kumquat-buildroot/package/spice/0006-reds-Avoid-buffer-overflows-handling-monitor-configu.patch

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From a957a90baf2c62d31f3547e56bba7d0e812d2331 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Frediano Ziglio <fziglio@redhat.com>
Date: Mon, 15 May 2017 15:57:28 +0100
Subject: [PATCH] reds: Avoid buffer overflows handling monitor
configuration
It was also possible for a malicious client to set
VDAgentMonitorsConfig::num_of_monitors to a number larger
than the actual size of VDAgentMOnitorsConfig::monitors.
This would lead to buffer overflows, which could allow the guest to
read part of the host memory. This might cause write overflows in the
host as well, but controlling the content of such buffers seems
complicated.
Signed-off-by: Frediano Ziglio <fziglio@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Peter Korsgaard <peter@korsgaard.com>
---
server/reds.c | 7 +++++++
1 file changed, 7 insertions(+)
diff --git a/server/reds.c b/server/reds.c
index e1c8c108..3a42c375 100644
--- a/server/reds.c
+++ b/server/reds.c
@@ -1000,6 +1000,7 @@ static void reds_on_main_agent_monitors_config(
VDAgentMessage *msg_header;
VDAgentMonitorsConfig *monitors_config;
RedsClientMonitorsConfig *cmc = &reds->client_monitors_config;
+ uint32_t max_monitors;
// limit size of message sent by the client as this can cause a DoS through
// memory exhaustion, or potentially some integer overflows
@@ -1028,6 +1029,12 @@ static void reds_on_main_agent_monitors_config(
goto overflow;
}
monitors_config = (VDAgentMonitorsConfig *)(cmc->buffer + sizeof(*msg_header));
+ // limit the monitor number to avoid buffer overflows
+ max_monitors = (msg_header->size - sizeof(VDAgentMonitorsConfig)) /
+ sizeof(VDAgentMonConfig);
+ if (monitors_config->num_of_monitors > max_monitors) {
+ goto overflow;
+ }
spice_debug("%s: %d", __func__, monitors_config->num_of_monitors);
red_dispatcher_client_monitors_config(monitors_config);
reds_client_monitors_config_cleanup();
--
2.11.0