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busybox: add upstream security fixes

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CVE-2017-15873: Integer overflow in decompress_bunzip2.c leads to a read
access violation

CVE-2017-15874: Integer overflow in decompress_unlzma.c leads to a read
access violation

Cc: Adam Duskett <aduskett@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Baruch Siach <baruch@tkos.co.il>
Signed-off-by: Thomas Petazzoni <thomas.petazzoni@bootlin.com>
This commit is contained in:
Baruch Siach 2018-02-13 18:51:41 +02:00 committed by Thomas Petazzoni
parent 7c384c3b0f
commit 6665360b6d
2 changed files with 135 additions and 0 deletions
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101
package/busybox/0006-bunzip2-fix-runCnt-overflow-from-bug-10431.patch Normal file
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@ -0,0 +1,101 @@
From 0402cb32df015d9372578e3db27db47b33d5c7b0 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Denys Vlasenko <vda.linux@googlemail.com>
Date: Sun, 22 Oct 2017 18:23:23 +0200
Subject: [PATCH] bunzip2: fix runCnt overflow from bug 10431
This particular corrupted file can be dealth with by using "unsigned".
If there will be cases where it genuinely overflows, there is a disabled
code to deal with that too.
function old new delta
get_next_block 1678 1667 -11
Signed-off-by: Denys Vlasenko <vda.linux@googlemail.com>
Signed-off-by: Baruch Siach <baruch@tkos.co.il>
---
Patch status: upstream commit 0402cb32df0
archival/libarchive/decompress_bunzip2.c | 30 +++++++++++++++++++-----------
1 file changed, 19 insertions(+), 11 deletions(-)
diff --git a/archival/libarchive/decompress_bunzip2.c b/archival/libarchive/decompress_bunzip2.c
index 7cd18f5ed4cf..bec89edd3a4d 100644
--- a/archival/libarchive/decompress_bunzip2.c
+++ b/archival/libarchive/decompress_bunzip2.c
@@ -156,15 +156,15 @@ static unsigned get_bits(bunzip_data *bd, int bits_wanted)
static int get_next_block(bunzip_data *bd)
{
struct group_data *hufGroup;
- int dbufCount, dbufSize, groupCount, *base, *limit, selector,
- i, j, runPos, symCount, symTotal, nSelectors, byteCount[256];
- int runCnt = runCnt; /* for compiler */
+ int groupCount, *base, *limit, selector,
+ i, j, symCount, symTotal, nSelectors, byteCount[256];
uint8_t uc, symToByte[256], mtfSymbol[256], *selectors;
uint32_t *dbuf;
unsigned origPtr, t;
+ unsigned dbufCount, runPos;
+ unsigned runCnt = runCnt; /* for compiler */
dbuf = bd->dbuf;
- dbufSize = bd->dbufSize;
selectors = bd->selectors;
/* In bbox, we are ok with aborting through setjmp which is set up in start_bunzip */
@@ -187,7 +187,7 @@ static int get_next_block(bunzip_data *bd)
it didn't actually work. */
if (get_bits(bd, 1)) return RETVAL_OBSOLETE_INPUT;
origPtr = get_bits(bd, 24);
- if ((int)origPtr > dbufSize) return RETVAL_DATA_ERROR;
+ if (origPtr > bd->dbufSize) return RETVAL_DATA_ERROR;
/* mapping table: if some byte values are never used (encoding things
like ascii text), the compression code removes the gaps to have fewer
@@ -435,7 +435,14 @@ static int get_next_block(bunzip_data *bd)
symbols, but a run of length 0 doesn't mean anything in this
context). Thus space is saved. */
runCnt += (runPos << nextSym); /* +runPos if RUNA; +2*runPos if RUNB */
- if (runPos < dbufSize) runPos <<= 1;
+//The 32-bit overflow of runCnt wasn't yet seen, but probably can happen.
+//This would be the fix (catches too large count way before it can overflow):
+// if (runCnt > bd->dbufSize) {
+// dbg("runCnt:%u > dbufSize:%u RETVAL_DATA_ERROR",
+// runCnt, bd->dbufSize);
+// return RETVAL_DATA_ERROR;
+// }
+ if (runPos < bd->dbufSize) runPos <<= 1;
goto end_of_huffman_loop;
}
@@ -445,14 +452,15 @@ static int get_next_block(bunzip_data *bd)
literal used is the one at the head of the mtfSymbol array.) */
if (runPos != 0) {
uint8_t tmp_byte;
- if (dbufCount + runCnt > dbufSize) {
- dbg("dbufCount:%d+runCnt:%d %d > dbufSize:%d RETVAL_DATA_ERROR",
- dbufCount, runCnt, dbufCount + runCnt, dbufSize);
+ if (dbufCount + runCnt > bd->dbufSize) {
+ dbg("dbufCount:%u+runCnt:%u %u > dbufSize:%u RETVAL_DATA_ERROR",
+ dbufCount, runCnt, dbufCount + runCnt, bd->dbufSize);
return RETVAL_DATA_ERROR;
}
tmp_byte = symToByte[mtfSymbol[0]];
byteCount[tmp_byte] += runCnt;
- while (--runCnt >= 0) dbuf[dbufCount++] = (uint32_t)tmp_byte;
+ while ((int)--runCnt >= 0)
+ dbuf[dbufCount++] = (uint32_t)tmp_byte;
runPos = 0;
}
@@ -466,7 +474,7 @@ static int get_next_block(bunzip_data *bd)
first symbol in the mtf array, position 0, would have been handled
as part of a run above. Therefore 1 unused mtf position minus
2 non-literal nextSym values equals -1.) */
- if (dbufCount >= dbufSize) return RETVAL_DATA_ERROR;
+ if (dbufCount >= bd->dbufSize) return RETVAL_DATA_ERROR;
i = nextSym - 1;
uc = mtfSymbol[i];
--
2.15.1

34
package/busybox/0007-unlzma-fix-SEGV-closes-10436.patch Normal file
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@ -0,0 +1,34 @@
From 9ac42c500586fa5f10a1f6d22c3f797df11b1f6b Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Denys Vlasenko <vda.linux@googlemail.com>
Date: Fri, 27 Oct 2017 15:37:03 +0200
Subject: [PATCH] unlzma: fix SEGV, closes 10436
Signed-off-by: Denys Vlasenko <vda.linux@googlemail.com>
Signed-off-by: Baruch Siach <baruch@tkos.co.il>
---
Patch status: upstream commit 9ac42c500586f
archival/libarchive/decompress_unlzma.c | 6 +++++-
1 file changed, 5 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
diff --git a/archival/libarchive/decompress_unlzma.c b/archival/libarchive/decompress_unlzma.c
index a9040877efa0..be4342414435 100644
--- a/archival/libarchive/decompress_unlzma.c
+++ b/archival/libarchive/decompress_unlzma.c
@@ -450,8 +450,12 @@ unpack_lzma_stream(transformer_state_t *xstate)
IF_NOT_FEATURE_LZMA_FAST(string:)
do {
uint32_t pos = buffer_pos - rep0;
- if ((int32_t)pos < 0)
+ if ((int32_t)pos < 0) {
pos += header.dict_size;
+ /* bug 10436 has an example file where this triggers: */
+ if ((int32_t)pos < 0)
+ goto bad;
+ }
previous_byte = buffer[pos];
IF_NOT_FEATURE_LZMA_FAST(one_byte2:)
buffer[buffer_pos++] = previous_byte;
--
2.15.1