2.5,
fusermount is vulnerable to a restriction bypass when SELinux is active.
This allows non-root users to mount a FUSE file system with the
'allow_other' mount option regardless of whether 'user_allow_other' is set
in the fuse configuration. An attacker may use this flaw to mount a FUSE
file system, accessible by other users, and trick them into accessing files
on that file system, possibly causing Denial of Service or other unspecified
effects.
And additionally:
- libfuse no longer segfaults when fuse_interrupted() is called outside the
event loop.
- The fusermount binary has been hardened in several ways to reduce
potential attack surface. Most importantly, mountpoints and mount options
must now match a hard-coded whitelist. It is expected that this whitelist
covers all regular use-cases.
Signed-off-by: Peter Korsgaard <peter@korsgaard.com>
The project moved to github, so point the homepage and download URL
there.
[Thomas:
- Remove comment "Switch to github helper on bump" since we clearly
don't want to switch to the github helper if they continue to
upload release tarballs.
- Adjust comment in the .hash file for clarity.]
Signed-off-by: Gustavo Zacarias <gustavo@zacarias.com.ar>
Signed-off-by: Thomas Petazzoni <thomas.petazzoni@free-electrons.com>
Fixes:
CVE-2015-3202 - fix exec environment for mount and umount.
Signed-off-by: Gustavo Zacarias <gustavo@zacarias.com.ar>
Signed-off-by: Peter Korsgaard <peter@korsgaard.com>
Since SourceForge sometimes serves us faulty tarballs, we can tons of
autobuild failures:
http://autobuild.buildroot.org/results/9fb/9fba5bf086a4e7a29e5f7156ec43847db7aacfc4/http://autobuild.buildroot.org/results/6c8/6c837b244c45ac3b3a887734a371cd6d226cf216/
...
Fix that by adding hash files for all SourceForge-hosted packages (thos
etht did not already have it).
We normally prefer to use hashes published by upstream, but hunting them
all one by one is a tedious task, so those hashes were all locally
computed with a script that searched for SF-hosted packages, downloades
the associated tarball, computed the hash, and stored it in the
corresponding .hash file.
Also, SF publishes sha1 hashes, while I used the stronger sha256, since
sha1 is now considered to be relatively weak.
Signed-off-by: "Yann E. MORIN" <yann.morin.1998@free.fr>
Cc: Peter Korsgaard <jacmet@uclibc.org>
Cc: Thomas Petazzoni <thomas.petazzoni@free-electrons.com>
Cc: Maxime Hadjinlian <maxime.hadjinlian@gmail.com>
Cc: Richard Braun <rbraun@sceen.net>
Cc: Nathaniel Roach <nroach44@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Thomas Petazzoni <thomas.petazzoni@free-electrons.com>
