kumquat-buildroot/boot/grub2/0028-linux-Fix-integer-overflows-in-initrd-size-handling.patch

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boot/grub2: Backport Boothole securify fixes Details: https://lists.gnu.org/archive/html/grub-devel/2020-07/msg00034.html Fixes the following security issues: * CVE-2020-10713 A flaw was found in grub2, prior to version 2.06. An attacker may use the GRUB 2 flaw to hijack and tamper the GRUB verification process. This flaw also allows the bypass of Secure Boot protections. In order to load an untrusted or modified kernel, an attacker would first need to establish access to the system such as gaining physical access, obtain the ability to alter a pxe-boot network, or have remote access to a networked system with root access. With this access, an attacker could then craft a string to cause a buffer overflow by injecting a malicious payload that leads to arbitrary code execution within GRUB. The highest threat from this vulnerability is to data confidentiality and integrity as well as system availability. * CVE-2020-14308 In grub2 versions before 2.06 the grub memory allocator doesn't check for possible arithmetic overflows on the requested allocation size. This leads the function to return invalid memory allocations which can be further used to cause possible integrity, confidentiality and availability impacts during the boot process. * CVE-2020-14309 There's an issue with grub2 in all versions before 2.06 when handling squashfs filesystems containing a symbolic link with name length of UINT32 bytes in size. The name size leads to an arithmetic overflow leading to a zero-size allocation further causing a heap-based buffer overflow with attacker controlled data. * CVE-2020-14310 An integer overflow in read_section_from_string may lead to a heap based buffer overflow. * CVE-2020-14311 An integer overflow in grub_ext2_read_link may lead to a heap-based buffer overflow. * CVE-2020-15706 GRUB2 contains a race condition in grub_script_function_create() leading to a use-after-free vulnerability which can be triggered by redefining a function whilst the same function is already executing, leading to arbitrary code execution and secure boot restriction bypass * CVE-2020-15707 Integer overflows were discovered in the functions grub_cmd_initrd and grub_initrd_init in the efilinux component of GRUB2, as shipped in Debian, Red Hat, and Ubuntu (the functionality is not included in GRUB2 upstream), leading to a heap-based buffer overflow. These could be triggered by an extremely large number of arguments to the initrd command on 32-bit architectures, or a crafted filesystem with very large files on any architecture. An attacker could use this to execute arbitrary code and bypass UEFI Secure Boot restrictions. This issue affects GRUB2 version 2.04 and prior versions. Signed-off-by: Stefan Sørensen <stefan.sorensen@spectralink.com> Signed-off-by: Peter Korsgaard <peter@korsgaard.com>
2020-08-03 10:00:25 +02:00
From 0367e7d1b9bac3a78608a672bf6e4ace6a28b964 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Colin Watson <cjwatson@debian.org>
Date: Sat, 25 Jul 2020 12:15:37 +0100
Subject: [PATCH] linux: Fix integer overflows in initrd size handling
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8
Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit
These could be triggered by a crafted filesystem with very large files.
Fixes: CVE-2020-15707
Signed-off-by: Colin Watson <cjwatson@debian.org>
Reviewed-by: Jan Setje-Eilers <jan.setjeeilers@oracle.com>
Reviewed-by: Daniel Kiper <daniel.kiper@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: Stefan Sørensen <stefan.sorensen@spectralink.com>
---
grub-core/loader/linux.c | 74 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++-----------
1 file changed, 54 insertions(+), 20 deletions(-)
diff --git a/grub-core/loader/linux.c b/grub-core/loader/linux.c
index 4cd8c20c7..3fe390f17 100644
--- a/grub-core/loader/linux.c
+++ b/grub-core/loader/linux.c
@@ -4,6 +4,7 @@
#include <grub/misc.h>
#include <grub/file.h>
#include <grub/mm.h>
+#include <grub/safemath.h>
struct newc_head
{
@@ -98,13 +99,13 @@ free_dir (struct dir *root)
grub_free (root);
}
-static grub_size_t
+static grub_err_t
insert_dir (const char *name, struct dir **root,
- grub_uint8_t *ptr)
+ grub_uint8_t *ptr, grub_size_t *size)
{
struct dir *cur, **head = root;
const char *cb, *ce = name;
- grub_size_t size = 0;
+ *size = 0;
while (1)
{
for (cb = ce; *cb == '/'; cb++);
@@ -130,14 +131,22 @@ insert_dir (const char *name, struct dir **root,
ptr = make_header (ptr, name, ce - name,
040777, 0);
}
- size += ALIGN_UP ((ce - (char *) name)
- + sizeof (struct newc_head), 4);
+ if (grub_add (*size,
+ ALIGN_UP ((ce - (char *) name)
+ + sizeof (struct newc_head), 4),
+ size))
+ {
+ grub_error (GRUB_ERR_OUT_OF_RANGE, N_("overflow is detected"));
+ grub_free (n->name);
+ grub_free (n);
+ return grub_errno;
+ }
*head = n;
cur = n;
}
root = &cur->next;
}
- return size;
+ return GRUB_ERR_NONE;
}
grub_err_t
@@ -172,26 +181,33 @@ grub_initrd_init (int argc, char *argv[],
eptr = grub_strchr (ptr, ':');
if (eptr)
{
+ grub_size_t dir_size, name_len;
+
initrd_ctx->components[i].newc_name = grub_strndup (ptr, eptr - ptr);
- if (!initrd_ctx->components[i].newc_name)
+ if (!initrd_ctx->components[i].newc_name ||
+ insert_dir (initrd_ctx->components[i].newc_name, &root, 0,
+ &dir_size))
{
grub_initrd_close (initrd_ctx);
return grub_errno;
}
- initrd_ctx->size
- += ALIGN_UP (sizeof (struct newc_head)
- + grub_strlen (initrd_ctx->components[i].newc_name),
- 4);
- initrd_ctx->size += insert_dir (initrd_ctx->components[i].newc_name,
- &root, 0);
+ name_len = grub_strlen (initrd_ctx->components[i].newc_name);
+ if (grub_add (initrd_ctx->size,
+ ALIGN_UP (sizeof (struct newc_head) + name_len, 4),
+ &initrd_ctx->size) ||
+ grub_add (initrd_ctx->size, dir_size, &initrd_ctx->size))
+ goto overflow;
newc = 1;
fname = eptr + 1;
}
}
else if (newc)
{
- initrd_ctx->size += ALIGN_UP (sizeof (struct newc_head)
- + sizeof ("TRAILER!!!") - 1, 4);
+ if (grub_add (initrd_ctx->size,
+ ALIGN_UP (sizeof (struct newc_head)
+ + sizeof ("TRAILER!!!") - 1, 4),
+ &initrd_ctx->size))
+ goto overflow;
free_dir (root);
root = 0;
newc = 0;
@@ -207,19 +223,29 @@ grub_initrd_init (int argc, char *argv[],
initrd_ctx->nfiles++;
initrd_ctx->components[i].size
= grub_file_size (initrd_ctx->components[i].file);
- initrd_ctx->size += initrd_ctx->components[i].size;
+ if (grub_add (initrd_ctx->size, initrd_ctx->components[i].size,
+ &initrd_ctx->size))
+ goto overflow;
}
if (newc)
{
initrd_ctx->size = ALIGN_UP (initrd_ctx->size, 4);
- initrd_ctx->size += ALIGN_UP (sizeof (struct newc_head)
- + sizeof ("TRAILER!!!") - 1, 4);
+ if (grub_add (initrd_ctx->size,
+ ALIGN_UP (sizeof (struct newc_head)
+ + sizeof ("TRAILER!!!") - 1, 4),
+ &initrd_ctx->size))
+ goto overflow;
free_dir (root);
root = 0;
}
return GRUB_ERR_NONE;
+
+ overflow:
+ free_dir (root);
+ grub_initrd_close (initrd_ctx);
+ return grub_error (GRUB_ERR_OUT_OF_RANGE, N_("overflow is detected"));
}
grub_size_t
@@ -260,8 +286,16 @@ grub_initrd_load (struct grub_linux_initrd_context *initrd_ctx,
if (initrd_ctx->components[i].newc_name)
{
- ptr += insert_dir (initrd_ctx->components[i].newc_name,
- &root, ptr);
+ grub_size_t dir_size;
+
+ if (insert_dir (initrd_ctx->components[i].newc_name, &root, ptr,
+ &dir_size))
+ {
+ free_dir (root);
+ grub_initrd_close (initrd_ctx);
+ return grub_errno;
+ }
+ ptr += dir_size;
ptr = make_header (ptr, initrd_ctx->components[i].newc_name,
grub_strlen (initrd_ctx->components[i].newc_name),
0100777,
--
2.26.2