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package/quagga: bump to version 1.2.3

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- Remove all patches except the first one as they are already in this
  version
- Remove AUTORECONF = YES as we're not patching any *.ac files anymore
- Disable new nhrpd option
- Add hash for license file

Signed-off-by: Fabrice Fontaine <fontaine.fabrice@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Thomas Petazzoni <thomas.petazzoni@bootlin.com>
This commit is contained in:
Fabrice Fontaine 2018-12-01 21:40:47 +01:00 committed by Thomas Petazzoni
parent a6dc02327a
commit 3ab5fd69bc
9 changed files with 7 additions and 526 deletions
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41
package/quagga/0002-configure-fix-static-linking-with-readline.patch
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@ -1,41 +0,0 @@
From 62ede7482da15d276b880f6d8540dce400dc50a7 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Thomas Petazzoni <thomas.petazzoni@free-electrons.com>
Date: Thu, 26 Nov 2015 15:59:07 +0100
Subject: [PATCH] configure: fix static linking with readline
When static linking is used, the order of the libraries is important,
and the libraries using a symbol from another library should be listed
*before* the library providing that symbol (see
http://eli.thegreenplace.net/2013/07/09/library-order-in-static-linking)
for details.
When vtysh is linked statically, the command line contains "-lcurses
-lreadline", which causes a build failure due to unresolved
symbols. This is because readline is using symbols from the curses
library: the order should be the opposite.
This patch fixes that problem by putting the -lreadline at the
beginning of the LIBREADLINE variable calcualted by the configure
script.
Signed-off-by: Thomas Petazzoni <thomas.petazzoni@free-electrons.com>
---
configure.ac | 2 +-
1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
diff --git a/configure.ac b/configure.ac
index 3003e62..290953d 100755
--- a/configure.ac
+++ b/configure.ac
@@ -652,7 +652,7 @@ dnl [TODO] on Linux, and in [TODO] on Solaris.
)]
)]
)
- AC_CHECK_LIB(readline, main, LIBREADLINE="$LIBREADLINE -lreadline",,
+ AC_CHECK_LIB(readline, main, LIBREADLINE="-lreadline $LIBREADLINE",,
"$LIBREADLINE")
if test $ac_cv_lib_readline_main = no; then
AC_MSG_ERROR([vtysh needs libreadline but was not found and usable on your system.])
--
2.6.3

108
package/quagga/0003-lib-memory-fix-indirect-static-link-with-zlib.patch
View File

@ -1,108 +0,0 @@
From 008dd9771057dbbd7ce971c43bce2a0b05e2cf97 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Baruch Siach <baruch@tkos.co.il>
Date: Sun, 21 Aug 2016 08:56:57 +0300
Subject: [PATCH] lib/memory: fix indirect static link with zlib
quagga SNMP support depends on netsnmp, that optionally depends on OpenSSL,
which in turn requires zlib. zlib exports the 'zcalloc' symbol, which collides
with a function of the same name in memory.c. This is not a problem when
linking dynamically, since quagga does not use zlib directly. But static
linking fails with the error:
CCLD ospfd
.../output/host/usr/mips64el-buildroot-linux-uclibc/sysroot/usr/lib/libz.a(zutil.o): In function `zcalloc':
zutil.c:(.text+0x48): multiple definition of `zcalloc'
.../output/build/quagga-1.0.20160315/lib/.libs/libzebra.a(memory.o):memory.c:(.text+0x1a0): first defined here
Rename 'zcalloc' to 'zzcalloc' to avoid symbol collision.
Signed-off-by: Baruch Siach <baruch@tkos.co.il>
---
Patch status: posted upstream
https://lists.quagga.net/pipermail/quagga-dev/2016-August/016109.html
lib/memory.c | 14 ++++++++------
lib/memory.h | 4 ++--
2 files changed, 10 insertions(+), 8 deletions(-)
diff --git a/lib/memory.c b/lib/memory.c
index 269520d5a435..b1680a5e6f07 100644
--- a/lib/memory.c
+++ b/lib/memory.c
@@ -80,9 +80,11 @@ zmalloc (int type, size_t size)
/*
* Allocate memory as in zmalloc, and also clear the memory.
+ * Add an extra 'z' prefix to function name to avoid collision when linking
+ * statically with zlib that exports the 'zcalloc' symbol.
*/
void *
-zcalloc (int type, size_t size)
+zzcalloc (int type, size_t size)
{
void *memory;
@@ -97,9 +99,9 @@ zcalloc (int type, size_t size)
}
/*
- * Given a pointer returned by zmalloc or zcalloc, free it and
+ * Given a pointer returned by zmalloc or zzcalloc, free it and
* return a pointer to a new size, basically acting like realloc().
- * Requires: ptr was returned by zmalloc, zcalloc, or zrealloc with the
+ * Requires: ptr was returned by zmalloc, zzcalloc, or zrealloc with the
* same type.
* Effects: Returns a pointer to the new memory, or aborts.
*/
@@ -109,7 +111,7 @@ zrealloc (int type, void *ptr, size_t size)
void *memory;
if (ptr == NULL) /* is really alloc */
- return zcalloc(type, size);
+ return zzcalloc(type, size);
memory = realloc (ptr, size);
if (memory == NULL)
@@ -122,7 +124,7 @@ zrealloc (int type, void *ptr, size_t size)
/*
* Free memory allocated by z*alloc or zstrdup.
- * Requires: ptr was returned by zmalloc, zcalloc, or zrealloc with the
+ * Requires: ptr was returned by zmalloc, zzcalloc, or zrealloc with the
* same type.
* Effects: The memory is freed and may no longer be referenced.
*/
@@ -196,7 +198,7 @@ mtype_zcalloc (const char *file, int line, int type, size_t size)
mstat[type].c_calloc++;
mstat[type].t_calloc++;
- memory = zcalloc (type, size);
+ memory = zzcalloc (type, size);
mtype_log ("xcalloc", memory, file, line, type);
return memory;
diff --git a/lib/memory.h b/lib/memory.h
index 23962235dbfe..501352993d21 100644
--- a/lib/memory.h
+++ b/lib/memory.h
@@ -56,7 +56,7 @@ extern struct mlist mlists[];
mtype_zstrdup (__FILE__, __LINE__, (mtype), (str))
#else
#define XMALLOC(mtype, size) zmalloc ((mtype), (size))
-#define XCALLOC(mtype, size) zcalloc ((mtype), (size))
+#define XCALLOC(mtype, size) zzcalloc ((mtype), (size))
#define XREALLOC(mtype, ptr, size) zrealloc ((mtype), (ptr), (size))
#define XFREE(mtype, ptr) do { \
zfree ((mtype), (ptr)); \
@@ -67,7 +67,7 @@ extern struct mlist mlists[];
/* Prototypes of memory function. */
extern void *zmalloc (int type, size_t size);
-extern void *zcalloc (int type, size_t size);
+extern void *zzcalloc (int type, size_t size);
extern void *zrealloc (int type, void *ptr, size_t size);
extern void zfree (int type, void *ptr);
extern char *zstrdup (int type, const char *str);
--
2.8.1

33
package/quagga/0004-bgpd-Fix-AS_PATH-size-calculation-for-long-paths.patch
View File

@ -1,33 +0,0 @@
From 7a42b78be9a4108d98833069a88e6fddb9285008 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Andreas Jaggi <aj@open.ch>
Date: Mon, 2 Oct 2017 19:38:43 +0530
Subject: [PATCH] bgpd: Fix AS_PATH size calculation for long paths
If you have an AS_PATH with more entries than
what can be written into a single AS_SEGMENT_MAX
it needs to be broken up. The code that noticed
that the AS_PATH needs to be broken up was not
correctly calculating the size of the resulting
message. This patch addresses this issue.
Signed-off-by: Peter Korsgaard <peter@korsgaard.com>
---
bgpd/bgp_aspath.c | 2 +-
1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
diff --git a/bgpd/bgp_aspath.c b/bgpd/bgp_aspath.c
index b7af5e88..d813bfba 100644
--- a/bgpd/bgp_aspath.c
+++ b/bgpd/bgp_aspath.c
@@ -903,7 +903,7 @@ aspath_put (struct stream *s, struct aspath *as, int use32bit )
assegment_header_put (s, seg->type, AS_SEGMENT_MAX);
assegment_data_put (s, seg->as, AS_SEGMENT_MAX, use32bit);
written += AS_SEGMENT_MAX;
- bytes += ASSEGMENT_SIZE (written, use32bit);
+ bytes += ASSEGMENT_SIZE (AS_SEGMENT_MAX, use32bit);
}
/* write the final segment, probably is also the first */
--
2.11.0

69
package/quagga/0005-bgpd-security-invalid-attr-length-sends-NOTIFY-with-.patch
View File

@ -1,69 +0,0 @@
From cc2e6770697e343f4af534114ab7e633d5beabec Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Paul Jakma <paul@jakma.org>
Date: Wed, 3 Jan 2018 23:57:33 +0000
Subject: [PATCH] bgpd/security: invalid attr length sends NOTIFY with data
overrun
Security issue: Quagga-2018-0543
See: https://www.quagga.net/security/Quagga-2018-0543.txt
* bgpd/bgp_attr.c: (bgp_attr_parse) An invalid attribute length is correctly
checked, and a NOTIFY prepared. The NOTIFY can include the incorrect
received data with the NOTIFY, for debug purposes. Commit
c69698704806a9ac5 modified the code to do that just, and also send the
malformed attr with the NOTIFY. However, the invalid attribute length was
used as the length of the data to send back.
The result is a read past the end of data, which is then written to the
NOTIFY message and sent to the peer.
A configured BGP peer can use this bug to read up to 64 KiB of memory from
the bgpd process, or crash the process if the invalid read is caught by
some means (unmapped page and SEGV, or other mechanism) resulting in a DoS.
This bug _ought_ /not/ be exploitable by anything other than the connected
BGP peer, assuming the underlying TCP transport is secure. For no BGP
peer should send on an UPDATE with this attribute. Quagga will not, as
Quagga always validates the attr header length, regardless of type.
However, it is possible that there are BGP implementations that do not
check lengths on some attributes (e.g. optional/transitive ones of a type
they do not recognise), and might pass such malformed attrs on. If such
implementations exists and are common, then this bug might be triggerable
by BGP speakers further hops away. Those peers will not receive the
NOTIFY (unless they sit on a shared medium), however they might then be
able to trigger a DoS.
Fix: use the valid bound to calculate the length.
Signed-off-by: Peter Korsgaard <peter@korsgaard.com>
---
bgpd/bgp_attr.c | 4 +++-
1 file changed, 3 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
diff --git a/bgpd/bgp_attr.c b/bgpd/bgp_attr.c
index ef58beb1..9564637e 100644
--- a/bgpd/bgp_attr.c
+++ b/bgpd/bgp_attr.c
@@ -2147,6 +2147,8 @@ bgp_attr_parse (struct peer *peer, struct attr *attr, bgp_size_t size,
memset (seen, 0, BGP_ATTR_BITMAP_SIZE);
/* End pointer of BGP attribute. */
+ assert (size <= stream_get_size (BGP_INPUT (peer)));
+ assert (size <= stream_get_endp (BGP_INPUT (peer)));
endp = BGP_INPUT_PNT (peer) + size;
/* Get attributes to the end of attribute length. */
@@ -2228,7 +2230,7 @@ bgp_attr_parse (struct peer *peer, struct attr *attr, bgp_size_t size,
bgp_notify_send_with_data (peer,
BGP_NOTIFY_UPDATE_ERR,
BGP_NOTIFY_UPDATE_ATTR_LENG_ERR,
- startp, attr_endp - startp);
+ startp, endp - startp);
return BGP_ATTR_PARSE_ERROR;
}
--
2.11.0

112
package/quagga/0006-bgpd-security-Fix-double-free-of-unknown-attribute.patch
View File

@ -1,112 +0,0 @@
From e69b535f92eafb599329bf725d9b4c6fd5d7fded Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Paul Jakma <paul@jakma.org>
Date: Sat, 6 Jan 2018 19:52:10 +0000
Subject: [PATCH] bgpd/security: Fix double free of unknown attribute
Security issue: Quagga-2018-1114
See: https://www.quagga.net/security/Quagga-2018-1114.txt
It is possible for bgpd to double-free an unknown attribute. This can happen
via bgp_update_receive receiving an UPDATE with an invalid unknown attribute.
bgp_update_receive then will call bgp_attr_unintern_sub and bgp_attr_flush,
and the latter may try free an already freed unknown attr.
* bgpd/bgp_attr.c: (transit_unintern) Take a pointer to the caller's storage
for the (struct transit *), so that transit_unintern can NULL out the
caller's reference if the (struct transit) is freed.
(cluster_unintern) By inspection, appears to have a similar issue.
(bgp_attr_unintern_sub) adjust for above.
Signed-off-by: Peter Korsgaard <peter@korsgaard.com>
---
bgpd/bgp_attr.c | 33 +++++++++++++++++++--------------
bgpd/bgp_attr.h | 4 ++--
2 files changed, 21 insertions(+), 16 deletions(-)
diff --git a/bgpd/bgp_attr.c b/bgpd/bgp_attr.c
index 9564637e..0c2806b5 100644
--- a/bgpd/bgp_attr.c
+++ b/bgpd/bgp_attr.c
@@ -199,15 +199,17 @@ cluster_intern (struct cluster_list *cluster)
}
void
-cluster_unintern (struct cluster_list *cluster)
+cluster_unintern (struct cluster_list **cluster)
{
- if (cluster->refcnt)
- cluster->refcnt--;
+ struct cluster_list *c = *cluster;
+ if (c->refcnt)
+ c->refcnt--;
- if (cluster->refcnt == 0)
+ if (c->refcnt == 0)
{
- hash_release (cluster_hash, cluster);
- cluster_free (cluster);
+ hash_release (cluster_hash, c);
+ cluster_free (c);
+ *cluster = NULL;
}
}
@@ -357,15 +359,18 @@ transit_intern (struct transit *transit)
}
void
-transit_unintern (struct transit *transit)
+transit_unintern (struct transit **transit)
{
- if (transit->refcnt)
- transit->refcnt--;
+ struct transit *t = *transit;
+
+ if (t->refcnt)
+ t->refcnt--;
- if (transit->refcnt == 0)
+ if (t->refcnt == 0)
{
- hash_release (transit_hash, transit);
- transit_free (transit);
+ hash_release (transit_hash, t);
+ transit_free (t);
+ *transit = NULL;
}
}
@@ -820,11 +825,11 @@ bgp_attr_unintern_sub (struct attr *attr)
UNSET_FLAG(attr->flag, ATTR_FLAG_BIT (BGP_ATTR_LARGE_COMMUNITIES));
if (attr->extra->cluster)
- cluster_unintern (attr->extra->cluster);
+ cluster_unintern (&attr->extra->cluster);
UNSET_FLAG(attr->flag, ATTR_FLAG_BIT (BGP_ATTR_CLUSTER_LIST));
if (attr->extra->transit)
- transit_unintern (attr->extra->transit);
+ transit_unintern (&attr->extra->transit);
}
}
diff --git a/bgpd/bgp_attr.h b/bgpd/bgp_attr.h
index 9ff074b2..052acc7d 100644
--- a/bgpd/bgp_attr.h
+++ b/bgpd/bgp_attr.h
@@ -187,10 +187,10 @@ extern unsigned long int attr_unknown_count (void);
/* Cluster list prototypes. */
extern int cluster_loop_check (struct cluster_list *, struct in_addr);
-extern void cluster_unintern (struct cluster_list *);
+extern void cluster_unintern (struct cluster_list **);
/* Transit attribute prototypes. */
-void transit_unintern (struct transit *);
+void transit_unintern (struct transit **);
/* Below exported for unit-test purposes only */
struct bgp_attr_parser_args {
--
2.11.0

114
package/quagga/0007-bgpd-security-debug-print-of-received-NOTIFY-data-ca.patch
View File

@ -1,114 +0,0 @@
From 9e5251151894aefdf8e9392a2371615222119ad8 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Paul Jakma <paul@jakma.org>
Date: Sat, 6 Jan 2018 22:31:52 +0000
Subject: [PATCH] bgpd/security: debug print of received NOTIFY data can
over-read msg array
Security issue: Quagga-2018-1550
See: https://www.quagga.net/security/Quagga-2018-1550.txt
* bgpd/bgp_debug.c: (struct message) Nearly every one of the NOTIFY
code/subcode message arrays has their corresponding size variables off
by one, as most have 1 as first index.
This means (bgp_notify_print) can cause mes_lookup to overread the (struct
message) by 1 pointer value if given an unknown index.
Fix the bgp_notify_..._msg_max variables to use the compiler to calculate
the correct sizes.
Signed-off-by: Peter Korsgaard <peter@korsgaard.com>
---
bgpd/bgp_debug.c | 21 ++++++++++++---------
1 file changed, 12 insertions(+), 9 deletions(-)
diff --git a/bgpd/bgp_debug.c b/bgpd/bgp_debug.c
index ba797228..43faee7c 100644
--- a/bgpd/bgp_debug.c
+++ b/bgpd/bgp_debug.c
@@ -29,6 +29,7 @@ Software Foundation, Inc., 59 Temple Place - Suite 330, Boston, MA
#include "log.h"
#include "sockunion.h"
#include "filter.h"
+#include "memory.h"
#include "bgpd/bgpd.h"
#include "bgpd/bgp_aspath.h"
@@ -73,7 +74,8 @@ const struct message bgp_status_msg[] =
{ Clearing, "Clearing" },
{ Deleted, "Deleted" },
};
-const int bgp_status_msg_max = BGP_STATUS_MAX;
+#define BGP_DEBUG_MSG_MAX(msg) const int msg ## _max = array_size (msg)
+BGP_DEBUG_MSG_MAX (bgp_status_msg);
/* BGP message type string. */
const char *bgp_type_str[] =
@@ -84,7 +86,8 @@ const char *bgp_type_str[] =
"NOTIFICATION",
"KEEPALIVE",
"ROUTE-REFRESH",
- "CAPABILITY"
+ "CAPABILITY",
+ NULL,
};
/* message for BGP-4 Notify */
@@ -98,15 +101,15 @@ static const struct message bgp_notify_msg[] =
{ BGP_NOTIFY_CEASE, "Cease"},
{ BGP_NOTIFY_CAPABILITY_ERR, "CAPABILITY Message Error"},
};
-static const int bgp_notify_msg_max = BGP_NOTIFY_MAX;
+BGP_DEBUG_MSG_MAX (bgp_notify_msg);
static const struct message bgp_notify_head_msg[] =
{
{ BGP_NOTIFY_HEADER_NOT_SYNC, "/Connection Not Synchronized"},
{ BGP_NOTIFY_HEADER_BAD_MESLEN, "/Bad Message Length"},
- { BGP_NOTIFY_HEADER_BAD_MESTYPE, "/Bad Message Type"}
+ { BGP_NOTIFY_HEADER_BAD_MESTYPE, "/Bad Message Type"},
};
-static const int bgp_notify_head_msg_max = BGP_NOTIFY_HEADER_MAX;
+BGP_DEBUG_MSG_MAX (bgp_notify_head_msg);
static const struct message bgp_notify_open_msg[] =
{
@@ -119,7 +122,7 @@ static const struct message bgp_notify_open_msg[] =
{ BGP_NOTIFY_OPEN_UNACEP_HOLDTIME, "/Unacceptable Hold Time"},
{ BGP_NOTIFY_OPEN_UNSUP_CAPBL, "/Unsupported Capability"},
};
-static const int bgp_notify_open_msg_max = BGP_NOTIFY_OPEN_MAX;
+BGP_DEBUG_MSG_MAX (bgp_notify_open_msg);
static const struct message bgp_notify_update_msg[] =
{
@@ -136,7 +139,7 @@ static const struct message bgp_notify_update_msg[] =
{ BGP_NOTIFY_UPDATE_INVAL_NETWORK, "/Invalid Network Field"},
{ BGP_NOTIFY_UPDATE_MAL_AS_PATH, "/Malformed AS_PATH"},
};
-static const int bgp_notify_update_msg_max = BGP_NOTIFY_UPDATE_MAX;
+BGP_DEBUG_MSG_MAX (bgp_notify_update_msg);
static const struct message bgp_notify_cease_msg[] =
{
@@ -150,7 +153,7 @@ static const struct message bgp_notify_cease_msg[] =
{ BGP_NOTIFY_CEASE_COLLISION_RESOLUTION, "/Connection collision resolution"},
{ BGP_NOTIFY_CEASE_OUT_OF_RESOURCE, "/Out of Resource"},
};
-static const int bgp_notify_cease_msg_max = BGP_NOTIFY_CEASE_MAX;
+BGP_DEBUG_MSG_MAX (bgp_notify_cease_msg);
static const struct message bgp_notify_capability_msg[] =
{
@@ -159,7 +162,7 @@ static const struct message bgp_notify_capability_msg[] =
{ BGP_NOTIFY_CAPABILITY_INVALID_LENGTH, "/Invalid Capability Length"},
{ BGP_NOTIFY_CAPABILITY_MALFORMED_CODE, "/Malformed Capability Value"},
};
-static const int bgp_notify_capability_msg_max = BGP_NOTIFY_CAPABILITY_MAX;
+BGP_DEBUG_MSG_MAX (bgp_notify_capability_msg);
/* Origin strings. */
const char *bgp_origin_str[] = {"i","e","?"};
--
2.11.0

43
package/quagga/0008-bgpd-security-fix-infinite-loop-on-certain-invalid-O.patch
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@ -1,43 +0,0 @@
From ce07207c50a3d1f05d6dd49b5294282e59749787 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Paul Jakma <paul@jakma.org>
Date: Sat, 6 Jan 2018 21:20:51 +0000
Subject: [PATCH] bgpd/security: fix infinite loop on certain invalid OPEN
messages
Security issue: Quagga-2018-1975
See: https://www.quagga.net/security/Quagga-2018-1975.txt
* bgpd/bgp_packet.c: (bgp_capability_msg_parse) capability parser can infinite
loop due to checks that issue 'continue' without bumping the input
pointer.
Signed-off-by: Peter Korsgaard <peter@korsgaard.com>
---
bgpd/bgp_packet.c | 4 ++--
1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
diff --git a/bgpd/bgp_packet.c b/bgpd/bgp_packet.c
index b3d601fc..f9338d8d 100644
--- a/bgpd/bgp_packet.c
+++ b/bgpd/bgp_packet.c
@@ -2328,7 +2328,8 @@ bgp_capability_msg_parse (struct peer *peer, u_char *pnt, bgp_size_t length)
end = pnt + length;
- while (pnt < end)
+ /* XXX: Streamify this */
+ for (; pnt < end; pnt += hdr->length + 3)
{
/* We need at least action, capability code and capability length. */
if (pnt + 3 > end)
@@ -2416,7 +2417,6 @@ bgp_capability_msg_parse (struct peer *peer, u_char *pnt, bgp_size_t length)
zlog_warn ("%s unrecognized capability code: %d - ignored",
peer->host, hdr->code);
}
- pnt += hdr->length + 3;
}
return 0;
}
--
2.11.0

5
package/quagga/quagga.hash
View File

@ -1,2 +1,5 @@
# Locally calculated after checking pgp signature
sha256 b5a94e5bdad3062e04595a5692b8cc435f0a85102f75dfdca0a06d093b4ef63f quagga-1.1.1.tar.gz
sha256 ee2c0907a106902abbdcaf63b4f28c67241c4f3396989ed54da7b4976eecad31 quagga-1.2.3.tar.gz
# Hash for license file
sha256 b39c1bad4e51e2a3389cd25fc4addebe41a3ae7c11100795683f9330de1536e5 COPYING

8
package/quagga/quagga.mk
View File

@ -4,7 +4,7 @@
#
################################################################################
QUAGGA_VERSION = 1.1.1
QUAGGA_VERSION = 1.2.3
QUAGGA_SITE = http://download.savannah.gnu.org/releases/quagga
QUAGGA_DEPENDENCIES = host-gawk host-pkgconf
QUAGGA_LICENSE = GPL-2.0+
@ -16,10 +16,8 @@ QUAGGA_LICENSE_FILES = COPYING
QUAGGA_CONF_OPTS = \
--program-transform-name='' \
--sysconfdir=/etc/quagga \
--localstatedir=/var/run/quagga
# 0002-configure-fix-static-linking-with-readline.patch
QUAGGA_AUTORECONF = YES
--localstatedir=/var/run/quagga \
--disable-nhrpd
ifeq ($(BR2_PACKAGE_LIBCAP),y)
QUAGGA_CONF_OPTS += --enable-capabilities