2014-02-19 20:10:18 +01:00
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################################################################################
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#
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# grub2
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#
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################################################################################
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2019-09-18 19:04:47 +02:00
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GRUB2_VERSION = 2.04
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2017-04-26 23:39:46 +02:00
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GRUB2_SITE = http://ftp.gnu.org/gnu/grub
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2014-02-19 20:10:18 +01:00
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GRUB2_SOURCE = grub-$(GRUB2_VERSION).tar.xz
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2017-03-30 15:43:33 +02:00
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GRUB2_LICENSE = GPL-3.0+
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2014-02-19 20:10:18 +01:00
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GRUB2_LICENSE_FILES = COPYING
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2018-09-27 00:37:15 +02:00
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GRUB2_DEPENDENCIES = host-bison host-flex host-grub2
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HOST_GRUB2_DEPENDENCIES = host-bison host-flex
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GRUB2_INSTALL_IMAGES = YES
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2018-09-27 00:37:16 +02:00
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boot/grub2: Backport 2021/03/02 securify fixes
Details: https://lists.gnu.org/archive/html/grub-devel/2021-03/msg00007.html
As detailed in commit 7e64a050fbd9add07ed84d48054ffee1b659d079, it is
difficult to utilize the upstream patches directly, so a number of
patches include changes to generated files so that we don't need invoke
the gentpl.py script.
In addition to the security fixes, these required patches has been
backported:
f76a27996 efi: Make shim_lock GUID and protocol type public
04ae030d0 efi: Return grub_efi_status_t from grub_efi_get_variable()
ac5c93675 efi: Add a function to read EFI variables with attributes
d7e54b2e5 efi: Add secure boot detection
The following security issues are fixed:
CVE-2020-14372 grub2: The acpi command allows privileged user to load crafted
ACPI tables when Secure Boot is enabled
CWE-184
7.5/CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:H/PR:H/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:H/A:H
GRUB2 enables the use of the command acpi even when Secure Boot is signaled by
the firmware. An attacker with local root privileges to can drop a small SSDT
in /boot/efi and modify grub.cfg to instruct grub to load said SSDT. The SSDT
then gets run by the kernel and it overwrites the kernel lock down configuration
enabling the attacker to load unsigned kernel modules and kexec unsigned code.
Reported-by: Máté Kukri
*******************************************************************************
CVE-2020-25632 grub2: Use-after-free in rmmod command
CWE-416
7.5/CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:H/PR:H/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:H/A:H
The rmmod implementation for GRUB2 is flawed, allowing an attacker to unload
a module used as dependency without checking if any other dependent module is
still loaded. This leads to an use-after-free scenario possibly allowing an
attacker to execute arbitrary code and by-pass Secure Boot protections.
Reported-by: Chris Coulson (Canonical)
*******************************************************************************
CVE-2020-25647 grub2: Out-of-bound write in grub_usb_device_initialize()
CWE-787
6.9/CVSS:3.1/AV:P/AC:H/PR:H/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:H/A:H
grub_usb_device_initialize() is called to handle USB device initialization. It
reads out the descriptors it needs from the USB device and uses that data to
fill in some USB data structures. grub_usb_device_initialize() performs very
little bounds checking and simply assumes the USB device provides sane values.
This behavior can trigger memory corruption. If properly exploited, this would
lead to arbitrary code execution allowing the attacker to by-pass Secure Boot
mechanism.
Reported-by: Joseph Tartaro (IOActive) and Ilja van Sprundel (IOActive)
*******************************************************************************
CVE-2020-27749 grub2: Stack buffer overflow in grub_parser_split_cmdline
CWE-121
7.5/CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:H/PR:H/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:H/A:H
grub_parser_split_cmdline() expands variable names present in the supplied
command line in to their corresponding variable contents and uses a 1kB stack
buffer for temporary storage without sufficient bounds checking. If the
function is called with a command line that references a variable with a
sufficiently large payload, it is possible to overflow the stack buffer,
corrupt the stack frame and control execution. An attacker may use this to
circumvent Secure Boot protections.
Reported-by: Chris Coulson (Canonical)
*******************************************************************************
CVE-2020-27779 grub2: The cutmem command allows privileged user to remove
memory regions when Secure Boot is enabled
CWE-285
7.5/CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:H/PR:H/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:H/A:H
The GRUB2's cutmem command does not honor Secure Boot locking. This allows an
privileged attacker to remove address ranges from memory creating an
opportunity to circumvent Secure Boot protections after proper triage about
grub's memory layout.
Reported-by: Teddy Reed
*******************************************************************************
CVE-2021-3418 - grub2: GRUB 2.05 reintroduced CVE-2020-15705
CWE-281
6.4/CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:H/PR:H/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H
The GRUB2 upstream reintroduced the CVE-2020-15705. This refers to a distro
specific flaw which made upstream in the mentioned version.
If certificates that signed GRUB2 are installed into db, GRUB2 can be booted
directly. It will then boot any kernel without signature validation. The booted
kernel will think it was booted in Secure Boot mode and will implement lock
down, yet it could have been tampered.
This flaw only affects upstream and distributions using the shim_lock verifier.
Reported-by: Dimitri John Ledkov (Canonical)
*******************************************************************************
CVE-2021-20225 grub2: Heap out-of-bounds write in short form option parser
CWE-787
7.5/CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:H/PR:H/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:H/A:H
The option parser in GRUB2 allows an attacker to write past the end of
a heap-allocated buffer by calling certain commands with a large number
of specific short forms of options.
Reported-by: Daniel Axtens (IBM)
*******************************************************************************
CVE-2021-20233 grub2: Heap out-of-bound write due to mis-calculation of
space required for quoting
CWE-787
7.5/CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:H/PR:H/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:H/A:H
There's a flaw on GRUB2 menu rendering code setparam_prefix() in the menu
rendering code performs a length calculation on the assumption that expressing
a quoted single quote will require 3 characters, while it actually requires
4 characters. This allow an attacker to corrupt memory by one byte for each
quote in the input.
Reported-by: Daniel Axtens (IBM)
*******************************************************************************
Signed-off-by: Stefan Sørensen <stefan.sorensen@spectralink.com>
Signed-off-by: Yann E. MORIN <yann.morin.1998@free.fr>
2021-03-11 10:53:06 +01:00
|
|
|
# 0001-build-Fix-GRUB-i386-pc-build-with-Ubuntu-gcc.patch and 2021/03/02
|
|
|
|
|
# security fixes (patches 0029-0149)
|
boot/grub2: Fix GRUB i386-pc build with Ubuntu gcc
Backport a patch from upstream to fix the build on certain versions of
gsc, notably:
Ubuntu 19.10 with gcc (Ubuntu 8.3.0-26ubuntu1~19.10) 8.3.0
Ubuntu 19.10 with gcc (Ubuntu 9.2.1-9ubuntu2) 9.2.1 20191008
The upstream patch is simply a change in the gentpl.py script, which is
used to generate parts of the automake machinery, so if we just backport
the upstream patch, we need to call the script to regenerate those files.
However, the modified script is a python script, so we would need to add
a dependency on host-python (2 or 3), which is not so nice.
Furthermore, calling the script is not enough: it needs a specific set
of optionss for each file it is to generate. That set of options is not
static; it is constructed in the convoluted autogen.sh. Calling
autogen.sh is usally not so good an idea in the Buildroot context, and
indeed this fails becasue it calls to autoreconf, but without our
carefuly crafted options and environment variables.
There was a little light in the tunnel, in that autogen.sh can be told
not to run autoreconf, by setting the environemnt variable
FROM_BOOTSTRAP to an non-=empty string, but this is fraught with various
other side-effects, as in that cause, autogen.sh expects to be valled by
an upper sciopt, bootstrap, which is not provided in the tarball
distribution...
So, between all those issues, autogen, bootstrap, and a host-python (2
or 3) dependency, we choose another route: path the script *and* the one
generated file affected by the change. Since that patched file is a .am
file, we also patch the corresponding .in file
However, we're faced with another issue: the other generated file is
now older than the script, so the automake machinery will now want to
re-run autoconf et al during the build step, which is still not a good
idea for us. So we touch the other generated file so it is mopre recent
than the script.
This is still not sufficient, because the patched file also has a
dependency on the generated file, so we need to touch as well.
Fixes:
- https://bugs.buildroot.org/show_bug.cgi?id=12946
Signed-off-by: Fabrice Fontaine <fontaine.fabrice@gmail.com>
[yann.morin.1998@free.fr:
- keep the hunk about patching gentpl.py
- make it a git-formatted patch
- add the touch
- drastically expand the commit log
]
Signed-off-by: Yann E. MORIN <yann.morin.1998@free.fr>
2020-05-28 23:50:15 +02:00
|
|
|
define GRUB2_AVOID_AUTORECONF
|
|
|
|
|
$(Q)touch $(@D)/Makefile.util.am
|
boot/grub2: Backport 2021/03/02 securify fixes
Details: https://lists.gnu.org/archive/html/grub-devel/2021-03/msg00007.html
As detailed in commit 7e64a050fbd9add07ed84d48054ffee1b659d079, it is
difficult to utilize the upstream patches directly, so a number of
patches include changes to generated files so that we don't need invoke
the gentpl.py script.
In addition to the security fixes, these required patches has been
backported:
f76a27996 efi: Make shim_lock GUID and protocol type public
04ae030d0 efi: Return grub_efi_status_t from grub_efi_get_variable()
ac5c93675 efi: Add a function to read EFI variables with attributes
d7e54b2e5 efi: Add secure boot detection
The following security issues are fixed:
CVE-2020-14372 grub2: The acpi command allows privileged user to load crafted
ACPI tables when Secure Boot is enabled
CWE-184
7.5/CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:H/PR:H/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:H/A:H
GRUB2 enables the use of the command acpi even when Secure Boot is signaled by
the firmware. An attacker with local root privileges to can drop a small SSDT
in /boot/efi and modify grub.cfg to instruct grub to load said SSDT. The SSDT
then gets run by the kernel and it overwrites the kernel lock down configuration
enabling the attacker to load unsigned kernel modules and kexec unsigned code.
Reported-by: Máté Kukri
*******************************************************************************
CVE-2020-25632 grub2: Use-after-free in rmmod command
CWE-416
7.5/CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:H/PR:H/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:H/A:H
The rmmod implementation for GRUB2 is flawed, allowing an attacker to unload
a module used as dependency without checking if any other dependent module is
still loaded. This leads to an use-after-free scenario possibly allowing an
attacker to execute arbitrary code and by-pass Secure Boot protections.
Reported-by: Chris Coulson (Canonical)
*******************************************************************************
CVE-2020-25647 grub2: Out-of-bound write in grub_usb_device_initialize()
CWE-787
6.9/CVSS:3.1/AV:P/AC:H/PR:H/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:H/A:H
grub_usb_device_initialize() is called to handle USB device initialization. It
reads out the descriptors it needs from the USB device and uses that data to
fill in some USB data structures. grub_usb_device_initialize() performs very
little bounds checking and simply assumes the USB device provides sane values.
This behavior can trigger memory corruption. If properly exploited, this would
lead to arbitrary code execution allowing the attacker to by-pass Secure Boot
mechanism.
Reported-by: Joseph Tartaro (IOActive) and Ilja van Sprundel (IOActive)
*******************************************************************************
CVE-2020-27749 grub2: Stack buffer overflow in grub_parser_split_cmdline
CWE-121
7.5/CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:H/PR:H/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:H/A:H
grub_parser_split_cmdline() expands variable names present in the supplied
command line in to their corresponding variable contents and uses a 1kB stack
buffer for temporary storage without sufficient bounds checking. If the
function is called with a command line that references a variable with a
sufficiently large payload, it is possible to overflow the stack buffer,
corrupt the stack frame and control execution. An attacker may use this to
circumvent Secure Boot protections.
Reported-by: Chris Coulson (Canonical)
*******************************************************************************
CVE-2020-27779 grub2: The cutmem command allows privileged user to remove
memory regions when Secure Boot is enabled
CWE-285
7.5/CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:H/PR:H/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:H/A:H
The GRUB2's cutmem command does not honor Secure Boot locking. This allows an
privileged attacker to remove address ranges from memory creating an
opportunity to circumvent Secure Boot protections after proper triage about
grub's memory layout.
Reported-by: Teddy Reed
*******************************************************************************
CVE-2021-3418 - grub2: GRUB 2.05 reintroduced CVE-2020-15705
CWE-281
6.4/CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:H/PR:H/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H
The GRUB2 upstream reintroduced the CVE-2020-15705. This refers to a distro
specific flaw which made upstream in the mentioned version.
If certificates that signed GRUB2 are installed into db, GRUB2 can be booted
directly. It will then boot any kernel without signature validation. The booted
kernel will think it was booted in Secure Boot mode and will implement lock
down, yet it could have been tampered.
This flaw only affects upstream and distributions using the shim_lock verifier.
Reported-by: Dimitri John Ledkov (Canonical)
*******************************************************************************
CVE-2021-20225 grub2: Heap out-of-bounds write in short form option parser
CWE-787
7.5/CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:H/PR:H/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:H/A:H
The option parser in GRUB2 allows an attacker to write past the end of
a heap-allocated buffer by calling certain commands with a large number
of specific short forms of options.
Reported-by: Daniel Axtens (IBM)
*******************************************************************************
CVE-2021-20233 grub2: Heap out-of-bound write due to mis-calculation of
space required for quoting
CWE-787
7.5/CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:H/PR:H/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:H/A:H
There's a flaw on GRUB2 menu rendering code setparam_prefix() in the menu
rendering code performs a length calculation on the assumption that expressing
a quoted single quote will require 3 characters, while it actually requires
4 characters. This allow an attacker to corrupt memory by one byte for each
quote in the input.
Reported-by: Daniel Axtens (IBM)
*******************************************************************************
Signed-off-by: Stefan Sørensen <stefan.sorensen@spectralink.com>
Signed-off-by: Yann E. MORIN <yann.morin.1998@free.fr>
2021-03-11 10:53:06 +01:00
|
|
|
$(Q)touch $(@D)/aclocal.m4
|
boot/grub2: Fix GRUB i386-pc build with Ubuntu gcc
Backport a patch from upstream to fix the build on certain versions of
gsc, notably:
Ubuntu 19.10 with gcc (Ubuntu 8.3.0-26ubuntu1~19.10) 8.3.0
Ubuntu 19.10 with gcc (Ubuntu 9.2.1-9ubuntu2) 9.2.1 20191008
The upstream patch is simply a change in the gentpl.py script, which is
used to generate parts of the automake machinery, so if we just backport
the upstream patch, we need to call the script to regenerate those files.
However, the modified script is a python script, so we would need to add
a dependency on host-python (2 or 3), which is not so nice.
Furthermore, calling the script is not enough: it needs a specific set
of optionss for each file it is to generate. That set of options is not
static; it is constructed in the convoluted autogen.sh. Calling
autogen.sh is usally not so good an idea in the Buildroot context, and
indeed this fails becasue it calls to autoreconf, but without our
carefuly crafted options and environment variables.
There was a little light in the tunnel, in that autogen.sh can be told
not to run autoreconf, by setting the environemnt variable
FROM_BOOTSTRAP to an non-=empty string, but this is fraught with various
other side-effects, as in that cause, autogen.sh expects to be valled by
an upper sciopt, bootstrap, which is not provided in the tarball
distribution...
So, between all those issues, autogen, bootstrap, and a host-python (2
or 3) dependency, we choose another route: path the script *and* the one
generated file affected by the change. Since that patched file is a .am
file, we also patch the corresponding .in file
However, we're faced with another issue: the other generated file is
now older than the script, so the automake machinery will now want to
re-run autoconf et al during the build step, which is still not a good
idea for us. So we touch the other generated file so it is mopre recent
than the script.
This is still not sufficient, because the patched file also has a
dependency on the generated file, so we need to touch as well.
Fixes:
- https://bugs.buildroot.org/show_bug.cgi?id=12946
Signed-off-by: Fabrice Fontaine <fontaine.fabrice@gmail.com>
[yann.morin.1998@free.fr:
- keep the hunk about patching gentpl.py
- make it a git-formatted patch
- add the touch
- drastically expand the commit log
]
Signed-off-by: Yann E. MORIN <yann.morin.1998@free.fr>
2020-05-28 23:50:15 +02:00
|
|
|
$(Q)touch $(@D)/Makefile.in
|
boot/grub2: Backport 2021/03/02 securify fixes
Details: https://lists.gnu.org/archive/html/grub-devel/2021-03/msg00007.html
As detailed in commit 7e64a050fbd9add07ed84d48054ffee1b659d079, it is
difficult to utilize the upstream patches directly, so a number of
patches include changes to generated files so that we don't need invoke
the gentpl.py script.
In addition to the security fixes, these required patches has been
backported:
f76a27996 efi: Make shim_lock GUID and protocol type public
04ae030d0 efi: Return grub_efi_status_t from grub_efi_get_variable()
ac5c93675 efi: Add a function to read EFI variables with attributes
d7e54b2e5 efi: Add secure boot detection
The following security issues are fixed:
CVE-2020-14372 grub2: The acpi command allows privileged user to load crafted
ACPI tables when Secure Boot is enabled
CWE-184
7.5/CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:H/PR:H/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:H/A:H
GRUB2 enables the use of the command acpi even when Secure Boot is signaled by
the firmware. An attacker with local root privileges to can drop a small SSDT
in /boot/efi and modify grub.cfg to instruct grub to load said SSDT. The SSDT
then gets run by the kernel and it overwrites the kernel lock down configuration
enabling the attacker to load unsigned kernel modules and kexec unsigned code.
Reported-by: Máté Kukri
*******************************************************************************
CVE-2020-25632 grub2: Use-after-free in rmmod command
CWE-416
7.5/CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:H/PR:H/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:H/A:H
The rmmod implementation for GRUB2 is flawed, allowing an attacker to unload
a module used as dependency without checking if any other dependent module is
still loaded. This leads to an use-after-free scenario possibly allowing an
attacker to execute arbitrary code and by-pass Secure Boot protections.
Reported-by: Chris Coulson (Canonical)
*******************************************************************************
CVE-2020-25647 grub2: Out-of-bound write in grub_usb_device_initialize()
CWE-787
6.9/CVSS:3.1/AV:P/AC:H/PR:H/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:H/A:H
grub_usb_device_initialize() is called to handle USB device initialization. It
reads out the descriptors it needs from the USB device and uses that data to
fill in some USB data structures. grub_usb_device_initialize() performs very
little bounds checking and simply assumes the USB device provides sane values.
This behavior can trigger memory corruption. If properly exploited, this would
lead to arbitrary code execution allowing the attacker to by-pass Secure Boot
mechanism.
Reported-by: Joseph Tartaro (IOActive) and Ilja van Sprundel (IOActive)
*******************************************************************************
CVE-2020-27749 grub2: Stack buffer overflow in grub_parser_split_cmdline
CWE-121
7.5/CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:H/PR:H/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:H/A:H
grub_parser_split_cmdline() expands variable names present in the supplied
command line in to their corresponding variable contents and uses a 1kB stack
buffer for temporary storage without sufficient bounds checking. If the
function is called with a command line that references a variable with a
sufficiently large payload, it is possible to overflow the stack buffer,
corrupt the stack frame and control execution. An attacker may use this to
circumvent Secure Boot protections.
Reported-by: Chris Coulson (Canonical)
*******************************************************************************
CVE-2020-27779 grub2: The cutmem command allows privileged user to remove
memory regions when Secure Boot is enabled
CWE-285
7.5/CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:H/PR:H/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:H/A:H
The GRUB2's cutmem command does not honor Secure Boot locking. This allows an
privileged attacker to remove address ranges from memory creating an
opportunity to circumvent Secure Boot protections after proper triage about
grub's memory layout.
Reported-by: Teddy Reed
*******************************************************************************
CVE-2021-3418 - grub2: GRUB 2.05 reintroduced CVE-2020-15705
CWE-281
6.4/CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:H/PR:H/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H
The GRUB2 upstream reintroduced the CVE-2020-15705. This refers to a distro
specific flaw which made upstream in the mentioned version.
If certificates that signed GRUB2 are installed into db, GRUB2 can be booted
directly. It will then boot any kernel without signature validation. The booted
kernel will think it was booted in Secure Boot mode and will implement lock
down, yet it could have been tampered.
This flaw only affects upstream and distributions using the shim_lock verifier.
Reported-by: Dimitri John Ledkov (Canonical)
*******************************************************************************
CVE-2021-20225 grub2: Heap out-of-bounds write in short form option parser
CWE-787
7.5/CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:H/PR:H/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:H/A:H
The option parser in GRUB2 allows an attacker to write past the end of
a heap-allocated buffer by calling certain commands with a large number
of specific short forms of options.
Reported-by: Daniel Axtens (IBM)
*******************************************************************************
CVE-2021-20233 grub2: Heap out-of-bound write due to mis-calculation of
space required for quoting
CWE-787
7.5/CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:H/PR:H/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:H/A:H
There's a flaw on GRUB2 menu rendering code setparam_prefix() in the menu
rendering code performs a length calculation on the assumption that expressing
a quoted single quote will require 3 characters, while it actually requires
4 characters. This allow an attacker to corrupt memory by one byte for each
quote in the input.
Reported-by: Daniel Axtens (IBM)
*******************************************************************************
Signed-off-by: Stefan Sørensen <stefan.sorensen@spectralink.com>
Signed-off-by: Yann E. MORIN <yann.morin.1998@free.fr>
2021-03-11 10:53:06 +01:00
|
|
|
$(Q)touch $(@D)/configure
|
boot/grub2: Fix GRUB i386-pc build with Ubuntu gcc
Backport a patch from upstream to fix the build on certain versions of
gsc, notably:
Ubuntu 19.10 with gcc (Ubuntu 8.3.0-26ubuntu1~19.10) 8.3.0
Ubuntu 19.10 with gcc (Ubuntu 9.2.1-9ubuntu2) 9.2.1 20191008
The upstream patch is simply a change in the gentpl.py script, which is
used to generate parts of the automake machinery, so if we just backport
the upstream patch, we need to call the script to regenerate those files.
However, the modified script is a python script, so we would need to add
a dependency on host-python (2 or 3), which is not so nice.
Furthermore, calling the script is not enough: it needs a specific set
of optionss for each file it is to generate. That set of options is not
static; it is constructed in the convoluted autogen.sh. Calling
autogen.sh is usally not so good an idea in the Buildroot context, and
indeed this fails becasue it calls to autoreconf, but without our
carefuly crafted options and environment variables.
There was a little light in the tunnel, in that autogen.sh can be told
not to run autoreconf, by setting the environemnt variable
FROM_BOOTSTRAP to an non-=empty string, but this is fraught with various
other side-effects, as in that cause, autogen.sh expects to be valled by
an upper sciopt, bootstrap, which is not provided in the tarball
distribution...
So, between all those issues, autogen, bootstrap, and a host-python (2
or 3) dependency, we choose another route: path the script *and* the one
generated file affected by the change. Since that patched file is a .am
file, we also patch the corresponding .in file
However, we're faced with another issue: the other generated file is
now older than the script, so the automake machinery will now want to
re-run autoconf et al during the build step, which is still not a good
idea for us. So we touch the other generated file so it is mopre recent
than the script.
This is still not sufficient, because the patched file also has a
dependency on the generated file, so we need to touch as well.
Fixes:
- https://bugs.buildroot.org/show_bug.cgi?id=12946
Signed-off-by: Fabrice Fontaine <fontaine.fabrice@gmail.com>
[yann.morin.1998@free.fr:
- keep the hunk about patching gentpl.py
- make it a git-formatted patch
- add the touch
- drastically expand the commit log
]
Signed-off-by: Yann E. MORIN <yann.morin.1998@free.fr>
2020-05-28 23:50:15 +02:00
|
|
|
endef
|
|
|
|
|
GRUB2_POST_PATCH_HOOKS += GRUB2_AVOID_AUTORECONF
|
|
|
|
|
HOST_GRUB2_POST_PATCH_HOOKS += GRUB2_AVOID_AUTORECONF
|
|
|
|
|
|
boot/grub2: Backport Boothole securify fixes
Details: https://lists.gnu.org/archive/html/grub-devel/2020-07/msg00034.html
Fixes the following security issues:
* CVE-2020-10713
A flaw was found in grub2, prior to version 2.06. An attacker may
use the GRUB 2 flaw to hijack and tamper the GRUB verification
process. This flaw also allows the bypass of Secure Boot
protections. In order to load an untrusted or modified kernel, an
attacker would first need to establish access to the system such as
gaining physical access, obtain the ability to alter a pxe-boot
network, or have remote access to a networked system with root
access. With this access, an attacker could then craft a string to
cause a buffer overflow by injecting a malicious payload that leads
to arbitrary code execution within GRUB. The highest threat from
this vulnerability is to data confidentiality and integrity as well
as system availability.
* CVE-2020-14308
In grub2 versions before 2.06 the grub memory allocator doesn't
check for possible arithmetic overflows on the requested allocation
size. This leads the function to return invalid memory allocations
which can be further used to cause possible integrity,
confidentiality and availability impacts during the boot process.
* CVE-2020-14309
There's an issue with grub2 in all versions before 2.06 when
handling squashfs filesystems containing a symbolic link with name
length of UINT32 bytes in size. The name size leads to an
arithmetic overflow leading to a zero-size allocation further
causing a heap-based buffer overflow with attacker controlled data.
* CVE-2020-14310
An integer overflow in read_section_from_string may lead to a heap
based buffer overflow.
* CVE-2020-14311
An integer overflow in grub_ext2_read_link may lead to a heap-based
buffer overflow.
* CVE-2020-15706
GRUB2 contains a race condition in grub_script_function_create()
leading to a use-after-free vulnerability which can be triggered by
redefining a function whilst the same function is already
executing, leading to arbitrary code execution and secure boot
restriction bypass
* CVE-2020-15707
Integer overflows were discovered in the functions grub_cmd_initrd
and grub_initrd_init in the efilinux component of GRUB2, as shipped
in Debian, Red Hat, and Ubuntu (the functionality is not included
in GRUB2 upstream), leading to a heap-based buffer overflow. These
could be triggered by an extremely large number of arguments to the
initrd command on 32-bit architectures, or a crafted filesystem
with very large files on any architecture. An attacker could use
this to execute arbitrary code and bypass UEFI Secure Boot
restrictions. This issue affects GRUB2 version 2.04 and prior
versions.
Signed-off-by: Stefan Sørensen <stefan.sorensen@spectralink.com>
Signed-off-by: Peter Korsgaard <peter@korsgaard.com>
2020-08-03 10:00:25 +02:00
|
|
|
# 0002-yylex-Make-lexer-fatal-errors-actually-be-fatal.patch
|
|
|
|
|
GRUB2_IGNORE_CVES += CVE-2020-10713
|
|
|
|
|
# 0005-calloc-Use-calloc-at-most-places.patch
|
|
|
|
|
GRUB2_IGNORE_CVES += CVE-2020-14308
|
|
|
|
|
# 0006-malloc-Use-overflow-checking-primitives-where-we-do-.patch
|
|
|
|
|
GRUB2_IGNORE_CVES += CVE-2020-14309 CVE-2020-14310 CVE-2020-14311
|
|
|
|
|
# 0019-script-Avoid-a-use-after-free-when-redefining-a-func.patch
|
|
|
|
|
GRUB2_IGNORE_CVES += CVE-2020-15706
|
|
|
|
|
# 0028-linux-Fix-integer-overflows-in-initrd-size-handling.patch
|
|
|
|
|
GRUB2_IGNORE_CVES += CVE-2020-15707
|
boot/grub2: Backport 2021/03/02 securify fixes
Details: https://lists.gnu.org/archive/html/grub-devel/2021-03/msg00007.html
As detailed in commit 7e64a050fbd9add07ed84d48054ffee1b659d079, it is
difficult to utilize the upstream patches directly, so a number of
patches include changes to generated files so that we don't need invoke
the gentpl.py script.
In addition to the security fixes, these required patches has been
backported:
f76a27996 efi: Make shim_lock GUID and protocol type public
04ae030d0 efi: Return grub_efi_status_t from grub_efi_get_variable()
ac5c93675 efi: Add a function to read EFI variables with attributes
d7e54b2e5 efi: Add secure boot detection
The following security issues are fixed:
CVE-2020-14372 grub2: The acpi command allows privileged user to load crafted
ACPI tables when Secure Boot is enabled
CWE-184
7.5/CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:H/PR:H/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:H/A:H
GRUB2 enables the use of the command acpi even when Secure Boot is signaled by
the firmware. An attacker with local root privileges to can drop a small SSDT
in /boot/efi and modify grub.cfg to instruct grub to load said SSDT. The SSDT
then gets run by the kernel and it overwrites the kernel lock down configuration
enabling the attacker to load unsigned kernel modules and kexec unsigned code.
Reported-by: Máté Kukri
*******************************************************************************
CVE-2020-25632 grub2: Use-after-free in rmmod command
CWE-416
7.5/CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:H/PR:H/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:H/A:H
The rmmod implementation for GRUB2 is flawed, allowing an attacker to unload
a module used as dependency without checking if any other dependent module is
still loaded. This leads to an use-after-free scenario possibly allowing an
attacker to execute arbitrary code and by-pass Secure Boot protections.
Reported-by: Chris Coulson (Canonical)
*******************************************************************************
CVE-2020-25647 grub2: Out-of-bound write in grub_usb_device_initialize()
CWE-787
6.9/CVSS:3.1/AV:P/AC:H/PR:H/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:H/A:H
grub_usb_device_initialize() is called to handle USB device initialization. It
reads out the descriptors it needs from the USB device and uses that data to
fill in some USB data structures. grub_usb_device_initialize() performs very
little bounds checking and simply assumes the USB device provides sane values.
This behavior can trigger memory corruption. If properly exploited, this would
lead to arbitrary code execution allowing the attacker to by-pass Secure Boot
mechanism.
Reported-by: Joseph Tartaro (IOActive) and Ilja van Sprundel (IOActive)
*******************************************************************************
CVE-2020-27749 grub2: Stack buffer overflow in grub_parser_split_cmdline
CWE-121
7.5/CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:H/PR:H/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:H/A:H
grub_parser_split_cmdline() expands variable names present in the supplied
command line in to their corresponding variable contents and uses a 1kB stack
buffer for temporary storage without sufficient bounds checking. If the
function is called with a command line that references a variable with a
sufficiently large payload, it is possible to overflow the stack buffer,
corrupt the stack frame and control execution. An attacker may use this to
circumvent Secure Boot protections.
Reported-by: Chris Coulson (Canonical)
*******************************************************************************
CVE-2020-27779 grub2: The cutmem command allows privileged user to remove
memory regions when Secure Boot is enabled
CWE-285
7.5/CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:H/PR:H/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:H/A:H
The GRUB2's cutmem command does not honor Secure Boot locking. This allows an
privileged attacker to remove address ranges from memory creating an
opportunity to circumvent Secure Boot protections after proper triage about
grub's memory layout.
Reported-by: Teddy Reed
*******************************************************************************
CVE-2021-3418 - grub2: GRUB 2.05 reintroduced CVE-2020-15705
CWE-281
6.4/CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:H/PR:H/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H
The GRUB2 upstream reintroduced the CVE-2020-15705. This refers to a distro
specific flaw which made upstream in the mentioned version.
If certificates that signed GRUB2 are installed into db, GRUB2 can be booted
directly. It will then boot any kernel without signature validation. The booted
kernel will think it was booted in Secure Boot mode and will implement lock
down, yet it could have been tampered.
This flaw only affects upstream and distributions using the shim_lock verifier.
Reported-by: Dimitri John Ledkov (Canonical)
*******************************************************************************
CVE-2021-20225 grub2: Heap out-of-bounds write in short form option parser
CWE-787
7.5/CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:H/PR:H/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:H/A:H
The option parser in GRUB2 allows an attacker to write past the end of
a heap-allocated buffer by calling certain commands with a large number
of specific short forms of options.
Reported-by: Daniel Axtens (IBM)
*******************************************************************************
CVE-2021-20233 grub2: Heap out-of-bound write due to mis-calculation of
space required for quoting
CWE-787
7.5/CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:H/PR:H/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:H/A:H
There's a flaw on GRUB2 menu rendering code setparam_prefix() in the menu
rendering code performs a length calculation on the assumption that expressing
a quoted single quote will require 3 characters, while it actually requires
4 characters. This allow an attacker to corrupt memory by one byte for each
quote in the input.
Reported-by: Daniel Axtens (IBM)
*******************************************************************************
Signed-off-by: Stefan Sørensen <stefan.sorensen@spectralink.com>
Signed-off-by: Yann E. MORIN <yann.morin.1998@free.fr>
2021-03-11 10:53:06 +01:00
|
|
|
# 2021/03/02 security fixes - patches 0029-0149
|
|
|
|
|
GRUB2_IGNORE_CVES += CVE-2020-25632 CVE-2020-25647 CVE-2020-27749 \
|
|
|
|
|
CVE-2020-27779 CVE-2021-3418 CVE-2021-20225 CVE-2021-20233
|
2021-04-05 20:52:30 +02:00
|
|
|
# 0039-acpi-Don-t-register-the-acpi-command-when-locked-dow.patch
|
|
|
|
|
GRUB2_IGNORE_CVES += CVE-2020-14372
|
|
|
|
|
# CVE-2019-14865 is about a flaw in the grub2-set-bootflag tool, which
|
|
|
|
|
# doesn't exist upstream, but is added by the Redhat/Fedora
|
|
|
|
|
# packaging. Not applicable to Buildroot.
|
|
|
|
|
GRUB2_IGNORE_CVES += CVE-2019-14865
|
|
|
|
|
# CVE-2020-15705 is related to a flaw in the use of the
|
|
|
|
|
# grub_linuxefi_secure_validate(), which was added by Debian/Ubuntu
|
|
|
|
|
# patches. The issue doesn't affect upstream Grub, and
|
|
|
|
|
# grub_linuxefi_secure_validate() is not implemented in the grub2
|
|
|
|
|
# version available in Buildroot.
|
|
|
|
|
GRUB2_IGNORE_CVES += CVE-2020-15705
|
boot/grub2: Backport Boothole securify fixes
Details: https://lists.gnu.org/archive/html/grub-devel/2020-07/msg00034.html
Fixes the following security issues:
* CVE-2020-10713
A flaw was found in grub2, prior to version 2.06. An attacker may
use the GRUB 2 flaw to hijack and tamper the GRUB verification
process. This flaw also allows the bypass of Secure Boot
protections. In order to load an untrusted or modified kernel, an
attacker would first need to establish access to the system such as
gaining physical access, obtain the ability to alter a pxe-boot
network, or have remote access to a networked system with root
access. With this access, an attacker could then craft a string to
cause a buffer overflow by injecting a malicious payload that leads
to arbitrary code execution within GRUB. The highest threat from
this vulnerability is to data confidentiality and integrity as well
as system availability.
* CVE-2020-14308
In grub2 versions before 2.06 the grub memory allocator doesn't
check for possible arithmetic overflows on the requested allocation
size. This leads the function to return invalid memory allocations
which can be further used to cause possible integrity,
confidentiality and availability impacts during the boot process.
* CVE-2020-14309
There's an issue with grub2 in all versions before 2.06 when
handling squashfs filesystems containing a symbolic link with name
length of UINT32 bytes in size. The name size leads to an
arithmetic overflow leading to a zero-size allocation further
causing a heap-based buffer overflow with attacker controlled data.
* CVE-2020-14310
An integer overflow in read_section_from_string may lead to a heap
based buffer overflow.
* CVE-2020-14311
An integer overflow in grub_ext2_read_link may lead to a heap-based
buffer overflow.
* CVE-2020-15706
GRUB2 contains a race condition in grub_script_function_create()
leading to a use-after-free vulnerability which can be triggered by
redefining a function whilst the same function is already
executing, leading to arbitrary code execution and secure boot
restriction bypass
* CVE-2020-15707
Integer overflows were discovered in the functions grub_cmd_initrd
and grub_initrd_init in the efilinux component of GRUB2, as shipped
in Debian, Red Hat, and Ubuntu (the functionality is not included
in GRUB2 upstream), leading to a heap-based buffer overflow. These
could be triggered by an extremely large number of arguments to the
initrd command on 32-bit architectures, or a crafted filesystem
with very large files on any architecture. An attacker could use
this to execute arbitrary code and bypass UEFI Secure Boot
restrictions. This issue affects GRUB2 version 2.04 and prior
versions.
Signed-off-by: Stefan Sørensen <stefan.sorensen@spectralink.com>
Signed-off-by: Peter Korsgaard <peter@korsgaard.com>
2020-08-03 10:00:25 +02:00
|
|
|
|
2018-09-27 00:37:16 +02:00
|
|
|
ifeq ($(BR2_TARGET_GRUB2_INSTALL_TOOLS),y)
|
|
|
|
|
GRUB2_INSTALL_TARGET = YES
|
|
|
|
|
else
|
2018-09-27 00:37:15 +02:00
|
|
|
GRUB2_INSTALL_TARGET = NO
|
2018-09-27 00:37:16 +02:00
|
|
|
endif
|
2020-12-04 16:46:01 +01:00
|
|
|
GRUB2_CPE_ID_VENDOR = gnu
|
2014-02-19 20:10:18 +01:00
|
|
|
|
2021-09-23 17:57:21 +02:00
|
|
|
GRUB2_BUILTIN_MODULES_PC = $(call qstrip,$(BR2_TARGET_GRUB2_BUILTIN_MODULES_PC))
|
|
|
|
|
GRUB2_BUILTIN_MODULES_EFI = $(call qstrip,$(BR2_TARGET_GRUB2_BUILTIN_MODULES_EFI))
|
|
|
|
|
GRUB2_BUILTIN_CONFIG_PC = $(call qstrip,$(BR2_TARGET_GRUB2_BUILTIN_CONFIG_PC))
|
|
|
|
|
GRUB2_BUILTIN_CONFIG_EFI = $(call qstrip,$(BR2_TARGET_GRUB2_BUILTIN_CONFIG_EFI))
|
2014-07-01 19:49:47 +02:00
|
|
|
GRUB2_BOOT_PARTITION = $(call qstrip,$(BR2_TARGET_GRUB2_BOOT_PARTITION))
|
|
|
|
|
|
2021-09-23 17:57:21 +02:00
|
|
|
GRUB2_IMAGE_i386-pc = $(BINARIES_DIR)/grub.img
|
|
|
|
|
GRUB2_CFG_i386-pc = $(TARGET_DIR)/boot/grub/grub.cfg
|
|
|
|
|
GRUB2_PREFIX_i386-pc = ($(GRUB2_BOOT_PARTITION))/boot/grub
|
|
|
|
|
GRUB2_TARGET_i386-pc = i386
|
|
|
|
|
GRUB2_PLATFORM_i386-pc = pc
|
|
|
|
|
GRUB2_BUILTIN_CONFIG_i386-pc = $(GRUB2_BUILTIN_CONFIG_PC)
|
|
|
|
|
GRUB2_BUILTIN_MODULES_i386-pc = $(GRUB2_BUILTIN_MODULES_PC)
|
|
|
|
|
GRUB2_TUPLES-$(BR2_TARGET_GRUB2_I386_PC) += i386-pc
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
GRUB2_IMAGE_i386-efi = $(BINARIES_DIR)/efi-part/EFI/BOOT/bootia32.efi
|
|
|
|
|
GRUB2_CFG_i386-efi = $(BINARIES_DIR)/efi-part/EFI/BOOT/grub.cfg
|
|
|
|
|
GRUB2_PREFIX_i386-efi = /EFI/BOOT
|
|
|
|
|
GRUB2_TARGET_i386-efi = i386
|
|
|
|
|
GRUB2_PLATFORM_i386-efi = efi
|
|
|
|
|
GRUB2_BUILTIN_CONFIG_i386-efi = $(GRUB2_BUILTIN_CONFIG_EFI)
|
|
|
|
|
GRUB2_BUILTIN_MODULES_i386-efi = $(GRUB2_BUILTIN_MODULES_EFI)
|
|
|
|
|
GRUB2_TUPLES-$(BR2_TARGET_GRUB2_I386_EFI) += i386-efi
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
GRUB2_IMAGE_x86_64-efi = $(BINARIES_DIR)/efi-part/EFI/BOOT/bootx64.efi
|
|
|
|
|
GRUB2_CFG_x86_64-efi = $(BINARIES_DIR)/efi-part/EFI/BOOT/grub.cfg
|
|
|
|
|
GRUB2_PREFIX_x86_64-efi = /EFI/BOOT
|
|
|
|
|
GRUB2_TARGET_x86_64-efi = x86_64
|
|
|
|
|
GRUB2_PLATFORM_x86_64-efi = efi
|
|
|
|
|
GRUB2_BUILTIN_CONFIG_x86_64-efi = $(GRUB2_BUILTIN_CONFIG_EFI)
|
|
|
|
|
GRUB2_BUILTIN_MODULES_x86_64-efi = $(GRUB2_BUILTIN_MODULES_EFI)
|
|
|
|
|
GRUB2_TUPLES-$(BR2_TARGET_GRUB2_X86_64_EFI) += x86_64-efi
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
GRUB2_IMAGE_arm-uboot = $(BINARIES_DIR)/boot-part/grub/grub.img
|
|
|
|
|
GRUB2_CFG_arm-uboot = $(BINARIES_DIR)/boot-part/grub/grub.cfg
|
|
|
|
|
GRUB2_PREFIX_arm-uboot = ($(GRUB2_BOOT_PARTITION))/boot/grub
|
|
|
|
|
GRUB2_TARGET_arm-uboot = arm
|
|
|
|
|
GRUB2_PLATFORM_arm-uboot = uboot
|
|
|
|
|
GRUB2_BUILTIN_CONFIG_arm-uboot = $(GRUB2_BUILTIN_CONFIG_PC)
|
|
|
|
|
GRUB2_BUILTIN_MODULES_arm-uboot = $(GRUB2_BUILTIN_MODULES_PC)
|
|
|
|
|
GRUB2_TUPLES-$(BR2_TARGET_GRUB2_ARM_UBOOT) += arm-uboot
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
GRUB2_IMAGE_arm-efi = $(BINARIES_DIR)/efi-part/EFI/BOOT/bootarm.efi
|
|
|
|
|
GRUB2_CFG_arm-efi = $(BINARIES_DIR)/efi-part/EFI/BOOT/grub.cfg
|
|
|
|
|
GRUB2_PREFIX_arm-efi = /EFI/BOOT
|
|
|
|
|
GRUB2_TARGET_arm-efi = arm
|
|
|
|
|
GRUB2_PLATFORM_arm-efi = efi
|
|
|
|
|
GRUB2_BUILTIN_CONFIG_arm-efi = $(GRUB2_BUILTIN_CONFIG_EFI)
|
|
|
|
|
GRUB2_BUILTIN_MODULES_arm-efi = $(GRUB2_BUILTIN_MODULES_EFI)
|
|
|
|
|
GRUB2_TUPLES-$(BR2_TARGET_GRUB2_ARM_EFI) += arm-efi
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
GRUB2_IMAGE_arm64-efi = $(BINARIES_DIR)/efi-part/EFI/BOOT/bootaa64.efi
|
|
|
|
|
GRUB2_CFG_arm64-efi = $(BINARIES_DIR)/efi-part/EFI/BOOT/grub.cfg
|
|
|
|
|
GRUB2_PREFIX_arm64-efi = /EFI/BOOT
|
|
|
|
|
GRUB2_TARGET_arm64-efi = aarch64
|
|
|
|
|
GRUB2_PLATFORM_arm64-efi = efi
|
|
|
|
|
GRUB2_BUILTIN_CONFIG_arm64-efi = $(GRUB2_BUILTIN_CONFIG_EFI)
|
|
|
|
|
GRUB2_BUILTIN_MODULES_arm64-efi = $(GRUB2_BUILTIN_MODULES_EFI)
|
|
|
|
|
GRUB2_TUPLES-$(BR2_TARGET_GRUB2_ARM64_EFI) += arm64-efi
|
2014-02-19 20:10:18 +01:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
# Grub2 is kind of special: it considers CC, LD and so on to be the
|
2018-09-27 00:37:15 +02:00
|
|
|
# tools to build the host programs and uses TARGET_CC, TARGET_CFLAGS,
|
|
|
|
|
# TARGET_CPPFLAGS, TARGET_LDFLAGS to build the bootloader itself.
|
2016-05-21 22:11:09 +02:00
|
|
|
#
|
2017-07-01 14:51:21 +02:00
|
|
|
# NOTE: TARGET_STRIP is overridden by !BR2_STRIP_strip, so always
|
2016-05-21 22:11:09 +02:00
|
|
|
# use the cross compile variant to ensure grub2 builds
|
2014-02-19 20:10:18 +01:00
|
|
|
|
2018-09-27 00:37:15 +02:00
|
|
|
HOST_GRUB2_CONF_ENV = \
|
|
|
|
|
CPP="$(HOSTCC) -E"
|
|
|
|
|
|
2014-02-19 20:10:18 +01:00
|
|
|
GRUB2_CONF_ENV = \
|
2018-09-27 00:37:15 +02:00
|
|
|
CPP="$(TARGET_CC) -E" \
|
2014-02-19 20:10:18 +01:00
|
|
|
TARGET_CC="$(TARGET_CC)" \
|
2021-06-25 13:42:51 +02:00
|
|
|
CFLAGS="$(TARGET_CFLAGS) -Os" \
|
|
|
|
|
TARGET_CFLAGS="$(TARGET_CFLAGS) -Os" \
|
|
|
|
|
CPPFLAGS="$(TARGET_CPPFLAGS) -Os -fno-stack-protector" \
|
|
|
|
|
TARGET_CPPFLAGS="$(TARGET_CPPFLAGS) -Os -fno-stack-protector" \
|
|
|
|
|
TARGET_LDFLAGS="$(TARGET_LDFLAGS) -Os" \
|
2018-09-27 00:37:15 +02:00
|
|
|
TARGET_NM="$(TARGET_NM)" \
|
|
|
|
|
TARGET_OBJCOPY="$(TARGET_OBJCOPY)" \
|
|
|
|
|
TARGET_STRIP="$(TARGET_CROSS)strip"
|
2014-02-19 20:10:18 +01:00
|
|
|
|
2018-09-27 00:37:15 +02:00
|
|
|
HOST_GRUB2_CONF_OPTS = \
|
|
|
|
|
--disable-grub-mkfont \
|
|
|
|
|
--enable-efiemu=no \
|
|
|
|
|
ac_cv_lib_lzma_lzma_code=no \
|
|
|
|
|
--enable-device-mapper=no \
|
|
|
|
|
--enable-libzfs=no \
|
|
|
|
|
--disable-werror
|
2014-02-19 20:10:18 +01:00
|
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2021-09-23 17:57:21 +02:00
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define GRUB2_CONFIGURE_CMDS
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$(foreach tuple, $(GRUB2_TUPLES-y), \
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mkdir -p $(@D)/build-$(tuple) ; \
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cd $(@D)/build-$(tuple) ; \
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$(TARGET_CONFIGURE_OPTS) \
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$(TARGET_CONFIGURE_ARGS) \
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$(GRUB2_CONF_ENV) \
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../configure \
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--target=$(GRUB2_TARGET_$(tuple)) \
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--with-platform=$(GRUB2_PLATFORM_$(tuple)) \
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--host=$(GNU_TARGET_NAME) \
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--build=$(GNU_HOST_NAME) \
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--prefix=/ \
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--exec-prefix=/ \
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--disable-grub-mkfont \
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--enable-efiemu=no \
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ac_cv_lib_lzma_lzma_code=no \
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--enable-device-mapper=no \
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--enable-libzfs=no \
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--disable-werror
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)
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endef
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define GRUB2_BUILD_CMDS
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$(foreach tuple, $(GRUB2_TUPLES-y), \
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$(TARGET_MAKE_ENV) $(MAKE) -C $(@D)/build-$(tuple)
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)
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2015-07-29 13:52:14 +02:00
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endef
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2018-09-27 00:37:15 +02:00
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define GRUB2_INSTALL_IMAGES_CMDS
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2021-09-23 17:57:21 +02:00
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$(foreach tuple, $(GRUB2_TUPLES-y), \
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mkdir -p $(dir $(GRUB2_IMAGE_$(tuple))) ; \
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$(HOST_DIR)/usr/bin/grub-mkimage \
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-d $(@D)/build-$(tuple)/grub-core/ \
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-O $(tuple) \
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-o $(GRUB2_IMAGE_$(tuple)) \
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-p "$(GRUB2_PREFIX_$(tuple))" \
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$(if $(GRUB2_BUILTIN_CONFIG_$(tuple)), \
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-c $(GRUB2_BUILTIN_CONFIG_$(tuple))) \
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$(GRUB2_BUILTIN_MODULES_$(tuple)) ; \
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$(INSTALL) -D -m 0644 boot/grub2/grub.cfg $(GRUB2_CFG_$(tuple)) ; \
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$(if $(findstring $(GRUB2_PLATFORM_$(tuple)), pc), \
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cat $(HOST_DIR)/lib/grub/$(tuple)/cdboot.img $(GRUB2_IMAGE_$(tuple)) > \
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$(BINARIES_DIR)/grub-eltorito.img ; \
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) \
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)
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2014-02-19 20:10:18 +01:00
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endef
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2021-09-23 17:57:21 +02:00
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$(eval $(generic-package))
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2018-09-27 00:37:15 +02:00
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$(eval $(host-autotools-package))
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