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wpa_supplicant: fix internal TLS implementation security issues

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Add upstream patches fixing internal TLS validation of X.509 certificates. See
http://lists.shmoo.com/pipermail/hostap/2014-May/030273.html for details.

Signed-off-by: Baruch Siach <baruch@tkos.co.il>
Signed-off-by: Peter Korsgaard <peter@korsgaard.com>
This commit is contained in:
Baruch Siach 2014-05-21 12:54:00 +03:00 committed by Peter Korsgaard
parent 9725c5aefc
commit 39d1717efd
3 changed files with 140 additions and 0 deletions
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38
package/wpa_supplicant/wpa_supplicant-0002-X.509-Fix-internal-TLS-X.509-validation-of-PKCS-1-si.patch Normal file
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@ -0,0 +1,38 @@
From 9c29d48725fd40a82407a89f193cf009aeef9745 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Jouni Malinen <jouni@qca.qualcomm.com>
Date: Mon, 19 May 2014 23:25:38 +0300
Subject: [PATCH] X.509: Fix internal TLS/X.509 validation of PKCS#1
signature
Verify that there is no extra data after the hash field. This is needed
to avoid potential attacks using additional data to construct a value
that passes the RSA operation and allows the hash value to be forged.
Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <jouni@qca.qualcomm.com>
---
src/tls/x509v3.c | 9 +++++++++
1 file changed, 9 insertions(+)
diff --git a/src/tls/x509v3.c b/src/tls/x509v3.c
index a9483cb7fc2f..751a268e1caf 100644
--- a/src/tls/x509v3.c
+++ b/src/tls/x509v3.c
@@ -1783,6 +1783,15 @@ skip_digest_oid:
return -1;
}
+ if (hdr.payload + hdr.length < data + data_len) {
+ wpa_hexdump(MSG_INFO,
+ "X509: Extra data after certificate signature hash",
+ hdr.payload + hdr.length,
+ data + data_len - hdr.payload - hdr.length);
+ os_free(data);
+ return -1;
+ }
+
os_free(data);
wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG, "X509: Certificate Digest matches with "
--
2.0.0.rc2

67
package/wpa_supplicant/wpa_supplicant-0003-PKCS-1-Allow-only-BT-01-for-signature-in-internal-TL.patch Normal file
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@ -0,0 +1,67 @@
From e6d83cc7babb978ba53ae8686159b41ab0f448cc Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Jouni Malinen <jouni@qca.qualcomm.com>
Date: Mon, 19 May 2014 23:26:19 +0300
Subject: [PATCH] PKCS #1: Allow only BT=01 for signature in internal TLS
Based on PKCS #1, v1.5, 10.1.3, the block type shall be 01 for a
signature. This avoids a potential attack vector for internal TLS/X.509
implementation.
Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <jouni@qca.qualcomm.com>
---
src/tls/pkcs1.c | 29 ++++++++++-------------------
1 file changed, 10 insertions(+), 19 deletions(-)
diff --git a/src/tls/pkcs1.c b/src/tls/pkcs1.c
index b6fde5ee868a..af58a42987c6 100644
--- a/src/tls/pkcs1.c
+++ b/src/tls/pkcs1.c
@@ -142,35 +142,26 @@ int pkcs1_decrypt_public_key(struct crypto_rsa_key *key,
* BT = 00 or 01
* PS = k-3-||D|| times (00 if BT=00) or (FF if BT=01)
* k = length of modulus in octets
+ *
+ * Based on 10.1.3, "The block type shall be 01" for a signature.
*/
if (len < 3 + 8 + 16 /* min hash len */ ||
- plain[0] != 0x00 || (plain[1] != 0x00 && plain[1] != 0x01)) {
+ plain[0] != 0x00 || plain[1] != 0x01) {
wpa_printf(MSG_INFO, "LibTomCrypt: Invalid signature EB "
"structure");
return -1;
}
pos = plain + 3;
- if (plain[1] == 0x00) {
- /* BT = 00 */
- if (plain[2] != 0x00) {
- wpa_printf(MSG_INFO, "LibTomCrypt: Invalid signature "
- "PS (BT=00)");
- return -1;
- }
- while (pos + 1 < plain + len && *pos == 0x00 && pos[1] == 0x00)
- pos++;
- } else {
- /* BT = 01 */
- if (plain[2] != 0xff) {
- wpa_printf(MSG_INFO, "LibTomCrypt: Invalid signature "
- "PS (BT=01)");
- return -1;
- }
- while (pos < plain + len && *pos == 0xff)
- pos++;
+ /* BT = 01 */
+ if (plain[2] != 0xff) {
+ wpa_printf(MSG_INFO, "LibTomCrypt: Invalid signature "
+ "PS (BT=01)");
+ return -1;
}
+ while (pos < plain + len && *pos == 0xff)
+ pos++;
if (pos - plain - 2 < 8) {
/* PKCS #1 v1.5, 8.1: At least eight octets long PS */
--
2.0.0.rc2

35
package/wpa_supplicant/wpa_supplicant-0004-PKCS-1-Enforce-minimum-padding-for-decryption-in-int.patch Normal file
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@ -0,0 +1,35 @@
From 6c5be116dd6997f68e524247751cff53c74519d7 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Jouni Malinen <jouni@qca.qualcomm.com>
Date: Mon, 19 May 2014 23:26:43 +0300
Subject: [PATCH] PKCS #1: Enforce minimum padding for decryption in
internal TLS
Follow the PKCS #1 v1.5, 8.1 constraint of at least eight octets long PS
for the case where the internal TLS implementation decrypts PKCS #1
formatted data. Similar limit was already in place for signature
validation, but not for this decryption routine.
Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <jouni@qca.qualcomm.com>
---
src/tls/pkcs1.c | 5 +++++
1 file changed, 5 insertions(+)
diff --git a/src/tls/pkcs1.c b/src/tls/pkcs1.c
index af58a42987c6..ea3e6171a1d1 100644
--- a/src/tls/pkcs1.c
+++ b/src/tls/pkcs1.c
@@ -113,6 +113,11 @@ int pkcs1_v15_private_key_decrypt(struct crypto_rsa_key *key,
pos++;
if (pos == end)
return -1;
+ if (pos - out - 2 < 8) {
+ /* PKCS #1 v1.5, 8.1: At least eight octets long PS */
+ wpa_printf(MSG_INFO, "LibTomCrypt: Too short padding");
+ return -1;
+ }
pos++;
*outlen -= pos - out;
--
2.0.0.rc2