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samba: bump to version 3.3.15

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Bump samba to version 3.3.15 and add security patches for CVE-2011-2522
and CVE-2011-2694.

Signed-off-by: Gustavo Zacarias <gustavo@zacarias.com.ar>
Signed-off-by: Peter Korsgaard <jacmet@sunsite.dk>
This commit is contained in:
Gustavo Zacarias 2011-07-28 17:14:03 -03:00 committed by Peter Korsgaard
parent b4d1882f7e
commit ced6c9df43
4 changed files with 808 additions and 616 deletions
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55
package/samba/samba-00CVE-2011-2694.patch Normal file
View File

@ -0,0 +1,55 @@
From d401ccaedaec09ad6900ec24ecaf205bed3e3ac1 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Kai Blin <kai@samba.org>
Date: Thu, 7 Jul 2011 10:03:33 +0200
Subject: [PATCH] s3 swat: Fix possible XSS attack (bug #8289)
Nobuhiro Tsuji of NTT DATA SECURITY CORPORATION reported a possible XSS attack
against SWAT, the Samba Web Administration Tool. The attack uses reflection to
insert arbitrary content into the "change password" page.
This patch fixes the reflection issue by not printing user-specified content on
the website anymore.
Signed-off-by: Kai Blin <kai@samba.org>
CVE-2011-2694.
---
source/web/swat.c | 14 ++------------
1 files changed, 2 insertions(+), 12 deletions(-)
diff --git a/source/web/swat.c b/source/web/swat.c
index 9c7294a..434b1ac 100644
--- a/source/web/swat.c
+++ b/source/web/swat.c
@@ -1120,11 +1120,9 @@ static void chg_passwd(void)
if(cgi_variable(CHG_S_PASSWD_FLAG)) {
printf("<p>");
if (rslt == True) {
- printf(_(" The passwd for '%s' has been changed."), cgi_variable_nonull(SWAT_USER));
- printf("\n");
+ printf("%s\n", _(" The passwd has been changed."));
} else {
- printf(_(" The passwd for '%s' has NOT been changed."), cgi_variable_nonull(SWAT_USER));
- printf("\n");
+ printf("%s\n", _(" The passwd has NOT been changed."));
}
}
@@ -1138,14 +1136,6 @@ static void passwd_page(void)
{
const char *new_name = cgi_user_name();
- /*
- * After the first time through here be nice. If the user
- * changed the User box text to another users name, remember it.
- */
- if (cgi_variable(SWAT_USER)) {
- new_name = cgi_variable_nonull(SWAT_USER);
- }
-
if (!new_name) new_name = "";
printf("<H2>%s</H2>\n", _("Server Password Management"));
--
1.7.1

749
package/samba/samba-01CVE-2011-2522.patch Normal file
View File

@ -0,0 +1,749 @@
From b610e0cee563465c6b970647b215f8ae4d0c6599 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Kai Blin <kai@samba.org>
Date: Fri, 8 Jul 2011 12:56:21 +0200
Subject: [PATCH 01/12] s3 swat: Allow getting the user's HTTP auth password
Signed-off-by: Kai Blin <kai@samba.org>
---
source/web/cgi.c | 9 +++++++++
source/web/swat_proto.h | 1 +
2 files changed, 10 insertions(+), 0 deletions(-)
diff --git a/source/web/cgi.c b/source/web/cgi.c
index 72aa11c..ccdc3a7 100644
--- a/source/web/cgi.c
+++ b/source/web/cgi.c
@@ -42,6 +42,7 @@ static char *query_string;
static const char *baseurl;
static char *pathinfo;
static char *C_user;
+static char *C_pass;
static bool inetd_server;
static bool got_request;
@@ -388,6 +389,7 @@ static bool cgi_handle_authorization(char *line)
/* Save the users name */
C_user = SMB_STRDUP(user);
+ C_pass = SMB_STRDUP(user_pass);
TALLOC_FREE(pass);
return True;
}
@@ -422,6 +424,13 @@ char *cgi_user_name(void)
return(C_user);
}
+/***************************************************************************
+return a ptr to the users password
+ ***************************************************************************/
+char *cgi_user_pass(void)
+{
+ return(C_pass);
+}
/***************************************************************************
handle a file download
diff --git a/source/web/swat_proto.h b/source/web/swat_proto.h
index 0f84e4f..76f9c3c 100644
--- a/source/web/swat_proto.h
+++ b/source/web/swat_proto.h
@@ -31,6 +31,7 @@ const char *cgi_variable(const char *name);
const char *cgi_variable_nonull(const char *name);
bool am_root(void);
char *cgi_user_name(void);
+char *cgi_user_pass(void);
void cgi_setup(const char *rootdir, int auth_required);
const char *cgi_baseurl(void);
const char *cgi_pathinfo(void);
--
1.7.1
From 3806fec53dcf3b6e5c3fd71917f9d67d47c65e32 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Kai Blin <kai@samba.org>
Date: Fri, 8 Jul 2011 12:57:43 +0200
Subject: [PATCH 02/12] s3 swat: Add support for anti-XSRF token
Signed-off-by: Kai Blin <kai@samba.org>
---
source/web/swat.c | 54 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
source/web/swat_proto.h | 5 ++++
2 files changed, 59 insertions(+), 0 deletions(-)
diff --git a/source/web/swat.c b/source/web/swat.c
index 434b1ac..e7d84e5 100644
--- a/source/web/swat.c
+++ b/source/web/swat.c
@@ -29,6 +29,7 @@
#include "includes.h"
#include "web/swat_proto.h"
+#include "../lib/crypto/md5.h"
static int demo_mode = False;
static int passwd_only = False;
@@ -50,6 +51,7 @@ static int iNumNonAutoPrintServices = 0;
#define DISABLE_USER_FLAG "disable_user_flag"
#define ENABLE_USER_FLAG "enable_user_flag"
#define RHOST "remote_host"
+#define XSRF_TOKEN "xsrf"
#define _(x) lang_msg_rotate(talloc_tos(),x)
@@ -138,6 +140,58 @@ static char *make_parm_name(const char *label)
return parmname;
}
+void get_xsrf_token(const char *username, const char *pass,
+ const char *formname, char token_str[33])
+{
+ struct MD5Context md5_ctx;
+ uint8_t token[16];
+ int i;
+
+ token_str[0] = '\0';
+ ZERO_STRUCT(md5_ctx);
+ MD5Init(&md5_ctx);
+
+ MD5Update(&md5_ctx, (uint8_t *)formname, strlen(formname));
+ if (username != NULL) {
+ MD5Update(&md5_ctx, (uint8_t *)username, strlen(username));
+ }
+ if (pass != NULL) {
+ MD5Update(&md5_ctx, (uint8_t *)pass, strlen(pass));
+ }
+
+ MD5Final(token, &md5_ctx);
+
+ for(i = 0; i < sizeof(token); i++) {
+ char tmp[3];
+
+ snprintf(tmp, sizeof(tmp), "%02x", token[i]);
+ strncat(token_str, tmp, sizeof(tmp));
+ }
+}
+
+void print_xsrf_token(const char *username, const char *pass,
+ const char *formname)
+{
+ char token[33];
+
+ get_xsrf_token(username, pass, formname, token);
+ printf("<input type=\"hidden\" name=\"%s\" value=\"%s\">\n",
+ XSRF_TOKEN, token);
+
+}
+
+bool verify_xsrf_token(const char *formname)
+{
+ char expected[33];
+ const char *username = cgi_user_name();
+ const char *pass = cgi_user_pass();
+ const char *token = cgi_variable_nonull(XSRF_TOKEN);
+
+ get_xsrf_token(username, pass, formname, expected);
+ return (strncmp(expected, token, sizeof(expected)) == 0);
+}
+
+
/****************************************************************************
include a lump of html in a page
****************************************************************************/
diff --git a/source/web/swat_proto.h b/source/web/swat_proto.h
index 76f9c3c..e66c942 100644
--- a/source/web/swat_proto.h
+++ b/source/web/swat_proto.h
@@ -67,5 +67,10 @@ void status_page(void);
/* The following definitions come from web/swat.c */
const char *lang_msg_rotate(TALLOC_CTX *ctx, const char *msgid);
+void get_xsrf_token(const char *username, const char *pass,
+ const char *formname, char token_str[33]);
+void print_xsrf_token(const char *username, const char *pass,
+ const char *formname);
+bool verify_xsrf_token(const char *formname);
#endif /* _SWAT_PROTO_H_ */
--
1.7.1
From 3f38cf42facc38c19e0448cbae3078b9606b08e4 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Kai Blin <kai@samba.org>
Date: Fri, 8 Jul 2011 12:58:53 +0200
Subject: [PATCH 03/12] s3 swat: Add XSRF protection to status page
Signed-off-by: Kai Blin <kai@samba.org>
---
source/web/statuspage.c | 7 +++++++
1 files changed, 7 insertions(+), 0 deletions(-)
diff --git a/source/web/statuspage.c b/source/web/statuspage.c
index 8070ae7..fe545e4 100644
--- a/source/web/statuspage.c
+++ b/source/web/statuspage.c
@@ -247,9 +247,14 @@ void status_page(void)
int nr_running=0;
bool waitup = False;
TALLOC_CTX *ctx = talloc_stackframe();
+ const char form_name[] = "status";
smbd_pid = pid_to_procid(pidfile_pid("smbd"));
+ if (!verify_xsrf_token(form_name)) {
+ goto output_page;
+ }
+
if (cgi_variable("smbd_restart") || cgi_variable("all_restart")) {
stop_smbd();
start_smbd();
@@ -326,9 +331,11 @@ void status_page(void)
initPid2Machine ();
+output_page:
printf("<H2>%s</H2>\n", _("Server Status"));
printf("<FORM method=post>\n");
+ print_xsrf_token(cgi_user_name(), cgi_user_pass(), form_name);
if (!autorefresh) {
printf("<input type=submit value=\"%s\" name=\"autorefresh\">\n", _("Auto Refresh"));
--
1.7.1
From ba996f0ae87f6bf4f19a4918e44dbd6d44a96561 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Kai Blin <kai@samba.org>
Date: Fri, 8 Jul 2011 15:02:53 +0200
Subject: [PATCH 04/12] s3 swat: Add XSRF protection to viewconfig page
Signed-off-by: Kai Blin <kai@samba.org>
---
source/web/swat.c | 7 +++++++
1 files changed, 7 insertions(+), 0 deletions(-)
diff --git a/source/web/swat.c b/source/web/swat.c
index e7d84e5..647126f 100644
--- a/source/web/swat.c
+++ b/source/web/swat.c
@@ -664,13 +664,20 @@ static void welcome_page(void)
static void viewconfig_page(void)
{
int full_view=0;
+ const char form_name[] = "viewconfig";
+
+ if (!verify_xsrf_token(form_name)) {
+ goto output_page;
+ }
if (cgi_variable("full_view")) {
full_view = 1;
}
+output_page:
printf("<H2>%s</H2>\n", _("Current Config"));
printf("<form method=post>\n");
+ print_xsrf_token(cgi_user_name(), cgi_user_pass(), form_name);
if (full_view) {
printf("<input type=submit name=\"normal_view\" value=\"%s\">\n", _("Normal View"));
--
1.7.1
From 94f8482607a175c44436fae456fbda3624629982 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Kai Blin <kai@samba.org>
Date: Fri, 8 Jul 2011 15:03:15 +0200
Subject: [PATCH 05/12] s3 swat: Add XSRF protection to wizard_params page
Signed-off-by: Kai Blin <kai@samba.org>
---
source/web/swat.c | 7 +++++++
1 files changed, 7 insertions(+), 0 deletions(-)
diff --git a/source/web/swat.c b/source/web/swat.c
index 647126f..b7eec4a 100644
--- a/source/web/swat.c
+++ b/source/web/swat.c
@@ -697,18 +697,25 @@ output_page:
static void wizard_params_page(void)
{
unsigned int parm_filter = FLAG_WIZARD;
+ const char form_name[] = "wizard_params";
/* Here we first set and commit all the parameters that were selected
in the previous screen. */
printf("<H2>%s</H2>\n", _("Wizard Parameter Edit Page"));
+ if (!verify_xsrf_token(form_name)) {
+ goto output_page;
+ }
+
if (cgi_variable("Commit")) {
commit_parameters(GLOBAL_SECTION_SNUM);
save_reload(0);
}
+output_page:
printf("<form name=\"swatform\" method=post action=wizard_params>\n");
+ print_xsrf_token(cgi_user_name(), cgi_user_pass(), form_name);
if (have_write_access) {
printf("<input type=submit name=\"Commit\" value=\"Commit Changes\">\n");
--
1.7.1
From eb22fd73060534700d514ec295985549131c7569 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Kai Blin <kai@samba.org>
Date: Fri, 8 Jul 2011 15:03:44 +0200
Subject: [PATCH 06/12] s3 swat: Add XSRF protection to wizard page
Signed-off-by: Kai Blin <kai@samba.org>
---
source/web/swat.c | 9 ++++++++-
1 files changed, 8 insertions(+), 1 deletions(-)
diff --git a/source/web/swat.c b/source/web/swat.c
index b7eec4a..b6e0c0f 100644
--- a/source/web/swat.c
+++ b/source/web/swat.c
@@ -751,6 +751,11 @@ static void wizard_page(void)
int have_home = -1;
int HomeExpo = 0;
int SerType = 0;
+ const char form_name[] = "wizard";
+
+ if (!verify_xsrf_token(form_name)) {
+ goto output_page;
+ }
if (cgi_variable("Rewrite")) {
(void) rewritecfg_file();
@@ -841,10 +846,12 @@ static void wizard_page(void)
winstype = 3;
role = lp_server_role();
-
+
+output_page:
/* Here we go ... */
printf("<H2>%s</H2>\n", _("Samba Configuration Wizard"));
printf("<form method=post action=wizard>\n");
+ print_xsrf_token(cgi_user_name(), cgi_user_pass(), form_name);
if (have_write_access) {
printf("%s\n", _("The \"Rewrite smb.conf file\" button will clear the smb.conf file of all default values and of comments."));
--
1.7.1
From 8fb3064eeaa3640af6c8b91aa5859d8bfb6d0888 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Kai Blin <kai@samba.org>
Date: Fri, 8 Jul 2011 15:04:12 +0200
Subject: [PATCH 07/12] s3 swat: Add XSRF protection to globals page
Signed-off-by: Kai Blin <kai@samba.org>
---
source/web/swat.c | 7 +++++++
1 files changed, 7 insertions(+), 0 deletions(-)
diff --git a/source/web/swat.c b/source/web/swat.c
index b6e0c0f..5d11685 100644
--- a/source/web/swat.c
+++ b/source/web/swat.c
@@ -920,9 +920,14 @@ static void globals_page(void)
{
unsigned int parm_filter = FLAG_BASIC;
int mode = 0;
+ const char form_name[] = "globals";
printf("<H2>%s</H2>\n", _("Global Parameters"));
+ if (!verify_xsrf_token(form_name)) {
+ goto output_page;
+ }
+
if (cgi_variable("Commit")) {
commit_parameters(GLOBAL_SECTION_SNUM);
save_reload(0);
@@ -935,7 +940,9 @@ static void globals_page(void)
if ( cgi_variable("AdvMode"))
mode = 1;
+output_page:
printf("<form name=\"swatform\" method=post action=globals>\n");
+ print_xsrf_token(cgi_user_name(), cgi_user_pass(), form_name);
ViewModeBoxes( mode );
switch ( mode ) {
--
1.7.1
From ef457a20422cfa8231e25b539d2cd87f299686b9 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Kai Blin <kai@samba.org>
Date: Fri, 8 Jul 2011 15:04:48 +0200
Subject: [PATCH 08/12] s3 swat: Add XSRF protection to shares page
Signed-off-by: Kai Blin <kai@samba.org>
---
source/web/swat.c | 18 +++++++++++++-----
1 files changed, 13 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-)
diff --git a/source/web/swat.c b/source/web/swat.c
index 5d11685..4544c31 100644
--- a/source/web/swat.c
+++ b/source/web/swat.c
@@ -982,11 +982,17 @@ static void shares_page(void)
int mode = 0;
unsigned int parm_filter = FLAG_BASIC;
size_t converted_size;
+ const char form_name[] = "shares";
+
+ printf("<H2>%s</H2>\n", _("Share Parameters"));
+
+ if (!verify_xsrf_token(form_name)) {
+ goto output_page;
+ }
if (share)
snum = lp_servicenumber(share);
- printf("<H2>%s</H2>\n", _("Share Parameters"));
if (cgi_variable("Commit") && snum >= 0) {
commit_parameters(snum);
@@ -1012,10 +1018,6 @@ static void shares_page(void)
}
}
- printf("<FORM name=\"swatform\" method=post>\n");
-
- printf("<table>\n");
-
if ( cgi_variable("ViewMode") )
mode = atoi(cgi_variable_nonull("ViewMode"));
if ( cgi_variable("BasicMode"))
@@ -1023,6 +1025,12 @@ static void shares_page(void)
if ( cgi_variable("AdvMode"))
mode = 1;
+output_page:
+ printf("<FORM name=\"swatform\" method=post>\n");
+ print_xsrf_token(cgi_user_name(), cgi_user_pass(), form_name);
+
+ printf("<table>\n");
+
ViewModeBoxes( mode );
switch ( mode ) {
case 0:
--
1.7.1
From 4850456845d2da5e3451716a5ad4ca0ef034e01f Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Kai Blin <kai@samba.org>
Date: Fri, 8 Jul 2011 15:05:38 +0200
Subject: [PATCH 09/12] s3 swat: Add XSRF protection to password page
Signed-off-by: Kai Blin <kai@samba.org>
---
source/web/swat.c | 11 ++++++++---
1 files changed, 8 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)
diff --git a/source/web/swat.c b/source/web/swat.c
index 4544c31..5242484 100644
--- a/source/web/swat.c
+++ b/source/web/swat.c
@@ -1225,12 +1225,15 @@ static void chg_passwd(void)
static void passwd_page(void)
{
const char *new_name = cgi_user_name();
+ const char passwd_form[] = "passwd";
+ const char rpasswd_form[] = "rpasswd";
if (!new_name) new_name = "";
printf("<H2>%s</H2>\n", _("Server Password Management"));
printf("<FORM name=\"swatform\" method=post>\n");
+ print_xsrf_token(cgi_user_name(), cgi_user_pass(), passwd_form);
printf("<table>\n");
@@ -1270,14 +1273,16 @@ static void passwd_page(void)
* Do some work if change, add, disable or enable was
* requested. It could be this is the first time through this
* code, so there isn't anything to do. */
- if ((cgi_variable(CHG_S_PASSWD_FLAG)) || (cgi_variable(ADD_USER_FLAG)) || (cgi_variable(DELETE_USER_FLAG)) ||
- (cgi_variable(DISABLE_USER_FLAG)) || (cgi_variable(ENABLE_USER_FLAG))) {
+ if (verify_xsrf_token(passwd_form) &&
+ ((cgi_variable(CHG_S_PASSWD_FLAG)) || (cgi_variable(ADD_USER_FLAG)) || (cgi_variable(DELETE_USER_FLAG)) ||
+ (cgi_variable(DISABLE_USER_FLAG)) || (cgi_variable(ENABLE_USER_FLAG)))) {
chg_passwd();
}
printf("<H2>%s</H2>\n", _("Client/Server Password Management"));
printf("<FORM name=\"swatform\" method=post>\n");
+ print_xsrf_token(cgi_user_name(), cgi_user_pass(), rpasswd_form);
printf("<table>\n");
@@ -1310,7 +1315,7 @@ static void passwd_page(void)
* password somewhere other than the server. It could be this
* is the first time through this code, so there isn't
* anything to do. */
- if (cgi_variable(CHG_R_PASSWD_FLAG)) {
+ if (verify_xsrf_token(passwd_form) && cgi_variable(CHG_R_PASSWD_FLAG)) {
chg_passwd();
}
--
1.7.1
From 407ae61fbfc8ee1643a4db8ea9b104f031b32e0f Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Kai Blin <kai@samba.org>
Date: Fri, 8 Jul 2011 15:06:13 +0200
Subject: [PATCH 10/12] s3 swat: Add XSRF protection to printer page
Signed-off-by: Kai Blin <kai@samba.org>
---
source/web/swat.c | 28 ++++++++++++++++++----------
1 files changed, 18 insertions(+), 10 deletions(-)
diff --git a/source/web/swat.c b/source/web/swat.c
index 5242484..4582a63 100644
--- a/source/web/swat.c
+++ b/source/web/swat.c
@@ -1332,18 +1332,15 @@ static void printers_page(void)
int i;
int mode = 0;
unsigned int parm_filter = FLAG_BASIC;
+ const char form_name[] = "printers";
+
+ if (!verify_xsrf_token(form_name)) {
+ goto output_page;
+ }
if (share)
snum = lp_servicenumber(share);
- printf("<H2>%s</H2>\n", _("Printer Parameters"));
-
- printf("<H3>%s</H3>\n", _("Important Note:"));
- printf("%s",_("Printer names marked with [*] in the Choose Printer drop-down box "));
- printf("%s",_("are autoloaded printers from "));
- printf("<A HREF=\"/swat/help/smb.conf.5.html#printcapname\" target=\"docs\">%s</A>\n", _("Printcap Name"));
- printf("%s\n", _("Attempting to delete these printers from SWAT will have no effect."));
-
if (cgi_variable("Commit") && snum >= 0) {
commit_parameters(snum);
if (snum >= iNumNonAutoPrintServices)
@@ -1372,8 +1369,6 @@ static void printers_page(void)
}
}
- printf("<FORM name=\"swatform\" method=post>\n");
-
if ( cgi_variable("ViewMode") )
mode = atoi(cgi_variable_nonull("ViewMode"));
if ( cgi_variable("BasicMode"))
@@ -1381,6 +1376,19 @@ static void printers_page(void)
if ( cgi_variable("AdvMode"))
mode = 1;
+output_page:
+ printf("<H2>%s</H2>\n", _("Printer Parameters"));
+
+ printf("<H3>%s</H3>\n", _("Important Note:"));
+ printf("%s",_("Printer names marked with [*] in the Choose Printer drop-down box "));
+ printf("%s",_("are autoloaded printers from "));
+ printf("<A HREF=\"/swat/help/smb.conf.5.html#printcapname\" target=\"docs\">%s</A>\n", _("Printcap Name"));
+ printf("%s\n", _("Attempting to delete these printers from SWAT will have no effect."));
+
+
+ printf("<FORM name=\"swatform\" method=post>\n");
+ print_xsrf_token(cgi_user_name(), cgi_user_pass(), form_name);
+
ViewModeBoxes( mode );
switch ( mode ) {
case 0:
--
1.7.1
From 11e281228f334bf3d384df5655136f0b4b4068aa Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Kai Blin <kai@samba.org>
Date: Sat, 9 Jul 2011 09:52:07 +0200
Subject: [PATCH 11/12] s3 swat: Add time component to XSRF token
Signed-off-by: Kai Blin <kai@samba.org>
---
source/web/swat.c | 28 ++++++++++++++++++++++++----
source/web/swat_proto.h | 2 +-
2 files changed, 25 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-)
diff --git a/source/web/swat.c b/source/web/swat.c
index 4582a63..50df66e 100644
--- a/source/web/swat.c
+++ b/source/web/swat.c
@@ -52,6 +52,8 @@ static int iNumNonAutoPrintServices = 0;
#define ENABLE_USER_FLAG "enable_user_flag"
#define RHOST "remote_host"
#define XSRF_TOKEN "xsrf"
+#define XSRF_TIME "xsrf_time"
+#define XSRF_TIMEOUT 300
#define _(x) lang_msg_rotate(talloc_tos(),x)
@@ -141,7 +143,7 @@ static char *make_parm_name(const char *label)
}
void get_xsrf_token(const char *username, const char *pass,
- const char *formname, char token_str[33])
+ const char *formname, time_t xsrf_time, char token_str[33])
{
struct MD5Context md5_ctx;
uint8_t token[16];
@@ -152,6 +154,7 @@ void get_xsrf_token(const char *username, const char *pass,
MD5Init(&md5_ctx);
MD5Update(&md5_ctx, (uint8_t *)formname, strlen(formname));
+ MD5Update(&md5_ctx, (uint8_t *)&xsrf_time, sizeof(time_t));
if (username != NULL) {
MD5Update(&md5_ctx, (uint8_t *)username, strlen(username));
}
@@ -173,11 +176,13 @@ void print_xsrf_token(const char *username, const char *pass,
const char *formname)
{
char token[33];
+ time_t xsrf_time = time(NULL);
- get_xsrf_token(username, pass, formname, token);
+ get_xsrf_token(username, pass, formname, xsrf_time, token);
printf("<input type=\"hidden\" name=\"%s\" value=\"%s\">\n",
XSRF_TOKEN, token);
-
+ printf("<input type=\"hidden\" name=\"%s\" value=\"%lld\">\n",
+ XSRF_TIME, (long long int)xsrf_time);
}
bool verify_xsrf_token(const char *formname)
@@ -186,8 +191,23 @@ bool verify_xsrf_token(const char *formname)
const char *username = cgi_user_name();
const char *pass = cgi_user_pass();
const char *token = cgi_variable_nonull(XSRF_TOKEN);
+ const char *time_str = cgi_variable_nonull(XSRF_TIME);
+ time_t xsrf_time = 0;
+ time_t now = time(NULL);
+
+ if (sizeof(time_t) == sizeof(int)) {
+ xsrf_time = atoi(time_str);
+ } else if (sizeof(time_t) == sizeof(long)) {
+ xsrf_time = atol(time_str);
+ } else if (sizeof(time_t) == sizeof(long long)) {
+ xsrf_time = atoll(time_str);
+ }
+
+ if (abs(now - xsrf_time) > XSRF_TIMEOUT) {
+ return false;
+ }
- get_xsrf_token(username, pass, formname, expected);
+ get_xsrf_token(username, pass, formname, xsrf_time, expected);
return (strncmp(expected, token, sizeof(expected)) == 0);
}
diff --git a/source/web/swat_proto.h b/source/web/swat_proto.h
index e66c942..424a3af 100644
--- a/source/web/swat_proto.h
+++ b/source/web/swat_proto.h
@@ -68,7 +68,7 @@ void status_page(void);
const char *lang_msg_rotate(TALLOC_CTX *ctx, const char *msgid);
void get_xsrf_token(const char *username, const char *pass,
- const char *formname, char token_str[33]);
+ const char *formname, time_t xsrf_time, char token_str[33]);
void print_xsrf_token(const char *username, const char *pass,
const char *formname);
bool verify_xsrf_token(const char *formname);
--
1.7.1
From 3973cfa50024983618a44ffdb9f756b642b85be7 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Kai Blin <kai@samba.org>
Date: Tue, 12 Jul 2011 08:08:24 +0200
Subject: [PATCH 12/12] s3 swat: Create random nonce in CGI mode
In CGI mode, we don't get access to the user's password, which would
reduce the hash used so far to parameters an attacker can easily guess.
To work around this, read the nonce from secrets.tdb or generate one if
it's not there.
Also populate the C_user field so we can use that for token creation.
Signed-off-by: Kai Blin <kai@samba.org>
The last 12 patches address bug #8290 (CSRF vulnerability in SWAT).
This addresses CVE-2011-2522 (Cross-Site Request Forgery in SWAT).
---
source/web/cgi.c | 18 +++++++++++++++++-
source/web/swat.c | 1 -
2 files changed, 17 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
diff --git a/source/web/cgi.c b/source/web/cgi.c
index ccdc3a7..890ac8e 100644
--- a/source/web/cgi.c
+++ b/source/web/cgi.c
@@ -19,6 +19,7 @@
#include "includes.h"
#include "web/swat_proto.h"
+#include "secrets.h"
#define MAX_VARIABLES 10000
@@ -321,7 +322,22 @@ static void cgi_web_auth(void)
exit(0);
}
- setuid(0);
+ C_user = SMB_STRDUP(user);
+
+ if (!setuid(0)) {
+ C_pass = secrets_fetch_generic("root", "SWAT");
+ if (C_pass == NULL) {
+ char *tmp_pass = NULL;
+ tmp_pass = generate_random_str(16);
+ if (tmp_pass == NULL) {
+ printf("%sFailed to create random nonce for "
+ "SWAT session\n<br>%s\n", head, tail);
+ exit(0);
+ }
+ secrets_store_generic("root", "SWAT", tmp_pass);
+ C_pass = SMB_STRDUP(tmp_pass);
+ }
+ }
setuid(pwd->pw_uid);
if (geteuid() != pwd->pw_uid || getuid() != pwd->pw_uid) {
printf("%sFailed to become user %s - uid=%d/%d<br>%s\n",
diff --git a/source/web/swat.c b/source/web/swat.c
index 50df66e..146f1cf 100644
--- a/source/web/swat.c
+++ b/source/web/swat.c
@@ -29,7 +29,6 @@
#include "includes.h"
#include "web/swat_proto.h"
-#include "../lib/crypto/md5.h"
static int demo_mode = False;
static int passwd_only = False;
--
1.7.1

613
package/samba/samba-CVE-2011-0719.patch
View File

@ -1,613 +0,0 @@
From 724e44eed299c618066dec411530aa9f156119ec Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Karolin Seeger <kseeger@samba.org>
Date: Sun, 27 Feb 2011 18:28:29 +0100
Subject: [PATCH] Fix denial of service - memory corruption.
CVE-2011-0719
Fix bug #7949 (DoS in Winbind and smbd with many file descriptors open).
All current released versions of Samba are vulnerable to
a denial of service caused by memory corruption. Range
checks on file descriptors being used in the FD_SET macro
were not present allowing stack corruption. This can cause
the Samba code to crash or to loop attempting to select
on a bad file descriptor set.
A connection to a file share, or a local account is needed
to exploit this problem, either authenticated or unauthenticated
(guest connection).
Currently we do not believe this flaw is exploitable
beyond a crash or causing the code to loop, but on the
advice of our security reviewers we are releasing fixes
in case an exploit is discovered at a later date.
---
source/client/client.c | 4 +++-
source/client/dnsbrowse.c | 12 ++++++++++++
source/lib/events.c | 13 +++++++++++++
source/lib/packet.c | 5 +++++
source/lib/readline.c | 5 +++++
source/lib/select.c | 6 ++++++
source/lib/util_sock.c | 11 +++++++++--
source/libaddns/dnssock.c | 6 +++++-
source/libsmb/nmblib.c | 5 +++++
source/nmbd/nmbd_packets.c | 24 ++++++++++++++++++++++--
source/nsswitch/wb_common.c | 22 ++++++++++++++++++++--
source/printing/printing.c | 5 +++++
source/smbd/dnsregister.c | 6 ++++++
source/smbd/oplock.c | 5 ++++-
source/smbd/oplock_irix.c | 5 +++++
source/smbd/process.c | 2 +-
source/smbd/server.c | 29 +++++++++++++++++++++--------
source/utils/smbfilter.c | 8 ++++++--
source/winbindd/winbindd.c | 12 +++++++++++-
source/winbindd/winbindd_dual.c | 7 +++++++
20 files changed, 171 insertions(+), 21 deletions(-)
diff --git a/source/client/client.c b/source/client/client.c
index 53bd9e6..a989441 100644
--- a/source/client/client.c
+++ b/source/client/client.c
@@ -4379,8 +4379,10 @@ static void readline_callback(void)
again:
- if (cli->fd == -1)
+ if (cli->fd < 0 || cli->fd >= FD_SETSIZE) {
+ errno = EBADF;
return;
+ }
FD_ZERO(&fds);
FD_SET(cli->fd,&fds);
diff --git a/source/client/dnsbrowse.c b/source/client/dnsbrowse.c
index 5e3a4de..aa2fb22 100644
--- a/source/client/dnsbrowse.c
+++ b/source/client/dnsbrowse.c
@@ -81,6 +81,11 @@ static void do_smb_resolve(struct mdns_smbsrv_result *browsesrv)
TALLOC_FREE(fdset);
}
+ if (mdnsfd < 0 || mdnsfd >= FD_SETSIZE) {
+ errno = EBADF;
+ break;
+ }
+
fdsetsz = howmany(mdnsfd + 1, NFDBITS) * sizeof(fd_mask);
fdset = TALLOC_ZERO(ctx, fdsetsz);
FD_SET(mdnsfd, fdset);
@@ -183,6 +188,13 @@ int do_smb_browse(void)
fdsetsz = howmany(mdnsfd + 1, NFDBITS) * sizeof(fd_mask);
fdset = TALLOC_ZERO(ctx, fdsetsz);
+
+ if (mdnsfd < 0 || mdnsfd >= FD_SETSIZE) {
+ errno = EBADF;
+ TALLOC_FREE(ctx);
+ return 1;
+ }
+
FD_SET(mdnsfd, fdset);
tv.tv_sec = 1;
diff --git a/source/lib/events.c b/source/lib/events.c
index cd20ceb..2ddbab7 100644
--- a/source/lib/events.c
+++ b/source/lib/events.c
@@ -140,6 +140,11 @@ struct fd_event *event_add_fd(struct event_context *event_ctx,
{
struct fd_event *fde;
+ if (fd < 0 || fd >= FD_SETSIZE) {
+ errno = EBADF;
+ return NULL;
+ }
+
if (!(fde = TALLOC_P(mem_ctx, struct fd_event))) {
return NULL;
}
@@ -190,6 +195,14 @@ bool event_add_to_select_args(struct event_context *event_ctx,
bool ret = False;
for (fde = event_ctx->fd_events; fde; fde = fde->next) {
+ if (fde->fd < 0 || fde->fd >= FD_SETSIZE) {
+ /* We ignore here, as it shouldn't be
+ possible to add an invalid fde->fd
+ but we don't want FD_SET to see an
+ invalid fd. */
+ continue;
+ }
+
if (fde->flags & EVENT_FD_READ) {
FD_SET(fde->fd, read_fds);
ret = True;
diff --git a/source/lib/packet.c b/source/lib/packet.c
index e048616..512c7f2 100644
--- a/source/lib/packet.c
+++ b/source/lib/packet.c
@@ -106,6 +106,11 @@ NTSTATUS packet_fd_read_sync(struct packet_context *ctx)
int res;
fd_set r_fds;
+ if (ctx->fd < 0 || ctx->fd >= FD_SETSIZE) {
+ errno = EBADF;
+ return map_nt_error_from_unix(errno);
+ }
+
FD_ZERO(&r_fds);
FD_SET(ctx->fd, &r_fds);
diff --git a/source/lib/readline.c b/source/lib/readline.c
index 34867aa..70a82f2 100644
--- a/source/lib/readline.c
+++ b/source/lib/readline.c
@@ -91,6 +91,11 @@ static char *smb_readline_replacement(const char *prompt, void (*callback)(void)
timeout.tv_sec = 5;
timeout.tv_usec = 0;
+ if (fd < 0 || fd >= FD_SETSIZE) {
+ errno = EBADF;
+ break;
+ }
+
FD_ZERO(&fds);
FD_SET(fd,&fds);
diff --git a/source/lib/select.c b/source/lib/select.c
index c3da6a9..2d5f02c 100644
--- a/source/lib/select.c
+++ b/source/lib/select.c
@@ -61,6 +61,11 @@ int sys_select(int maxfd, fd_set *readfds, fd_set *writefds, fd_set *errorfds, s
if (pipe(select_pipe) == -1)
smb_panic("Could not create select pipe");
+ if (select_pipe[0] < 0 || select_pipe[0] >= FD_SETSIZE) {
+ errno = EBADF;
+ return -1;
+ }
+
/*
* These next two lines seem to fix a bug with the Linux
* 2.0.x kernel (and probably other UNIXes as well) where
@@ -87,6 +92,7 @@ int sys_select(int maxfd, fd_set *readfds, fd_set *writefds, fd_set *errorfds, s
readfds2 = &readfds_buf;
FD_ZERO(readfds2);
}
+
FD_SET(select_pipe[0], readfds2);
errno = 0;
diff --git a/source/lib/util_sock.c b/source/lib/util_sock.c
index 650bd13..8aa2c97 100644
--- a/source/lib/util_sock.c
+++ b/source/lib/util_sock.c
@@ -960,6 +960,11 @@ NTSTATUS read_socket_with_timeout(int fd, char *buf,
timeout.tv_usec = (long)(1000 * (time_out % 1000));
for (nread=0; nread < mincnt; ) {
+ if (fd < 0 || fd >= FD_SETSIZE) {
+ errno = EBADF;
+ return map_nt_error_from_unix(EBADF);
+ }
+
FD_ZERO(&fds);
FD_SET(fd,&fds);
@@ -1492,7 +1497,7 @@ bool open_any_socket_out(struct sockaddr_storage *addrs, int num_addrs,
for (i=0; i<num_addrs; i++) {
sockets[i] = socket(addrs[i].ss_family, SOCK_STREAM, 0);
- if (sockets[i] < 0)
+ if (sockets[i] < 0 || sockets[i] >= FD_SETSIZE)
goto done;
set_blocking(sockets[i], false);
}
@@ -1541,8 +1546,10 @@ bool open_any_socket_out(struct sockaddr_storage *addrs, int num_addrs,
FD_ZERO(&r_fds);
for (i=0; i<num_addrs; i++) {
- if (sockets[i] == -1)
+ if (sockets[i] < 0 || sockets[i] >= FD_SETSIZE) {
+ /* This cannot happen - ignore if so. */
continue;
+ }
FD_SET(sockets[i], &wr_fds);
FD_SET(sockets[i], &r_fds);
if (sockets[i]>maxfd)
diff --git a/source/libaddns/dnssock.c b/source/libaddns/dnssock.c
index 7c8bd41..f427bd5 100644
--- a/source/libaddns/dnssock.c
+++ b/source/libaddns/dnssock.c
@@ -218,7 +218,11 @@ static DNS_ERROR read_all(int fd, uint8 *data, size_t len)
while (total < len) {
ssize_t ret;
int fd_ready;
-
+
+ if (fd < 0 || fd >= FD_SETSIZE) {
+ return ERROR_DNS_SOCKET_ERROR;
+ }
+
FD_ZERO( &rfds );
FD_SET( fd, &rfds );
diff --git a/source/libsmb/nmblib.c b/source/libsmb/nmblib.c
index bfe5e7b..768e54d 100644
--- a/source/libsmb/nmblib.c
+++ b/source/libsmb/nmblib.c
@@ -1097,6 +1097,11 @@ struct packet_struct *receive_packet(int fd,enum packet_type type,int t)
struct timeval timeout;
int ret;
+ if (fd < 0 || fd >= FD_SETSIZE) {
+ errno = EBADF;
+ return NULL;
+ }
+
FD_ZERO(&fds);
FD_SET(fd,&fds);
timeout.tv_sec = t/1000;
diff --git a/source/nmbd/nmbd_packets.c b/source/nmbd/nmbd_packets.c
index 4b97819..03e5362 100644
--- a/source/nmbd/nmbd_packets.c
+++ b/source/nmbd/nmbd_packets.c
@@ -1683,7 +1683,7 @@ static bool create_listen_fdset(fd_set **ppset, int **psock_array, int *listen_n
for (subrec = FIRST_SUBNET; subrec; subrec = NEXT_SUBNET_EXCLUDING_UNICAST(subrec))
count++;
- if((count*2) + 2 > FD_SETSIZE) {
+ if((count*2) + 2 >= FD_SETSIZE) {
DEBUG(0,("create_listen_fdset: Too many file descriptors needed (%d). We can \
only use %d.\n", (count*2) + 2, FD_SETSIZE));
SAFE_FREE(pset);
@@ -1699,24 +1699,44 @@ only use %d.\n", (count*2) + 2, FD_SETSIZE));
FD_ZERO(pset);
/* Add in the broadcast socket on 137. */
+ if (ClientNMB < 0 || ClientNMB >= FD_SETSIZE) {
+ errno = EBADF;
+ SAFE_FREE(pset);
+ return True;
+ }
+
FD_SET(ClientNMB,pset);
sock_array[num++] = ClientNMB;
*maxfd = MAX( *maxfd, ClientNMB);
/* Add in the 137 sockets on all the interfaces. */
for (subrec = FIRST_SUBNET; subrec; subrec = NEXT_SUBNET_EXCLUDING_UNICAST(subrec)) {
+ if (subrec->nmb_sock < 0 || subrec->nmb_sock >= FD_SETSIZE) {
+ /* We have to ignore sockets outside FD_SETSIZE. */
+ continue;
+ }
FD_SET(subrec->nmb_sock,pset);
sock_array[num++] = subrec->nmb_sock;
*maxfd = MAX( *maxfd, subrec->nmb_sock);
}
/* Add in the broadcast socket on 138. */
+ if (ClientDGRAM < 0 || ClientDGRAM >= FD_SETSIZE) {
+ errno = EBADF;
+ SAFE_FREE(pset);
+ return True;
+ }
+
FD_SET(ClientDGRAM,pset);
sock_array[num++] = ClientDGRAM;
*maxfd = MAX( *maxfd, ClientDGRAM);
/* Add in the 138 sockets on all the interfaces. */
for (subrec = FIRST_SUBNET; subrec; subrec = NEXT_SUBNET_EXCLUDING_UNICAST(subrec)) {
+ if (subrec->dgram_sock < 0 || subrec->dgram_sock >= FD_SETSIZE) {
+ /* We have to ignore sockets outside FD_SETSIZE. */
+ continue;
+ }
FD_SET(subrec->dgram_sock,pset);
sock_array[num++] = subrec->dgram_sock;
*maxfd = MAX( *maxfd, subrec->dgram_sock);
@@ -1767,7 +1787,7 @@ bool listen_for_packets(bool run_election)
#ifndef SYNC_DNS
dns_fd = asyncdns_fd();
- if (dns_fd != -1) {
+ if (dns_fd >= 0 && dns_fd < FD_SETSIZE) {
FD_SET(dns_fd, &r_fds);
maxfd = MAX( maxfd, dns_fd);
}
diff --git a/source/nsswitch/wb_common.c b/source/nsswitch/wb_common.c
index a164621..4f76bd0 100644
--- a/source/nsswitch/wb_common.c
+++ b/source/nsswitch/wb_common.c
@@ -240,6 +240,12 @@ static int winbind_named_pipe_sock(const char *dir)
switch (errno) {
case EINPROGRESS:
+
+ if (fd < 0 || fd >= FD_SETSIZE) {
+ errno = EBADF;
+ goto error_out;
+ }
+
FD_ZERO(&w_fds);
FD_SET(fd, &w_fds);
tv.tv_sec = CONNECT_TIMEOUT - wait_time;
@@ -383,7 +389,13 @@ int winbind_write_sock(void *buffer, int count, int recursing, int need_priv)
while(nwritten < count) {
struct timeval tv;
fd_set r_fds;
-
+
+ if (winbindd_fd < 0 || winbindd_fd >= FD_SETSIZE) {
+ errno = EBADF;
+ winbind_close_sock();
+ return -1;
+ }
+
/* Catch pipe close on other end by checking if a read()
call would not block by calling select(). */
@@ -443,7 +455,13 @@ int winbind_read_sock(void *buffer, int count)
while(nread < count) {
struct timeval tv;
fd_set r_fds;
-
+
+ if (winbindd_fd < 0 || winbindd_fd >= FD_SETSIZE) {
+ errno = EBADF;
+ winbind_close_sock();
+ return -1;
+ }
+
/* Catch pipe close on other end by checking if a read()
call would not block by calling select(). */
diff --git a/source/printing/printing.c b/source/printing/printing.c
index a9272eb..c3b8c61 100644
--- a/source/printing/printing.c
+++ b/source/printing/printing.c
@@ -1407,6 +1407,11 @@ void start_background_queue(void)
exit(1);
}
+ if (pause_pipe[1] < 0 || pause_pipe[1] >= FD_SETSIZE) {
+ DEBUG(5,("start_background_queue: pipe fd out of range.\n"));
+ exit(1);
+ }
+
background_lpq_updater_pid = sys_fork();
if (background_lpq_updater_pid == -1) {
diff --git a/source/smbd/dnsregister.c b/source/smbd/dnsregister.c
index f02739e..3c689b9 100644
--- a/source/smbd/dnsregister.c
+++ b/source/smbd/dnsregister.c
@@ -125,6 +125,9 @@ void dns_register_smbd(struct dns_reg_state ** dns_state_ptr,
*/
if (dns_state->srv_ref != NULL) {
mdnsd_conn_fd = DNSServiceRefSockFD(dns_state->srv_ref);
+ if (mdnsd_conn_fd < 0 || mdnsd_conn_fd >= FD_SETSIZE) {
+ return;
+ }
FD_SET(mdnsd_conn_fd, listen_set);
return;
}
@@ -156,6 +159,9 @@ void dns_register_smbd(struct dns_reg_state ** dns_state_ptr,
}
mdnsd_conn_fd = DNSServiceRefSockFD(dns_state->srv_ref);
+ if (mdnsd_conn_fd < 0 || mdnsd_conn_fd >= FD_SETSIZE) {
+ return;
+ }
FD_SET(mdnsd_conn_fd, listen_set);
*maxfd = MAX(*maxfd, mdnsd_conn_fd);
*timeout = timeval_zero();
diff --git a/source/smbd/oplock.c b/source/smbd/oplock.c
index a07d05d..5ae3fdf 100644
--- a/source/smbd/oplock.c
+++ b/source/smbd/oplock.c
@@ -241,7 +241,10 @@ bool downgrade_oplock(files_struct *fsp)
int oplock_notify_fd(void)
{
if (koplocks) {
- return koplocks->notification_fd;
+ int fd = koplocks->notification_fd;
+ if (fd < 0 || fd >= FD_SETSIZE) {
+ return -1;
+ }
}
return -1;
diff --git a/source/smbd/oplock_irix.c b/source/smbd/oplock_irix.c
index 8c287c9..6e86fac 100644
--- a/source/smbd/oplock_irix.c
+++ b/source/smbd/oplock_irix.c
@@ -284,6 +284,11 @@ struct kernel_oplocks *irix_init_kernel_oplocks(void)
return False;
}
+ if (pfd[0] < 0 || pfd[0] >= FD_SETSIZE) {
+ DEBUG(0,("setup_kernel_oplock_pipe: fd out of range.\n"));
+ return False;
+ }
+
oplock_pipe_read = pfd[0];
oplock_pipe_write = pfd[1];
diff --git a/source/smbd/process.c b/source/smbd/process.c
index 403c7c6..9b8f29b 100644
--- a/source/smbd/process.c
+++ b/source/smbd/process.c
@@ -698,7 +698,7 @@ static void async_processing(fd_set *pfds)
static int select_on_fd(int fd, int maxfd, fd_set *fds)
{
- if (fd != -1) {
+ if (fd != -1 && fd < FD_SETSIZE) {
FD_SET(fd, fds);
maxfd = MAX(maxfd, fd);
}
diff --git a/source/smbd/server.c b/source/smbd/server.c
index 5129484..a670334 100644
--- a/source/smbd/server.c
+++ b/source/smbd/server.c
@@ -209,7 +209,13 @@ static bool open_sockets_inetd(void)
/* Started from inetd. fd 0 is the socket. */
/* We will abort gracefully when the client or remote system
goes away */
- smbd_set_server_fd(dup(0));
+ int fd = dup(0);
+
+ if (fd < 0 || fd >= FD_SETSIZE) {
+ return false;
+ }
+
+ smbd_set_server_fd(fd);
/* close our standard file descriptors */
close_low_fds(False); /* Don't close stderr */
@@ -436,7 +442,8 @@ static bool open_sockets_smbd(bool is_daemon, bool interactive, const char *smb_
num_sockets == 0 ? 0 : 2,
ifss,
true);
- if(s == -1) {
+ if(s < 0 || s >= FD_SETSIZE) {
+ close(s);
continue;
}
@@ -516,7 +523,7 @@ static bool open_sockets_smbd(bool is_daemon, bool interactive, const char *smb_
num_sockets == 0 ? 0 : 2,
&ss,
true);
- if (s == -1) {
+ if (s < 0 || s >= FD_SETSIZE) {
continue;
}
@@ -709,6 +716,7 @@ static bool open_sockets_smbd(bool is_daemon, bool interactive, const char *smb_
struct sockaddr addr;
socklen_t in_addrlen = sizeof(addr);
pid_t child = 0;
+ int fd;
s = -1;
for(i = 0; i < num_sockets; i++) {
@@ -721,16 +729,21 @@ static bool open_sockets_smbd(bool is_daemon, bool interactive, const char *smb_
}
}
- smbd_set_server_fd(accept(s,&addr,&in_addrlen));
-
- if (smbd_server_fd() == -1 && errno == EINTR)
+ fd = accept(s,&addr,&in_addrlen);
+ if (fd == -1 && errno == EINTR)
continue;
-
- if (smbd_server_fd() == -1) {
+ if (fd == -1) {
DEBUG(2,("open_sockets_smbd: accept: %s\n",
strerror(errno)));
continue;
}
+ if (fd < 0 || fd >= FD_SETSIZE) {
+ DEBUG(2,("open_sockets_smbd: bad fd %d\n",
+ fd ));
+ continue;
+ }
+
+ smbd_set_server_fd(fd);
/* Ensure child is set to blocking mode */
set_blocking(smbd_server_fd(),True);
diff --git a/source/utils/smbfilter.c b/source/utils/smbfilter.c
index 1e22a40..45f9207 100644
--- a/source/utils/smbfilter.c
+++ b/source/utils/smbfilter.c
@@ -162,8 +162,8 @@ static void filter_child(int c, struct sockaddr_storage *dest_ss)
int num;
FD_ZERO(&fds);
- if (s != -1) FD_SET(s, &fds);
- if (c != -1) FD_SET(c, &fds);
+ if (s >= 0 && s < FD_SETSIZE) FD_SET(s, &fds);
+ if (c >= 0 && c < FD_SETSIZE) FD_SET(c, &fds);
num = sys_select_intr(MAX(s+1, c+1),&fds,NULL,NULL,NULL);
if (num <= 0) continue;
@@ -235,6 +235,10 @@ static void start_filter(char *desthost)
struct sockaddr_storage ss;
socklen_t in_addrlen = sizeof(ss);
+ if (s < 0 || s >= FD_SETSIZE) {
+ break;
+ }
+
FD_ZERO(&fds);
FD_SET(s, &fds);
diff --git a/source/winbindd/winbindd.c b/source/winbindd/winbindd.c
index 1d618e2..6b5c251 100644
--- a/source/winbindd/winbindd.c
+++ b/source/winbindd/winbindd.c
@@ -836,7 +836,8 @@ static void process_loop(void)
listen_sock = open_winbindd_socket();
listen_priv_sock = open_winbindd_priv_socket();
- if (listen_sock == -1 || listen_priv_sock == -1) {
+ if (listen_sock < 0 || listen_sock >= FD_SETSIZE ||
+ listen_priv_sock < 0 || listen_priv_sock >= FD_SETSIZE) {
perror("open_winbind_socket");
exit(1);
}
@@ -861,6 +862,9 @@ static void process_loop(void)
FD_ZERO(&r_fds);
FD_ZERO(&w_fds);
+
+ /* We check the range for listen_sock and
+ listen_priv_sock above. */
FD_SET(listen_sock, &r_fds);
FD_SET(listen_priv_sock, &r_fds);
@@ -890,6 +894,12 @@ static void process_loop(void)
}
for (ev = fd_events; ev; ev = ev->next) {
+ if (ev->fd < 0 || ev->fd >= FD_SETSIZE) {
+ /* Ignore here - event_add_to_select_args
+ should make this impossible. */
+ continue;
+ }
+
if (ev->flags & EVENT_FD_READ) {
FD_SET(ev->fd, &r_fds);
maxfd = MAX(ev->fd, maxfd);
diff --git a/source/winbindd/winbindd_dual.c b/source/winbindd/winbindd_dual.c
index ff004f2..b30ec20 100644
--- a/source/winbindd/winbindd_dual.c
+++ b/source/winbindd/winbindd_dual.c
@@ -1250,6 +1250,12 @@ static bool fork_domain_child(struct winbindd_child *child)
return False;
}
+ if (fdpair[0] < 0 || fdpair[0] >= FD_SETSIZE) {
+ DEBUG(0, ("fork_domain_child: bad fd range (%d)\n", fdpair[0]));
+ errno = EBADF;
+ return False;
+ }
+
ZERO_STRUCT(state);
state.pid = sys_getpid();
@@ -1405,6 +1411,7 @@ static bool fork_domain_child(struct winbindd_child *child)
message_dispatch(winbind_messaging_context());
FD_ZERO(&read_fds);
+ /* We check state.sock against FD_SETSIZE above. */
FD_SET(state.sock, &read_fds);
ret = sys_select(state.sock + 1, &read_fds, NULL, NULL, tp);
--
1.6.4.2

7
package/samba/samba.mk
View File

@ -3,9 +3,10 @@
# samba
#
#############################################################
SAMBA_VERSION:=3.3.14
SAMBA_SOURCE:=samba-$(SAMBA_VERSION).tar.gz
SAMBA_SITE:=http://samba.org/samba/ftp/stable/
SAMBA_VERSION = 3.3.15
SAMBA_SOURCE = samba-$(SAMBA_VERSION).tar.gz
SAMBA_SITE = http://samba.org/samba/ftp/stable/
SAMBA_SUBDIR = source
SAMBA_AUTORECONF = NO