kumquat-buildroot/package/git/git.hash

# From: https://www.kernel.org/pub/software/scm/git/sha256sums.asc
sha256 6e69b0e9c487e5da52a14d4829f0b6a28b2c18a0bb6fb67c0dc8b5b5658bd532  git-2.16.4.tar.xz
sha256 5b2198d1645f767585e8a88ac0499b04472164c0d2da22e75ecf97ef443ab32e  COPYING
sha256 1922f45d2c49e390032c9c0ba6d7cac904087f7cec51af30c2b2ad022ce0e76a  LGPL-2.1
git: bump version to 2.1.3 - Bump version to 2.1.3 - Add a hash file Signed-off-by: Vicente Olivert Riera <Vincent.Riera@imgtec.com> Signed-off-by: Thomas Petazzoni <thomas.petazzoni@free-electrons.com> 2014-11-19 18:45:46 +01:00			`# From: https://www.kernel.org/pub/software/scm/git/sha256sums.asc`
git: security bump to version 2.16.4 Forward port of security fixes from the 2.13.7 release. The 2.13.7 release notes say this: * Submodule "names" come from the untrusted .gitmodules file, but we blindly append them to $GIT_DIR/modules to create our on-disk repo paths. This means you can do bad things by putting "../" into the name. We now enforce some rules for submodule names which will cause Git to ignore these malicious names (CVE-2018-11235). Credit for finding this vulnerability and the proof of concept from which the test script was adapted goes to Etienne Stalmans. * It was possible to trick the code that sanity-checks paths on NTFS into reading random piece of memory (CVE-2018-11233). Cc: Matt Weber <matthew.weber@rockwellcollins.com> Signed-off-by: Baruch Siach <baruch@tkos.co.il> Signed-off-by: Peter Korsgaard <peter@korsgaard.com> 2018-05-29 19:38:39 +02:00			`sha256 6e69b0e9c487e5da52a14d4829f0b6a28b2c18a0bb6fb67c0dc8b5b5658bd532 git-2.16.4.tar.xz`
git: bump to version 2.13.3 Add license files hashes. Signed-off-by: Baruch Siach <baruch@tkos.co.il> Signed-off-by: Thomas Petazzoni <thomas.petazzoni@free-electrons.com> 2017-07-18 14:21:19 +02:00			`sha256 5b2198d1645f767585e8a88ac0499b04472164c0d2da22e75ecf97ef443ab32e COPYING`
			`sha256 1922f45d2c49e390032c9c0ba6d7cac904087f7cec51af30c2b2ad022ce0e76a LGPL-2.1`