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kumquat-buildroot/package/putty/0002-New-option-to-reject-trivial-success-of-userauth.patch

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package/putty: fix CVE-2021-36367 PuTTY through 0.75 proceeds with establishing an SSH session even if it has never sent a substantive authentication response. This makes it easier for an attacker-controlled SSH server to present a later spoofed authentication prompt (that the attacker can use to capture credential data, and use that data for purposes that are undesired by the client user). Signed-off-by: Fabrice Fontaine <fontaine.fabrice@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: Yann E. MORIN <yann.morin.1998@free.fr>
2021-07-17 11:16:19 +02:00
From 1dc5659aa62848f0aeb5de7bd3839fecc7debefa Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Simon Tatham <anakin@pobox.com>
Date: Sat, 19 Jun 2021 15:39:15 +0100
Subject: [PATCH] New option to reject 'trivial' success of userauth.
Suggested by Manfred Kaiser, who also wrote most of this patch
(although outlying parts, like documentation and SSH-1 support, are by
me).
This is a second line of defence against the kind of spoofing attacks
in which a malicious or compromised SSH server rushes the client
through the userauth phase of SSH without actually requiring any auth
inputs (passwords or signatures or whatever), and then at the start of
the connection phase it presents something like a spoof prompt,
intended to be taken for part of userauth by the user but in fact with
some more sinister purpose.
Our existing line of defence against this is the trust sigil system,
and as far as I know, that's still working. This option allows a bit of
extra defence in depth: if you don't expect your SSH server to
trivially accept authentication in the first place, then enabling this
option will cause PuTTY to disconnect if it unexpectedly does so,
without the user having to spot the presence or absence of a fiddly
little sigil anywhere.
Several types of authentication count as 'trivial'. The obvious one is
the SSH-2 "none" method, which clients always try first so that the
failure message will tell them what else they can try, and which a
server can instead accept in order to authenticate you unconditionally.
But there are two other ways to do it that we know of: one is to run
keyboard-interactive authentication and send an empty INFO_REQUEST
packet containing no actual prompts for the user, and another even
weirder one is to send USERAUTH_SUCCESS in response to the user's
preliminary *offer* of a public key (instead of sending the usual PK_OK
to request an actual signature from the key).
This new option detects all of those, by clearing the 'is_trivial_auth'
flag only when we send some kind of substantive authentication response
(be it a password, a k-i prompt response, a signature, or a GSSAPI
token). So even if there's a further path through the userauth maze we
haven't spotted, that somehow avoids sending anything substantive, this
strategy should still pick it up.
(cherry picked from commit 5f5c710cf3704737e24ffceb2c918e412a2a674f)
[Retrieved from:
https://git.tartarus.org/?p=simon/putty.git;a=commit;h=1dc5659aa62848f0aeb5de7bd3839fecc7debefa]
Signed-off-by: Fabrice Fontaine <fontaine.fabrice@gmail.com>
---
cmdline.c | 8 ++++++++
config.c | 4 ++++
doc/config.but | 43 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
pscp.c | 2 ++
psftp.c | 2 ++
putty.h | 1 +
settings.c | 2 ++
ssh.c | 4 +++-
ssh1login.c | 14 +++++++++++++-
ssh2userauth.c | 20 ++++++++++++++++----
sshppl.h | 2 +-
unix/uxplink.c | 2 ++
windows/winhelp.h | 1 +
windows/winplink.c | 2 ++
14 files changed, 100 insertions(+), 7 deletions(-)
diff --git a/cmdline.c b/cmdline.c
index 7ea5cacc..62d65e19 100644
--- a/cmdline.c
+++ b/cmdline.c
@@ -598,6 +598,14 @@ int cmdline_process_param(const char *p, char *value,
SAVEABLE(0);
conf_set_bool(conf, CONF_tryagent, false);
}
+
+ if (!strcmp(p, "-no-trivial-auth")) {
+ RETURN(1);
+ UNAVAILABLE_IN(TOOLTYPE_NONNETWORK);
+ SAVEABLE(0);
+ conf_set_bool(conf, CONF_ssh_no_trivial_userauth, true);
+ }
+
if (!strcmp(p, "-share")) {
RETURN(1);
UNAVAILABLE_IN(TOOLTYPE_NONNETWORK);
diff --git a/config.c b/config.c
index ca808511..b8348530 100644
--- a/config.c
+++ b/config.c
@@ -2772,6 +2772,10 @@ void setup_config_box(struct controlbox *b, bool midsession,
HELPCTX(ssh_auth_bypass),
conf_checkbox_handler,
I(CONF_ssh_no_userauth));
+ ctrl_checkbox(s, "Disconnect if authentication succeeds trivially",
+ 'n', HELPCTX(ssh_no_trivial_userauth),
+ conf_checkbox_handler,
+ I(CONF_ssh_no_trivial_userauth));
s = ctrl_getset(b, "Connection/SSH/Auth", "methods",
"Authentication methods");
diff --git a/doc/config.but b/doc/config.but
index a00ae476..77313282 100644
--- a/doc/config.but
+++ b/doc/config.but
@@ -2623,6 +2623,49 @@ interact with them.)
This option only affects SSH-2 connections. SSH-1 connections always
require an authentication step.
+\S{config-ssh-notrivialauth} \q{Disconnect if authentication succeeds
+trivially}
+
+This option causes PuTTY to abandon an SSH session and disconnect from
+the server, if the server accepted authentication without ever having
+asked for any kind of password or signature or token.
+
+This might be used as a security measure. There are some forms of
+attack against an SSH client user which work by terminating the SSH
+authentication stage early, and then doing something in the main part
+of the SSH session which \e{looks} like part of the authentication,
+but isn't really.
+
+For example, instead of demanding a signature from your public key,
+for which PuTTY would ask for your key's passphrase, a compromised or
+malicious server might allow you to log in with no signature or
+password at all, and then print a message that \e{imitates} PuTTY's
+request for your passphrase, in the hope that you would type it in.
+(In fact, the passphrase for your public key should not be sent to any
+server.)
+
+PuTTY's main defence against attacks of this type is the \q{trust
+sigil} system: messages in the PuTTY window that are truly originated
+by PuTTY itself are shown next to a small copy of the PuTTY icon,
+which the server cannot fake when it tries to imitate the same message
+using terminal output.
+
+However, if you think you might be at risk of this kind of thing
+anyway (if you don't watch closely for the trust sigils, or if you
+think you're at extra risk of one of your servers being malicious),
+then you could enable this option as an extra defence. Then, if the
+server tries any of these attacks involving letting you through the
+authentication stage, PuTTY will disconnect from the server before it
+can send a follow-up fake prompt or other type of attack.
+
+On the other hand, some servers \e{legitimately} let you through the
+SSH authentication phase trivially, either because they are genuinely
+public, or because the important authentication step happens during
+the terminal session. (An example might be an SSH server that connects
+you directly to the terminal login prompt of a legacy mainframe.) So
+enabling this option might cause some kinds of session to stop
+working. It's up to you.
+
\S{config-ssh-tryagent} \q{Attempt authentication using Pageant}
If this option is enabled, then PuTTY will look for Pageant (the SSH
diff --git a/pscp.c b/pscp.c
index 0bfda92d..a11d1e18 100644
--- a/pscp.c
+++ b/pscp.c
@@ -2203,6 +2203,8 @@ static void usage(void)
printf(" -i key private key file for user authentication\n");
printf(" -noagent disable use of Pageant\n");
printf(" -agent enable use of Pageant\n");
+ printf(" -no-trivial-auth\n");
+ printf(" disconnect if SSH authentication succeeds trivially\n");
printf(" -hostkey keyid\n");
printf(" manually specify a host key (may be repeated)\n");
printf(" -batch disable all interactive prompts\n");
diff --git a/psftp.c b/psftp.c
index 40cb73f5..c4b5374b 100644
--- a/psftp.c
+++ b/psftp.c
@@ -2538,6 +2538,8 @@ static void usage(void)
printf(" -i key private key file for user authentication\n");
printf(" -noagent disable use of Pageant\n");
printf(" -agent enable use of Pageant\n");
+ printf(" -no-trivial-auth\n");
+ printf(" disconnect if SSH authentication succeeds trivially\n");
printf(" -hostkey keyid\n");
printf(" manually specify a host key (may be repeated)\n");
printf(" -batch disable all interactive prompts\n");
diff --git a/putty.h b/putty.h
index ef6f7a37..7789f217 100644
--- a/putty.h
+++ b/putty.h
@@ -1428,6 +1428,7 @@ NORETURN void cleanup_exit(int);
X(INT, NONE, sshprot) \
X(BOOL, NONE, ssh2_des_cbc) /* "des-cbc" unrecommended SSH-2 cipher */ \
X(BOOL, NONE, ssh_no_userauth) /* bypass "ssh-userauth" (SSH-2 only) */ \
+ X(BOOL, NONE, ssh_no_trivial_userauth) /* disable trivial types of auth */ \
X(BOOL, NONE, ssh_show_banner) /* show USERAUTH_BANNERs (SSH-2 only) */ \
X(BOOL, NONE, try_tis_auth) \
X(BOOL, NONE, try_ki_auth) \
diff --git a/settings.c b/settings.c
index 547af0dc..32a53c54 100644
--- a/settings.c
+++ b/settings.c
@@ -609,6 +609,7 @@ void save_open_settings(settings_w *sesskey, Conf *conf)
#endif
write_setting_s(sesskey, "RekeyBytes", conf_get_str(conf, CONF_ssh_rekey_data));
write_setting_b(sesskey, "SshNoAuth", conf_get_bool(conf, CONF_ssh_no_userauth));
+ write_setting_b(sesskey, "SshNoTrivialAuth", conf_get_bool(conf, CONF_ssh_no_trivial_userauth));
write_setting_b(sesskey, "SshBanner", conf_get_bool(conf, CONF_ssh_show_banner));
write_setting_b(sesskey, "AuthTIS", conf_get_bool(conf, CONF_try_tis_auth));
write_setting_b(sesskey, "AuthKI", conf_get_bool(conf, CONF_try_ki_auth));
@@ -1025,6 +1026,7 @@ void load_open_settings(settings_r *sesskey, Conf *conf)
gpps(sesskey, "LogHost", "", conf, CONF_loghost);
gppb(sesskey, "SSH2DES", false, conf, CONF_ssh2_des_cbc);
gppb(sesskey, "SshNoAuth", false, conf, CONF_ssh_no_userauth);
+ gppb(sesskey, "SshNoTrivialAuth", false, conf, CONF_ssh_no_trivial_userauth);
gppb(sesskey, "SshBanner", true, conf, CONF_ssh_show_banner);
gppb(sesskey, "AuthTIS", false, conf, CONF_try_tis_auth);
gppb(sesskey, "AuthKI", true, conf, CONF_try_ki_auth);
diff --git a/ssh.c b/ssh.c
index 00a516ea..91e7e869 100644
--- a/ssh.c
+++ b/ssh.c
@@ -254,7 +254,9 @@ static void ssh_got_ssh_version(struct ssh_version_receiver *rcv,
connection_layer, ssh->savedhost, ssh->fullhostname,
conf_get_filename(ssh->conf, CONF_keyfile),
conf_get_bool(ssh->conf, CONF_ssh_show_banner),
- conf_get_bool(ssh->conf, CONF_tryagent), username,
+ conf_get_bool(ssh->conf, CONF_tryagent),
+ conf_get_bool(ssh->conf, CONF_ssh_no_trivial_userauth),
+ username,
conf_get_bool(ssh->conf, CONF_change_username),
conf_get_bool(ssh->conf, CONF_try_ki_auth),
#ifndef NO_GSSAPI
diff --git a/ssh1login.c b/ssh1login.c
index 8486cbf0..519838d7 100644
--- a/ssh1login.c
+++ b/ssh1login.c
@@ -27,7 +27,7 @@ struct ssh1_login_state {
char *savedhost;
int savedport;
- bool try_agent_auth;
+ bool try_agent_auth, is_trivial_auth;
int remote_protoflags;
int local_protoflags;
@@ -105,6 +105,8 @@ PacketProtocolLayer *ssh1_login_new(
s->savedhost = dupstr(host);
s->savedport = port;
s->successor_layer = successor_layer;
+ s->is_trivial_auth = true;
+
return &s->ppl;
}
@@ -645,6 +647,7 @@ static void ssh1_login_process_queue(PacketProtocolLayer *ppl)
s->ppl.bpp, SSH1_CMSG_AUTH_RSA_RESPONSE);
put_data(pkt, ret + 5, 16);
pq_push(s->ppl.out_pq, pkt);
+ s->is_trivial_auth = false;
crMaybeWaitUntilV(
(pktin = ssh1_login_pop(s))
!= NULL);
@@ -814,6 +817,7 @@ static void ssh1_login_process_queue(PacketProtocolLayer *ppl)
s->ppl.bpp, SSH1_CMSG_AUTH_RSA_RESPONSE);
put_data(pkt, buffer, 16);
pq_push(s->ppl.out_pq, pkt);
+ s->is_trivial_auth = false;
mp_free(challenge);
mp_free(response);
@@ -1105,6 +1109,7 @@ static void ssh1_login_process_queue(PacketProtocolLayer *ppl)
put_stringz(pkt, prompt_get_result_ref(s->cur_prompt->prompts[0]));
pq_push(s->ppl.out_pq, pkt);
}
+ s->is_trivial_auth = false;
ppl_logevent("Sent password");
free_prompts(s->cur_prompt);
s->cur_prompt = NULL;
@@ -1121,6 +1126,13 @@ static void ssh1_login_process_queue(PacketProtocolLayer *ppl)
}
}
+ if (conf_get_bool(s->conf, CONF_ssh_no_trivial_userauth) &&
+ s->is_trivial_auth) {
+ ssh_proto_error(s->ppl.ssh, "Authentication was trivial! "
+ "Abandoning session as specified in configuration.");
+ return;
+ }
+
ppl_logevent("Authentication successful");
if (conf_get_bool(s->conf, CONF_compression)) {
diff --git a/ssh2userauth.c b/ssh2userauth.c
index 01243baf..451d5abe 100644
--- a/ssh2userauth.c
+++ b/ssh2userauth.c
@@ -28,7 +28,7 @@ struct ssh2_userauth_state {
PacketProtocolLayer *transport_layer, *successor_layer;
Filename *keyfile;
- bool show_banner, tryagent, change_username;
+ bool show_banner, tryagent, notrivialauth, change_username;
char *hostname, *fullhostname;
char *default_username;
bool try_ki_auth, try_gssapi_auth, try_gssapi_kex_auth, gssapi_fwd;
@@ -82,6 +82,7 @@ struct ssh2_userauth_state {
int len;
PktOut *pktout;
bool want_user_input;
+ bool is_trivial_auth;
agent_pending_query *auth_agent_query;
bufchain banner;
@@ -134,7 +135,7 @@ static const PacketProtocolLayerVtable ssh2_userauth_vtable = {
PacketProtocolLayer *ssh2_userauth_new(
PacketProtocolLayer *successor_layer,
const char *hostname, const char *fullhostname,
- Filename *keyfile, bool show_banner, bool tryagent,
+ Filename *keyfile, bool show_banner, bool tryagent, bool notrivialauth,
const char *default_username, bool change_username,
bool try_ki_auth, bool try_gssapi_auth, bool try_gssapi_kex_auth,
bool gssapi_fwd, struct ssh_connection_shared_gss_state *shgss)
@@ -149,6 +150,7 @@ PacketProtocolLayer *ssh2_userauth_new(
s->keyfile = filename_copy(keyfile);
s->show_banner = show_banner;
s->tryagent = tryagent;
+ s->notrivialauth = notrivialauth;
s->default_username = dupstr(default_username);
s->change_username = change_username;
s->try_ki_auth = try_ki_auth;
@@ -157,6 +159,7 @@ PacketProtocolLayer *ssh2_userauth_new(
s->gssapi_fwd = gssapi_fwd;
s->shgss = shgss;
s->last_methods_string = strbuf_new();
+ s->is_trivial_auth = true;
bufchain_init(&s->banner);
bufchain_sink_init(&s->banner_bs, &s->banner);
@@ -818,6 +821,7 @@ static void ssh2_userauth_process_queue(PacketProtocolLayer *ppl)
sigblob);
pq_push(s->ppl.out_pq, s->pktout);
s->type = AUTH_TYPE_PUBLICKEY;
+ s->is_trivial_auth = false;
} else {
ppl_logevent("Pageant refused signing request");
ppl_printf("Pageant failed to "
@@ -1038,6 +1042,7 @@ static void ssh2_userauth_process_queue(PacketProtocolLayer *ppl)
ssh_key_free(key->key);
sfree(key->comment);
sfree(key);
+ s->is_trivial_auth = false;
}
#ifndef NO_GSSAPI
@@ -1169,6 +1174,7 @@ static void ssh2_userauth_process_queue(PacketProtocolLayer *ppl)
* no longer says CONTINUE_NEEDED
*/
if (s->gss_sndtok.length != 0) {
+ s->is_trivial_auth = false;
s->pktout =
ssh_bpp_new_pktout(
s->ppl.bpp, SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_GSSAPI_TOKEN);
@@ -1288,7 +1294,6 @@ static void ssh2_userauth_process_queue(PacketProtocolLayer *ppl)
* Loop while the server continues to send INFO_REQUESTs.
*/
while (pktin->type == SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_INFO_REQUEST) {
-
ptrlen name, inst;
strbuf *sb;
@@ -1308,6 +1313,7 @@ static void ssh2_userauth_process_queue(PacketProtocolLayer *ppl)
*/
s->num_prompts = get_uint32(pktin);
for (uint32_t i = 0; i < s->num_prompts; i++) {
+ s->is_trivial_auth = false;
ptrlen prompt = get_string(pktin);
bool echo = get_bool(pktin);
@@ -1472,7 +1478,7 @@ static void ssh2_userauth_process_queue(PacketProtocolLayer *ppl)
pq_push_front(s->ppl.in_pq, pktin);
} else if (s->can_passwd) {
-
+ s->is_trivial_auth = false;
/*
* Plain old password authentication.
*/
@@ -1731,6 +1737,12 @@ static void ssh2_userauth_process_queue(PacketProtocolLayer *ppl)
}
userauth_success:
+ if (s->notrivialauth && s->is_trivial_auth) {
+ ssh_proto_error(s->ppl.ssh, "Authentication was trivial! "
+ "Abandoning session as specified in configuration.");
+ return;
+ }
+
/*
* We've just received USERAUTH_SUCCESS, and we haven't sent
* any packets since. Signal the transport layer to consider
diff --git a/sshppl.h b/sshppl.h
index b339d67c..2c1dbf42 100644
--- a/sshppl.h
+++ b/sshppl.h
@@ -116,7 +116,7 @@ PacketProtocolLayer *ssh2_transport_new(
PacketProtocolLayer *ssh2_userauth_new(
PacketProtocolLayer *successor_layer,
const char *hostname, const char *fullhostname,
- Filename *keyfile, bool show_banner, bool tryagent,
+ Filename *keyfile, bool show_banner, bool tryagent, bool notrivialauth,
const char *default_username, bool change_username,
bool try_ki_auth,
bool try_gssapi_auth, bool try_gssapi_kex_auth,
diff --git a/unix/uxplink.c b/unix/uxplink.c
index 3e2a9b6b..240783f4 100644
--- a/unix/uxplink.c
+++ b/unix/uxplink.c
@@ -527,6 +527,8 @@ static void usage(void)
printf(" -i key private key file for user authentication\n");
printf(" -noagent disable use of Pageant\n");
printf(" -agent enable use of Pageant\n");
+ printf(" -no-trivial-auth\n");
+ printf(" disconnect if SSH authentication succeeds trivially\n");
printf(" -noshare disable use of connection sharing\n");
printf(" -share enable use of connection sharing\n");
printf(" -hostkey keyid\n");
diff --git a/windows/winhelp.h b/windows/winhelp.h
index ae5a7a7f..9011df45 100644
--- a/windows/winhelp.h
+++ b/windows/winhelp.h
@@ -111,6 +111,7 @@
#define WINHELP_CTX_ssh_kex_repeat "config-ssh-kex-rekey"
#define WINHELP_CTX_ssh_kex_manual_hostkeys "config-ssh-kex-manual-hostkeys"
#define WINHELP_CTX_ssh_auth_bypass "config-ssh-noauth"
+#define WINHELP_CTX_ssh_no_trivial_userauth "config-ssh-notrivialauth"
#define WINHELP_CTX_ssh_auth_banner "config-ssh-banner"
#define WINHELP_CTX_ssh_auth_privkey "config-ssh-privkey"
#define WINHELP_CTX_ssh_auth_agentfwd "config-ssh-agentfwd"
diff --git a/windows/winplink.c b/windows/winplink.c
index 9bda0712..58d43e6d 100644
--- a/windows/winplink.c
+++ b/windows/winplink.c
@@ -149,6 +149,8 @@ static void usage(void)
printf(" -i key private key file for user authentication\n");
printf(" -noagent disable use of Pageant\n");
printf(" -agent enable use of Pageant\n");
+ printf(" -no-trivial-auth\n");
+ printf(" disconnect if SSH authentication succeeds trivially\n");
printf(" -noshare disable use of connection sharing\n");
printf(" -share enable use of connection sharing\n");
printf(" -hostkey keyid\n");
--
2.20.1
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