quagga: add upstream security fix for CVE-2017-16227

>From the advisory:
http://www.openwall.com/lists/oss-security/2017/10/30/4

It was discovered that the bgpd daemon in the Quagga routing suite does
not properly calculate the length of multi-segment AS_PATH UPDATE
messages, causing bgpd to drop a session and potentially resulting in
loss of network connectivity.

Signed-off-by: Peter Korsgaard <peter@korsgaard.com>
Signed-off-by: Thomas Petazzoni <thomas.petazzoni@free-electrons.com>
This commit is contained in:
Peter Korsgaard 2017-10-30 22:53:09 +01:00 committed by Thomas Petazzoni
parent cc856401e8
commit d77d7220a7

View File

@ -0,0 +1,33 @@
From 7a42b78be9a4108d98833069a88e6fddb9285008 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Andreas Jaggi <aj@open.ch>
Date: Mon, 2 Oct 2017 19:38:43 +0530
Subject: [PATCH] bgpd: Fix AS_PATH size calculation for long paths
If you have an AS_PATH with more entries than
what can be written into a single AS_SEGMENT_MAX
it needs to be broken up. The code that noticed
that the AS_PATH needs to be broken up was not
correctly calculating the size of the resulting
message. This patch addresses this issue.
Signed-off-by: Peter Korsgaard <peter@korsgaard.com>
---
bgpd/bgp_aspath.c | 2 +-
1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
diff --git a/bgpd/bgp_aspath.c b/bgpd/bgp_aspath.c
index b7af5e88..d813bfba 100644
--- a/bgpd/bgp_aspath.c
+++ b/bgpd/bgp_aspath.c
@@ -903,7 +903,7 @@ aspath_put (struct stream *s, struct aspath *as, int use32bit )
assegment_header_put (s, seg->type, AS_SEGMENT_MAX);
assegment_data_put (s, seg->as, AS_SEGMENT_MAX, use32bit);
written += AS_SEGMENT_MAX;
- bytes += ASSEGMENT_SIZE (written, use32bit);
+ bytes += ASSEGMENT_SIZE (AS_SEGMENT_MAX, use32bit);
}
/* write the final segment, probably is also the first */
--
2.11.0