kumquat-buildroot/boot/grub2/0148-templates-Disable-the-os-prober-by-default.patch

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boot/grub2: Backport 2021/03/02 securify fixes Details: https://lists.gnu.org/archive/html/grub-devel/2021-03/msg00007.html As detailed in commit 7e64a050fbd9add07ed84d48054ffee1b659d079, it is difficult to utilize the upstream patches directly, so a number of patches include changes to generated files so that we don't need invoke the gentpl.py script. In addition to the security fixes, these required patches has been backported: f76a27996 efi: Make shim_lock GUID and protocol type public 04ae030d0 efi: Return grub_efi_status_t from grub_efi_get_variable() ac5c93675 efi: Add a function to read EFI variables with attributes d7e54b2e5 efi: Add secure boot detection The following security issues are fixed: CVE-2020-14372 grub2: The acpi command allows privileged user to load crafted ACPI tables when Secure Boot is enabled CWE-184 7.5/CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:H/PR:H/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:H/A:H GRUB2 enables the use of the command acpi even when Secure Boot is signaled by the firmware. An attacker with local root privileges to can drop a small SSDT in /boot/efi and modify grub.cfg to instruct grub to load said SSDT. The SSDT then gets run by the kernel and it overwrites the kernel lock down configuration enabling the attacker to load unsigned kernel modules and kexec unsigned code. Reported-by: Máté Kukri ******************************************************************************* CVE-2020-25632 grub2: Use-after-free in rmmod command CWE-416 7.5/CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:H/PR:H/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:H/A:H The rmmod implementation for GRUB2 is flawed, allowing an attacker to unload a module used as dependency without checking if any other dependent module is still loaded. This leads to an use-after-free scenario possibly allowing an attacker to execute arbitrary code and by-pass Secure Boot protections. Reported-by: Chris Coulson (Canonical) ******************************************************************************* CVE-2020-25647 grub2: Out-of-bound write in grub_usb_device_initialize() CWE-787 6.9/CVSS:3.1/AV:P/AC:H/PR:H/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:H/A:H grub_usb_device_initialize() is called to handle USB device initialization. It reads out the descriptors it needs from the USB device and uses that data to fill in some USB data structures. grub_usb_device_initialize() performs very little bounds checking and simply assumes the USB device provides sane values. This behavior can trigger memory corruption. If properly exploited, this would lead to arbitrary code execution allowing the attacker to by-pass Secure Boot mechanism. Reported-by: Joseph Tartaro (IOActive) and Ilja van Sprundel (IOActive) ******************************************************************************* CVE-2020-27749 grub2: Stack buffer overflow in grub_parser_split_cmdline CWE-121 7.5/CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:H/PR:H/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:H/A:H grub_parser_split_cmdline() expands variable names present in the supplied command line in to their corresponding variable contents and uses a 1kB stack buffer for temporary storage without sufficient bounds checking. If the function is called with a command line that references a variable with a sufficiently large payload, it is possible to overflow the stack buffer, corrupt the stack frame and control execution. An attacker may use this to circumvent Secure Boot protections. Reported-by: Chris Coulson (Canonical) ******************************************************************************* CVE-2020-27779 grub2: The cutmem command allows privileged user to remove memory regions when Secure Boot is enabled CWE-285 7.5/CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:H/PR:H/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:H/A:H The GRUB2's cutmem command does not honor Secure Boot locking. This allows an privileged attacker to remove address ranges from memory creating an opportunity to circumvent Secure Boot protections after proper triage about grub's memory layout. Reported-by: Teddy Reed ******************************************************************************* CVE-2021-3418 - grub2: GRUB 2.05 reintroduced CVE-2020-15705 CWE-281 6.4/CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:H/PR:H/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H The GRUB2 upstream reintroduced the CVE-2020-15705. This refers to a distro specific flaw which made upstream in the mentioned version. If certificates that signed GRUB2 are installed into db, GRUB2 can be booted directly. It will then boot any kernel without signature validation. The booted kernel will think it was booted in Secure Boot mode and will implement lock down, yet it could have been tampered. This flaw only affects upstream and distributions using the shim_lock verifier. Reported-by: Dimitri John Ledkov (Canonical) ******************************************************************************* CVE-2021-20225 grub2: Heap out-of-bounds write in short form option parser CWE-787 7.5/CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:H/PR:H/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:H/A:H The option parser in GRUB2 allows an attacker to write past the end of a heap-allocated buffer by calling certain commands with a large number of specific short forms of options. Reported-by: Daniel Axtens (IBM) ******************************************************************************* CVE-2021-20233 grub2: Heap out-of-bound write due to mis-calculation of space required for quoting CWE-787 7.5/CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:H/PR:H/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:H/A:H There's a flaw on GRUB2 menu rendering code setparam_prefix() in the menu rendering code performs a length calculation on the assumption that expressing a quoted single quote will require 3 characters, while it actually requires 4 characters. This allow an attacker to corrupt memory by one byte for each quote in the input. Reported-by: Daniel Axtens (IBM) ******************************************************************************* Signed-off-by: Stefan Sørensen <stefan.sorensen@spectralink.com> Signed-off-by: Yann E. MORIN <yann.morin.1998@free.fr>
2021-03-11 10:53:06 +01:00
From e346414725a70e5c74ee87ca14e580c66f517666 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Alex Burmashev <alexander.burmashev@oracle.com>
Date: Tue, 16 Feb 2021 11:12:12 +0100
Subject: [PATCH] templates: Disable the os-prober by default
The os-prober is enabled by default what may lead to potentially
dangerous use cases and borderline opening attack vectors. This
patch disables the os-prober, adds warning messages and updates
GRUB_DISABLE_OS_PROBER configuration option documentation. This
way we make it clear that the os-prober usage is not recommended.
Simplistic nature of this change allows downstream vendors, who
really want os-prober to be enabled out of the box in their
relevant products, easily revert to it's old behavior.
Reported-by: NyankoSec (<nyanko@10x.moe>, https://twitter.com/NyankoSec),
working with SSD Secure Disclosure
Signed-off-by: Alex Burmashev <alexander.burmashev@oracle.com>
Reviewed-by: Daniel Kiper <daniel.kiper@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: Stefan Sørensen <stefan.sorensen@spectralink.com>
---
docs/grub.texi | 18 ++++++++++--------
util/grub.d/30_os-prober.in | 5 ++++-
2 files changed, 14 insertions(+), 9 deletions(-)
diff --git a/docs/grub.texi b/docs/grub.texi
index e302797..45a9f80 100644
--- a/docs/grub.texi
+++ b/docs/grub.texi
@@ -1481,10 +1481,13 @@ boot sequence. If you have problems, set this option to @samp{text} and
GRUB will tell Linux to boot in normal text mode.
@item GRUB_DISABLE_OS_PROBER
-Normally, @command{grub-mkconfig} will try to use the external
-@command{os-prober} program, if installed, to discover other operating
-systems installed on the same system and generate appropriate menu entries
-for them. Set this option to @samp{true} to disable this.
+The @command{grub-mkconfig} has a feature to use the external
+@command{os-prober} program to discover other operating systems installed on
+the same machine and generate appropriate menu entries for them. It is disabled
+by default since automatic and silent execution of @command{os-prober}, and
+creating boot entries based on that data, is a potential attack vector. Set
+this option to @samp{false} to enable this feature in the
+@command{grub-mkconfig} command.
@item GRUB_OS_PROBER_SKIP_LIST
List of space-separated FS UUIDs of filesystems to be ignored from os-prober
@@ -1812,10 +1815,9 @@ than zero; otherwise 0.
@section Multi-boot manual config
Currently autogenerating config files for multi-boot environments depends on
-os-prober and has several shortcomings. While fixing it is scheduled for the
-next release, meanwhile you can make use of the power of GRUB syntax and do it
-yourself. A possible configuration is detailed here, feel free to adjust to your
-needs.
+os-prober and has several shortcomings. Due to that it is disabled by default.
+It is advised to use the power of GRUB syntax and do it yourself. A possible
+configuration is detailed here, feel free to adjust to your needs.
First create a separate GRUB partition, big enough to hold GRUB. Some of the
following entries show how to load OS installer images from this same partition,
diff --git a/util/grub.d/30_os-prober.in b/util/grub.d/30_os-prober.in
index 515a68c..99de043 100644
--- a/util/grub.d/30_os-prober.in
+++ b/util/grub.d/30_os-prober.in
@@ -26,7 +26,8 @@ export TEXTDOMAINDIR="@localedir@"
. "$pkgdatadir/grub-mkconfig_lib"
-if [ "x${GRUB_DISABLE_OS_PROBER}" = "xtrue" ]; then
+if [ "x${GRUB_DISABLE_OS_PROBER}" = "xfalse" ]; then
+ gettext_printf "os-prober will not be executed to detect other bootable partitions.\nSystems on them will not be added to the GRUB boot configuration.\nCheck GRUB_DISABLE_OS_PROBER documentation entry.\n"
exit 0
fi
@@ -39,6 +40,8 @@ OSPROBED="`os-prober | tr ' ' '^' | paste -s -d ' '`"
if [ -z "${OSPROBED}" ] ; then
# empty os-prober output, nothing doing
exit 0
+else
+ grub_warn "$(gettext_printf "os-prober was executed to detect other bootable partitions.\nIt's output will be used to detect bootable binaries on them and create new boot entries.")"
fi
osx_entry() {
--
2.14.2