package/file: add upstream security fix

Fixes the following security vulnerability:

- CVE-2019-18218: cdf_read_property_info in cdf.c in file through 5.37 does
  not restrict the number of CDF_VECTOR elements, which allows a heap-based
  buffer overflow (4-byte out-of-bounds write).

Signed-off-by: Peter Korsgaard <peter@korsgaard.com>
Signed-off-by: Thomas Petazzoni <thomas.petazzoni@bootlin.com>
This commit is contained in:
Peter Korsgaard 2019-10-27 08:45:59 +01:00 committed by Thomas Petazzoni
parent 41eadb1a9b
commit 1c4584e47e
2 changed files with 130 additions and 0 deletions

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@ -0,0 +1,68 @@
From 06de62c022138f63de9bcd04074491945eaa8662 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Christos Zoulas <christos@zoulas.com>
Date: Fri, 23 Aug 2019 14:29:14 +0000
Subject: [PATCH] Detect multiplication overflow when computing sector position
(found by oss-fuzz)
Fixes CVE-2019-18218
Signed-off-by: Peter Korsgaard <peter@korsgaard.com>
---
src/cdf.c | 20 +++++++++++++++++---
1 file changed, 17 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)
diff --git a/src/cdf.c b/src/cdf.c
index 556a3ff8..9d639674 100644
--- a/src/cdf.c
+++ b/src/cdf.c
@@ -35,7 +35,7 @@
#include "file.h"
#ifndef lint
-FILE_RCSID("@(#)$File: cdf.c,v 1.114 2019/02/20 02:35:27 christos Exp $")
+FILE_RCSID("@(#)$File: cdf.c,v 1.115 2019/08/23 14:29:14 christos Exp $")
#endif
#include <assert.h>
@@ -53,6 +53,10 @@ FILE_RCSID("@(#)$File: cdf.c,v 1.114 2019/02/20 02:35:27 christos Exp $")
#define EFTYPE EINVAL
#endif
+#ifndef SIZE_T_MAX
+#define SIZE_T_MAX CAST(size_t, ~0ULL)
+#endif
+
#include "cdf.h"
#ifdef CDF_DEBUG
@@ -405,7 +409,12 @@ cdf_read_sector(const cdf_info_t *info, void *buf, size_t offs, size_t len,
const cdf_header_t *h, cdf_secid_t id)
{
size_t ss = CDF_SEC_SIZE(h);
- size_t pos = CDF_SEC_POS(h, id);
+ size_t pos;
+
+ if (SIZE_T_MAX / ss < CAST(size_t, id))
+ return -1;
+
+ pos = CDF_SEC_POS(h, id);
assert(ss == len);
return cdf_read(info, CAST(off_t, pos), RCAST(char *, buf) + offs, len);
}
@@ -415,7 +424,12 @@ cdf_read_short_sector(const cdf_stream_t *sst, void *buf, size_t offs,
size_t len, const cdf_header_t *h, cdf_secid_t id)
{
size_t ss = CDF_SHORT_SEC_SIZE(h);
- size_t pos = CDF_SHORT_SEC_POS(h, id);
+ size_t pos;
+
+ if (SIZE_T_MAX / ss < CAST(size_t, id))
+ return -1;
+
+ pos = CDF_SHORT_SEC_POS(h, id);
assert(ss == len);
if (pos + len > CDF_SEC_SIZE(h) * sst->sst_len) {
DPRINTF(("Out of bounds read %" SIZE_T_FORMAT "u > %"
--
2.20.1

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@ -0,0 +1,62 @@
From 46a8443f76cec4b41ec736eca396984c74664f84 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Christos Zoulas <christos@zoulas.com>
Date: Mon, 26 Aug 2019 14:31:39 +0000
Subject: [PATCH] Limit the number of elements in a vector (found by oss-fuzz)
Fixes CVE-2019-18218
Signed-off-by: Peter Korsgaard <peter@korsgaard.com>
---
src/cdf.c | 9 ++++-----
src/cdf.h | 1 +
2 files changed, 5 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-)
diff --git a/src/cdf.c b/src/cdf.c
index 9d639674..bb81d637 100644
--- a/src/cdf.c
+++ b/src/cdf.c
@@ -35,7 +35,7 @@
#include "file.h"
#ifndef lint
-FILE_RCSID("@(#)$File: cdf.c,v 1.115 2019/08/23 14:29:14 christos Exp $")
+FILE_RCSID("@(#)$File: cdf.c,v 1.116 2019/08/26 14:31:39 christos Exp $")
#endif
#include <assert.h>
@@ -1027,8 +1027,9 @@ cdf_read_property_info(const cdf_stream_t *sst, const cdf_header_t *h,
goto out;
}
nelements = CDF_GETUINT32(q, 1);
- if (nelements == 0) {
- DPRINTF(("CDF_VECTOR with nelements == 0\n"));
+ if (nelements > CDF_ELEMENT_LIMIT || nelements == 0) {
+ DPRINTF(("CDF_VECTOR with nelements == %"
+ SIZE_T_FORMAT "u\n", nelements));
goto out;
}
slen = 2;
@@ -1070,8 +1071,6 @@ cdf_read_property_info(const cdf_stream_t *sst, const cdf_header_t *h,
goto out;
inp += nelem;
}
- DPRINTF(("nelements = %" SIZE_T_FORMAT "u\n",
- nelements));
for (j = 0; j < nelements && i < sh.sh_properties;
j++, i++)
{
diff --git a/src/cdf.h b/src/cdf.h
index 2f7e554b..05056668 100644
--- a/src/cdf.h
+++ b/src/cdf.h
@@ -48,6 +48,7 @@
typedef int32_t cdf_secid_t;
#define CDF_LOOP_LIMIT 10000
+#define CDF_ELEMENT_LIMIT 100000
#define CDF_SECID_NULL 0
#define CDF_SECID_FREE -1
--
2.20.1