package/systemd: add upstream security fixes

CVE-2019-6454: systemd (PID1) crash with specially crafted D-Bus message
from unprivileged user

Cc: Maxime Hadjinlian <maxime.hadjinlian@gmail.com>
Cc: Yann E. MORIN <yann.morin.1998@free.fr>
Signed-off-by: Baruch Siach <baruch@tkos.co.il>
Signed-off-by: Peter Korsgaard <peter@korsgaard.com>
This commit is contained in:
Baruch Siach 2019-02-26 20:15:34 +02:00 committed by Peter Korsgaard
parent 759c9623aa
commit c12b32ba46
2 changed files with 247 additions and 0 deletions

View File

@ -0,0 +1,53 @@
From febef5e18558c114f4fb7c94f6c8ed3520c50cdf Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Riccardo Schirone <rschiron@redhat.com>
Date: Mon, 4 Feb 2019 14:29:09 +0100
Subject: [PATCH] Refuse dbus message paths longer than BUS_PATH_SIZE_MAX
limit.
Even though the dbus specification does not enforce any length limit on the
path of a dbus message, having to analyze too long strings in PID1 may be
time-consuming and it may have security impacts.
In any case, the limit is set so high that real-life applications should not
have a problem with it.
(cherry picked from commit 61397a60d98e368a5720b37e83f3169e3eb511c4)
Signed-off-by: Baruch Siach <baruch@tkos.co.il>
---
Upstream status: commit 61397a60d98
src/libsystemd/sd-bus/bus-internal.c | 2 +-
src/libsystemd/sd-bus/bus-internal.h | 4 ++++
2 files changed, 5 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
diff --git a/src/libsystemd/sd-bus/bus-internal.c b/src/libsystemd/sd-bus/bus-internal.c
index 40acae213381..598b7f110c73 100644
--- a/src/libsystemd/sd-bus/bus-internal.c
+++ b/src/libsystemd/sd-bus/bus-internal.c
@@ -43,7 +43,7 @@ bool object_path_is_valid(const char *p) {
if (slash)
return false;
- return true;
+ return (q - p) <= BUS_PATH_SIZE_MAX;
}
char* object_path_startswith(const char *a, const char *b) {
diff --git a/src/libsystemd/sd-bus/bus-internal.h b/src/libsystemd/sd-bus/bus-internal.h
index f208b294d8f1..a8d61bf72a4e 100644
--- a/src/libsystemd/sd-bus/bus-internal.h
+++ b/src/libsystemd/sd-bus/bus-internal.h
@@ -332,6 +332,10 @@ struct sd_bus {
#define BUS_MESSAGE_SIZE_MAX (128*1024*1024)
#define BUS_AUTH_SIZE_MAX (64*1024)
+/* Note that the D-Bus specification states that bus paths shall have no size limit. We enforce here one
+ * anyway, since truly unbounded strings are a security problem. The limit we pick is relatively large however,
+ * to not clash unnecessarily with real-life applications. */
+#define BUS_PATH_SIZE_MAX (64*1024)
#define BUS_CONTAINER_DEPTH 128
--
2.20.1

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@ -0,0 +1,194 @@
From 9e3f5a77226d5320270c92df001f6c79be735af3 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Riccardo Schirone <rschiron@redhat.com>
Date: Mon, 4 Feb 2019 14:29:28 +0100
Subject: [PATCH] Allocate temporary strings to hold dbus paths on the heap
Paths are limited to BUS_PATH_SIZE_MAX but the maximum size is anyway too big
to be allocated on the stack, so let's switch to the heap where there is a
clear way to understand if the allocation fails.
(cherry picked from commit f519a19bcd5afe674a9b8fc462cd77d8bad403c1)
[baruch: backport to v240]
Signed-off-by: Baruch Siach <baruch@tkos.co.il>
---
Upstream status: commit f519a19bcd5
src/libsystemd/sd-bus/bus-objects.c | 68 +++++++++++++++++++++++------
1 file changed, 54 insertions(+), 14 deletions(-)
diff --git a/src/libsystemd/sd-bus/bus-objects.c b/src/libsystemd/sd-bus/bus-objects.c
index d0538104ae25..54b977418e03 100644
--- a/src/libsystemd/sd-bus/bus-objects.c
+++ b/src/libsystemd/sd-bus/bus-objects.c
@@ -1133,7 +1133,8 @@ static int object_manager_serialize_path_and_fallbacks(
const char *path,
sd_bus_error *error) {
- char *prefix;
+ _cleanup_free_ char *prefix = NULL;
+ size_t pl;
int r;
assert(bus);
@@ -1149,7 +1150,12 @@ static int object_manager_serialize_path_and_fallbacks(
return 0;
/* Second, add fallback vtables registered for any of the prefixes */
- prefix = alloca(strlen(path) + 1);
+ pl = strlen(path);
+ assert(pl <= BUS_PATH_SIZE_MAX);
+ prefix = new(char, pl + 1);
+ if (!prefix)
+ return -ENOMEM;
+
OBJECT_PATH_FOREACH_PREFIX(prefix, path) {
r = object_manager_serialize_path(bus, reply, prefix, path, true, error);
if (r < 0)
@@ -1345,6 +1351,7 @@ static int object_find_and_run(
}
int bus_process_object(sd_bus *bus, sd_bus_message *m) {
+ _cleanup_free_ char *prefix = NULL;
int r;
size_t pl;
bool found_object = false;
@@ -1369,9 +1376,12 @@ int bus_process_object(sd_bus *bus, sd_bus_message *m) {
assert(m->member);
pl = strlen(m->path);
- do {
- char prefix[pl+1];
+ assert(pl <= BUS_PATH_SIZE_MAX);
+ prefix = new(char, pl + 1);
+ if (!prefix)
+ return -ENOMEM;
+ do {
bus->nodes_modified = false;
r = object_find_and_run(bus, m, m->path, false, &found_object);
@@ -1498,9 +1508,15 @@ static int bus_find_parent_object_manager(sd_bus *bus, struct node **out, const
n = hashmap_get(bus->nodes, path);
if (!n) {
- char *prefix;
+ _cleanup_free_ char *prefix = NULL;
+ size_t pl;
+
+ pl = strlen(path);
+ assert(pl <= BUS_PATH_SIZE_MAX);
+ prefix = new(char, pl + 1);
+ if (!prefix)
+ return -ENOMEM;
- prefix = alloca(strlen(path) + 1);
OBJECT_PATH_FOREACH_PREFIX(prefix, path) {
n = hashmap_get(bus->nodes, prefix);
if (n)
@@ -2083,8 +2099,9 @@ _public_ int sd_bus_emit_properties_changed_strv(
const char *interface,
char **names) {
+ _cleanup_free_ char *prefix = NULL;
bool found_interface = false;
- char *prefix;
+ size_t pl;
int r;
assert_return(bus, -EINVAL);
@@ -2105,6 +2122,12 @@ _public_ int sd_bus_emit_properties_changed_strv(
BUS_DONT_DESTROY(bus);
+ pl = strlen(path);
+ assert(pl <= BUS_PATH_SIZE_MAX);
+ prefix = new(char, pl + 1);
+ if (!prefix)
+ return -ENOMEM;
+
do {
bus->nodes_modified = false;
@@ -2114,7 +2137,6 @@ _public_ int sd_bus_emit_properties_changed_strv(
if (bus->nodes_modified)
continue;
- prefix = alloca(strlen(path) + 1);
OBJECT_PATH_FOREACH_PREFIX(prefix, path) {
r = emit_properties_changed_on_interface(bus, prefix, path, interface, true, &found_interface, names);
if (r != 0)
@@ -2246,7 +2268,8 @@ static int object_added_append_all_prefix(
static int object_added_append_all(sd_bus *bus, sd_bus_message *m, const char *path) {
_cleanup_set_free_ Set *s = NULL;
- char *prefix;
+ _cleanup_free_ char *prefix = NULL;
+ size_t pl;
int r;
assert(bus);
@@ -2291,7 +2314,12 @@ static int object_added_append_all(sd_bus *bus, sd_bus_message *m, const char *p
if (bus->nodes_modified)
return 0;
- prefix = alloca(strlen(path) + 1);
+ pl = strlen(path);
+ assert(pl <= BUS_PATH_SIZE_MAX);
+ prefix = new(char, pl + 1);
+ if (!prefix)
+ return -ENOMEM;
+
OBJECT_PATH_FOREACH_PREFIX(prefix, path) {
r = object_added_append_all_prefix(bus, m, s, prefix, path, true);
if (r < 0)
@@ -2430,7 +2458,8 @@ static int object_removed_append_all_prefix(
static int object_removed_append_all(sd_bus *bus, sd_bus_message *m, const char *path) {
_cleanup_set_free_ Set *s = NULL;
- char *prefix;
+ _cleanup_free_ char *prefix = NULL;
+ size_t pl;
int r;
assert(bus);
@@ -2462,7 +2491,12 @@ static int object_removed_append_all(sd_bus *bus, sd_bus_message *m, const char
if (bus->nodes_modified)
return 0;
- prefix = alloca(strlen(path) + 1);
+ pl = strlen(path);
+ assert(pl <= BUS_PATH_SIZE_MAX);
+ prefix = new(char, pl + 1);
+ if (!prefix)
+ return -ENOMEM;
+
OBJECT_PATH_FOREACH_PREFIX(prefix, path) {
r = object_removed_append_all_prefix(bus, m, s, prefix, path, true);
if (r < 0)
@@ -2612,7 +2646,8 @@ static int interfaces_added_append_one(
const char *path,
const char *interface) {
- char *prefix;
+ _cleanup_free_ char *prefix = NULL;
+ size_t pl;
int r;
assert(bus);
@@ -2626,7 +2661,12 @@ static int interfaces_added_append_one(
if (bus->nodes_modified)
return 0;
- prefix = alloca(strlen(path) + 1);
+ pl = strlen(path);
+ assert(pl <= BUS_PATH_SIZE_MAX);
+ prefix = new(char, pl + 1);
+ if (!prefix)
+ return -ENOMEM;
+
OBJECT_PATH_FOREACH_PREFIX(prefix, path) {
r = interfaces_added_append_one_prefix(bus, m, prefix, path, interface, true);
if (r != 0)
--
2.20.1