kumquat-buildroot/boot/grub2/grub2.mk

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################################################################################
#
# grub2
#
################################################################################
GRUB2_VERSION = 2.04
GRUB2_SITE = http://ftp.gnu.org/gnu/grub
GRUB2_SOURCE = grub-$(GRUB2_VERSION).tar.xz
GRUB2_LICENSE = GPL-3.0+
GRUB2_LICENSE_FILES = COPYING
GRUB2_DEPENDENCIES = host-bison host-flex host-grub2
HOST_GRUB2_DEPENDENCIES = host-bison host-flex
GRUB2_INSTALL_IMAGES = YES
boot/grub2: Backport 2021/03/02 securify fixes Details: https://lists.gnu.org/archive/html/grub-devel/2021-03/msg00007.html As detailed in commit 7e64a050fbd9add07ed84d48054ffee1b659d079, it is difficult to utilize the upstream patches directly, so a number of patches include changes to generated files so that we don't need invoke the gentpl.py script. In addition to the security fixes, these required patches has been backported: f76a27996 efi: Make shim_lock GUID and protocol type public 04ae030d0 efi: Return grub_efi_status_t from grub_efi_get_variable() ac5c93675 efi: Add a function to read EFI variables with attributes d7e54b2e5 efi: Add secure boot detection The following security issues are fixed: CVE-2020-14372 grub2: The acpi command allows privileged user to load crafted ACPI tables when Secure Boot is enabled CWE-184 7.5/CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:H/PR:H/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:H/A:H GRUB2 enables the use of the command acpi even when Secure Boot is signaled by the firmware. An attacker with local root privileges to can drop a small SSDT in /boot/efi and modify grub.cfg to instruct grub to load said SSDT. The SSDT then gets run by the kernel and it overwrites the kernel lock down configuration enabling the attacker to load unsigned kernel modules and kexec unsigned code. Reported-by: Máté Kukri ******************************************************************************* CVE-2020-25632 grub2: Use-after-free in rmmod command CWE-416 7.5/CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:H/PR:H/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:H/A:H The rmmod implementation for GRUB2 is flawed, allowing an attacker to unload a module used as dependency without checking if any other dependent module is still loaded. This leads to an use-after-free scenario possibly allowing an attacker to execute arbitrary code and by-pass Secure Boot protections. Reported-by: Chris Coulson (Canonical) ******************************************************************************* CVE-2020-25647 grub2: Out-of-bound write in grub_usb_device_initialize() CWE-787 6.9/CVSS:3.1/AV:P/AC:H/PR:H/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:H/A:H grub_usb_device_initialize() is called to handle USB device initialization. It reads out the descriptors it needs from the USB device and uses that data to fill in some USB data structures. grub_usb_device_initialize() performs very little bounds checking and simply assumes the USB device provides sane values. This behavior can trigger memory corruption. If properly exploited, this would lead to arbitrary code execution allowing the attacker to by-pass Secure Boot mechanism. Reported-by: Joseph Tartaro (IOActive) and Ilja van Sprundel (IOActive) ******************************************************************************* CVE-2020-27749 grub2: Stack buffer overflow in grub_parser_split_cmdline CWE-121 7.5/CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:H/PR:H/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:H/A:H grub_parser_split_cmdline() expands variable names present in the supplied command line in to their corresponding variable contents and uses a 1kB stack buffer for temporary storage without sufficient bounds checking. If the function is called with a command line that references a variable with a sufficiently large payload, it is possible to overflow the stack buffer, corrupt the stack frame and control execution. An attacker may use this to circumvent Secure Boot protections. Reported-by: Chris Coulson (Canonical) ******************************************************************************* CVE-2020-27779 grub2: The cutmem command allows privileged user to remove memory regions when Secure Boot is enabled CWE-285 7.5/CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:H/PR:H/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:H/A:H The GRUB2's cutmem command does not honor Secure Boot locking. This allows an privileged attacker to remove address ranges from memory creating an opportunity to circumvent Secure Boot protections after proper triage about grub's memory layout. Reported-by: Teddy Reed ******************************************************************************* CVE-2021-3418 - grub2: GRUB 2.05 reintroduced CVE-2020-15705 CWE-281 6.4/CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:H/PR:H/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H The GRUB2 upstream reintroduced the CVE-2020-15705. This refers to a distro specific flaw which made upstream in the mentioned version. If certificates that signed GRUB2 are installed into db, GRUB2 can be booted directly. It will then boot any kernel without signature validation. The booted kernel will think it was booted in Secure Boot mode and will implement lock down, yet it could have been tampered. This flaw only affects upstream and distributions using the shim_lock verifier. Reported-by: Dimitri John Ledkov (Canonical) ******************************************************************************* CVE-2021-20225 grub2: Heap out-of-bounds write in short form option parser CWE-787 7.5/CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:H/PR:H/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:H/A:H The option parser in GRUB2 allows an attacker to write past the end of a heap-allocated buffer by calling certain commands with a large number of specific short forms of options. Reported-by: Daniel Axtens (IBM) ******************************************************************************* CVE-2021-20233 grub2: Heap out-of-bound write due to mis-calculation of space required for quoting CWE-787 7.5/CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:H/PR:H/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:H/A:H There's a flaw on GRUB2 menu rendering code setparam_prefix() in the menu rendering code performs a length calculation on the assumption that expressing a quoted single quote will require 3 characters, while it actually requires 4 characters. This allow an attacker to corrupt memory by one byte for each quote in the input. Reported-by: Daniel Axtens (IBM) ******************************************************************************* Signed-off-by: Stefan Sørensen <stefan.sorensen@spectralink.com> Signed-off-by: Yann E. MORIN <yann.morin.1998@free.fr>
2021-03-11 10:53:06 +01:00
# 0001-build-Fix-GRUB-i386-pc-build-with-Ubuntu-gcc.patch and 2021/03/02
# security fixes (patches 0029-0149)
boot/grub2: Fix GRUB i386-pc build with Ubuntu gcc Backport a patch from upstream to fix the build on certain versions of gsc, notably: Ubuntu 19.10 with gcc (Ubuntu 8.3.0-26ubuntu1~19.10) 8.3.0 Ubuntu 19.10 with gcc (Ubuntu 9.2.1-9ubuntu2) 9.2.1 20191008 The upstream patch is simply a change in the gentpl.py script, which is used to generate parts of the automake machinery, so if we just backport the upstream patch, we need to call the script to regenerate those files. However, the modified script is a python script, so we would need to add a dependency on host-python (2 or 3), which is not so nice. Furthermore, calling the script is not enough: it needs a specific set of optionss for each file it is to generate. That set of options is not static; it is constructed in the convoluted autogen.sh. Calling autogen.sh is usally not so good an idea in the Buildroot context, and indeed this fails becasue it calls to autoreconf, but without our carefuly crafted options and environment variables. There was a little light in the tunnel, in that autogen.sh can be told not to run autoreconf, by setting the environemnt variable FROM_BOOTSTRAP to an non-=empty string, but this is fraught with various other side-effects, as in that cause, autogen.sh expects to be valled by an upper sciopt, bootstrap, which is not provided in the tarball distribution... So, between all those issues, autogen, bootstrap, and a host-python (2 or 3) dependency, we choose another route: path the script *and* the one generated file affected by the change. Since that patched file is a .am file, we also patch the corresponding .in file However, we're faced with another issue: the other generated file is now older than the script, so the automake machinery will now want to re-run autoconf et al during the build step, which is still not a good idea for us. So we touch the other generated file so it is mopre recent than the script. This is still not sufficient, because the patched file also has a dependency on the generated file, so we need to touch as well. Fixes: - https://bugs.buildroot.org/show_bug.cgi?id=12946 Signed-off-by: Fabrice Fontaine <fontaine.fabrice@gmail.com> [yann.morin.1998@free.fr: - keep the hunk about patching gentpl.py - make it a git-formatted patch - add the touch - drastically expand the commit log ] Signed-off-by: Yann E. MORIN <yann.morin.1998@free.fr>
2020-05-28 23:50:15 +02:00
define GRUB2_AVOID_AUTORECONF
$(Q)touch $(@D)/Makefile.util.am
boot/grub2: Backport 2021/03/02 securify fixes Details: https://lists.gnu.org/archive/html/grub-devel/2021-03/msg00007.html As detailed in commit 7e64a050fbd9add07ed84d48054ffee1b659d079, it is difficult to utilize the upstream patches directly, so a number of patches include changes to generated files so that we don't need invoke the gentpl.py script. In addition to the security fixes, these required patches has been backported: f76a27996 efi: Make shim_lock GUID and protocol type public 04ae030d0 efi: Return grub_efi_status_t from grub_efi_get_variable() ac5c93675 efi: Add a function to read EFI variables with attributes d7e54b2e5 efi: Add secure boot detection The following security issues are fixed: CVE-2020-14372 grub2: The acpi command allows privileged user to load crafted ACPI tables when Secure Boot is enabled CWE-184 7.5/CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:H/PR:H/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:H/A:H GRUB2 enables the use of the command acpi even when Secure Boot is signaled by the firmware. An attacker with local root privileges to can drop a small SSDT in /boot/efi and modify grub.cfg to instruct grub to load said SSDT. The SSDT then gets run by the kernel and it overwrites the kernel lock down configuration enabling the attacker to load unsigned kernel modules and kexec unsigned code. Reported-by: Máté Kukri ******************************************************************************* CVE-2020-25632 grub2: Use-after-free in rmmod command CWE-416 7.5/CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:H/PR:H/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:H/A:H The rmmod implementation for GRUB2 is flawed, allowing an attacker to unload a module used as dependency without checking if any other dependent module is still loaded. This leads to an use-after-free scenario possibly allowing an attacker to execute arbitrary code and by-pass Secure Boot protections. Reported-by: Chris Coulson (Canonical) ******************************************************************************* CVE-2020-25647 grub2: Out-of-bound write in grub_usb_device_initialize() CWE-787 6.9/CVSS:3.1/AV:P/AC:H/PR:H/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:H/A:H grub_usb_device_initialize() is called to handle USB device initialization. It reads out the descriptors it needs from the USB device and uses that data to fill in some USB data structures. grub_usb_device_initialize() performs very little bounds checking and simply assumes the USB device provides sane values. This behavior can trigger memory corruption. If properly exploited, this would lead to arbitrary code execution allowing the attacker to by-pass Secure Boot mechanism. Reported-by: Joseph Tartaro (IOActive) and Ilja van Sprundel (IOActive) ******************************************************************************* CVE-2020-27749 grub2: Stack buffer overflow in grub_parser_split_cmdline CWE-121 7.5/CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:H/PR:H/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:H/A:H grub_parser_split_cmdline() expands variable names present in the supplied command line in to their corresponding variable contents and uses a 1kB stack buffer for temporary storage without sufficient bounds checking. If the function is called with a command line that references a variable with a sufficiently large payload, it is possible to overflow the stack buffer, corrupt the stack frame and control execution. An attacker may use this to circumvent Secure Boot protections. Reported-by: Chris Coulson (Canonical) ******************************************************************************* CVE-2020-27779 grub2: The cutmem command allows privileged user to remove memory regions when Secure Boot is enabled CWE-285 7.5/CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:H/PR:H/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:H/A:H The GRUB2's cutmem command does not honor Secure Boot locking. This allows an privileged attacker to remove address ranges from memory creating an opportunity to circumvent Secure Boot protections after proper triage about grub's memory layout. Reported-by: Teddy Reed ******************************************************************************* CVE-2021-3418 - grub2: GRUB 2.05 reintroduced CVE-2020-15705 CWE-281 6.4/CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:H/PR:H/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H The GRUB2 upstream reintroduced the CVE-2020-15705. This refers to a distro specific flaw which made upstream in the mentioned version. If certificates that signed GRUB2 are installed into db, GRUB2 can be booted directly. It will then boot any kernel without signature validation. The booted kernel will think it was booted in Secure Boot mode and will implement lock down, yet it could have been tampered. This flaw only affects upstream and distributions using the shim_lock verifier. Reported-by: Dimitri John Ledkov (Canonical) ******************************************************************************* CVE-2021-20225 grub2: Heap out-of-bounds write in short form option parser CWE-787 7.5/CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:H/PR:H/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:H/A:H The option parser in GRUB2 allows an attacker to write past the end of a heap-allocated buffer by calling certain commands with a large number of specific short forms of options. Reported-by: Daniel Axtens (IBM) ******************************************************************************* CVE-2021-20233 grub2: Heap out-of-bound write due to mis-calculation of space required for quoting CWE-787 7.5/CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:H/PR:H/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:H/A:H There's a flaw on GRUB2 menu rendering code setparam_prefix() in the menu rendering code performs a length calculation on the assumption that expressing a quoted single quote will require 3 characters, while it actually requires 4 characters. This allow an attacker to corrupt memory by one byte for each quote in the input. Reported-by: Daniel Axtens (IBM) ******************************************************************************* Signed-off-by: Stefan Sørensen <stefan.sorensen@spectralink.com> Signed-off-by: Yann E. MORIN <yann.morin.1998@free.fr>
2021-03-11 10:53:06 +01:00
$(Q)touch $(@D)/aclocal.m4
boot/grub2: Fix GRUB i386-pc build with Ubuntu gcc Backport a patch from upstream to fix the build on certain versions of gsc, notably: Ubuntu 19.10 with gcc (Ubuntu 8.3.0-26ubuntu1~19.10) 8.3.0 Ubuntu 19.10 with gcc (Ubuntu 9.2.1-9ubuntu2) 9.2.1 20191008 The upstream patch is simply a change in the gentpl.py script, which is used to generate parts of the automake machinery, so if we just backport the upstream patch, we need to call the script to regenerate those files. However, the modified script is a python script, so we would need to add a dependency on host-python (2 or 3), which is not so nice. Furthermore, calling the script is not enough: it needs a specific set of optionss for each file it is to generate. That set of options is not static; it is constructed in the convoluted autogen.sh. Calling autogen.sh is usally not so good an idea in the Buildroot context, and indeed this fails becasue it calls to autoreconf, but without our carefuly crafted options and environment variables. There was a little light in the tunnel, in that autogen.sh can be told not to run autoreconf, by setting the environemnt variable FROM_BOOTSTRAP to an non-=empty string, but this is fraught with various other side-effects, as in that cause, autogen.sh expects to be valled by an upper sciopt, bootstrap, which is not provided in the tarball distribution... So, between all those issues, autogen, bootstrap, and a host-python (2 or 3) dependency, we choose another route: path the script *and* the one generated file affected by the change. Since that patched file is a .am file, we also patch the corresponding .in file However, we're faced with another issue: the other generated file is now older than the script, so the automake machinery will now want to re-run autoconf et al during the build step, which is still not a good idea for us. So we touch the other generated file so it is mopre recent than the script. This is still not sufficient, because the patched file also has a dependency on the generated file, so we need to touch as well. Fixes: - https://bugs.buildroot.org/show_bug.cgi?id=12946 Signed-off-by: Fabrice Fontaine <fontaine.fabrice@gmail.com> [yann.morin.1998@free.fr: - keep the hunk about patching gentpl.py - make it a git-formatted patch - add the touch - drastically expand the commit log ] Signed-off-by: Yann E. MORIN <yann.morin.1998@free.fr>
2020-05-28 23:50:15 +02:00
$(Q)touch $(@D)/Makefile.in
boot/grub2: Backport 2021/03/02 securify fixes Details: https://lists.gnu.org/archive/html/grub-devel/2021-03/msg00007.html As detailed in commit 7e64a050fbd9add07ed84d48054ffee1b659d079, it is difficult to utilize the upstream patches directly, so a number of patches include changes to generated files so that we don't need invoke the gentpl.py script. In addition to the security fixes, these required patches has been backported: f76a27996 efi: Make shim_lock GUID and protocol type public 04ae030d0 efi: Return grub_efi_status_t from grub_efi_get_variable() ac5c93675 efi: Add a function to read EFI variables with attributes d7e54b2e5 efi: Add secure boot detection The following security issues are fixed: CVE-2020-14372 grub2: The acpi command allows privileged user to load crafted ACPI tables when Secure Boot is enabled CWE-184 7.5/CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:H/PR:H/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:H/A:H GRUB2 enables the use of the command acpi even when Secure Boot is signaled by the firmware. An attacker with local root privileges to can drop a small SSDT in /boot/efi and modify grub.cfg to instruct grub to load said SSDT. The SSDT then gets run by the kernel and it overwrites the kernel lock down configuration enabling the attacker to load unsigned kernel modules and kexec unsigned code. Reported-by: Máté Kukri ******************************************************************************* CVE-2020-25632 grub2: Use-after-free in rmmod command CWE-416 7.5/CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:H/PR:H/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:H/A:H The rmmod implementation for GRUB2 is flawed, allowing an attacker to unload a module used as dependency without checking if any other dependent module is still loaded. This leads to an use-after-free scenario possibly allowing an attacker to execute arbitrary code and by-pass Secure Boot protections. Reported-by: Chris Coulson (Canonical) ******************************************************************************* CVE-2020-25647 grub2: Out-of-bound write in grub_usb_device_initialize() CWE-787 6.9/CVSS:3.1/AV:P/AC:H/PR:H/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:H/A:H grub_usb_device_initialize() is called to handle USB device initialization. It reads out the descriptors it needs from the USB device and uses that data to fill in some USB data structures. grub_usb_device_initialize() performs very little bounds checking and simply assumes the USB device provides sane values. This behavior can trigger memory corruption. If properly exploited, this would lead to arbitrary code execution allowing the attacker to by-pass Secure Boot mechanism. Reported-by: Joseph Tartaro (IOActive) and Ilja van Sprundel (IOActive) ******************************************************************************* CVE-2020-27749 grub2: Stack buffer overflow in grub_parser_split_cmdline CWE-121 7.5/CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:H/PR:H/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:H/A:H grub_parser_split_cmdline() expands variable names present in the supplied command line in to their corresponding variable contents and uses a 1kB stack buffer for temporary storage without sufficient bounds checking. If the function is called with a command line that references a variable with a sufficiently large payload, it is possible to overflow the stack buffer, corrupt the stack frame and control execution. An attacker may use this to circumvent Secure Boot protections. Reported-by: Chris Coulson (Canonical) ******************************************************************************* CVE-2020-27779 grub2: The cutmem command allows privileged user to remove memory regions when Secure Boot is enabled CWE-285 7.5/CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:H/PR:H/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:H/A:H The GRUB2's cutmem command does not honor Secure Boot locking. This allows an privileged attacker to remove address ranges from memory creating an opportunity to circumvent Secure Boot protections after proper triage about grub's memory layout. Reported-by: Teddy Reed ******************************************************************************* CVE-2021-3418 - grub2: GRUB 2.05 reintroduced CVE-2020-15705 CWE-281 6.4/CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:H/PR:H/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H The GRUB2 upstream reintroduced the CVE-2020-15705. This refers to a distro specific flaw which made upstream in the mentioned version. If certificates that signed GRUB2 are installed into db, GRUB2 can be booted directly. It will then boot any kernel without signature validation. The booted kernel will think it was booted in Secure Boot mode and will implement lock down, yet it could have been tampered. This flaw only affects upstream and distributions using the shim_lock verifier. Reported-by: Dimitri John Ledkov (Canonical) ******************************************************************************* CVE-2021-20225 grub2: Heap out-of-bounds write in short form option parser CWE-787 7.5/CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:H/PR:H/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:H/A:H The option parser in GRUB2 allows an attacker to write past the end of a heap-allocated buffer by calling certain commands with a large number of specific short forms of options. Reported-by: Daniel Axtens (IBM) ******************************************************************************* CVE-2021-20233 grub2: Heap out-of-bound write due to mis-calculation of space required for quoting CWE-787 7.5/CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:H/PR:H/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:H/A:H There's a flaw on GRUB2 menu rendering code setparam_prefix() in the menu rendering code performs a length calculation on the assumption that expressing a quoted single quote will require 3 characters, while it actually requires 4 characters. This allow an attacker to corrupt memory by one byte for each quote in the input. Reported-by: Daniel Axtens (IBM) ******************************************************************************* Signed-off-by: Stefan Sørensen <stefan.sorensen@spectralink.com> Signed-off-by: Yann E. MORIN <yann.morin.1998@free.fr>
2021-03-11 10:53:06 +01:00
$(Q)touch $(@D)/configure
boot/grub2: Fix GRUB i386-pc build with Ubuntu gcc Backport a patch from upstream to fix the build on certain versions of gsc, notably: Ubuntu 19.10 with gcc (Ubuntu 8.3.0-26ubuntu1~19.10) 8.3.0 Ubuntu 19.10 with gcc (Ubuntu 9.2.1-9ubuntu2) 9.2.1 20191008 The upstream patch is simply a change in the gentpl.py script, which is used to generate parts of the automake machinery, so if we just backport the upstream patch, we need to call the script to regenerate those files. However, the modified script is a python script, so we would need to add a dependency on host-python (2 or 3), which is not so nice. Furthermore, calling the script is not enough: it needs a specific set of optionss for each file it is to generate. That set of options is not static; it is constructed in the convoluted autogen.sh. Calling autogen.sh is usally not so good an idea in the Buildroot context, and indeed this fails becasue it calls to autoreconf, but without our carefuly crafted options and environment variables. There was a little light in the tunnel, in that autogen.sh can be told not to run autoreconf, by setting the environemnt variable FROM_BOOTSTRAP to an non-=empty string, but this is fraught with various other side-effects, as in that cause, autogen.sh expects to be valled by an upper sciopt, bootstrap, which is not provided in the tarball distribution... So, between all those issues, autogen, bootstrap, and a host-python (2 or 3) dependency, we choose another route: path the script *and* the one generated file affected by the change. Since that patched file is a .am file, we also patch the corresponding .in file However, we're faced with another issue: the other generated file is now older than the script, so the automake machinery will now want to re-run autoconf et al during the build step, which is still not a good idea for us. So we touch the other generated file so it is mopre recent than the script. This is still not sufficient, because the patched file also has a dependency on the generated file, so we need to touch as well. Fixes: - https://bugs.buildroot.org/show_bug.cgi?id=12946 Signed-off-by: Fabrice Fontaine <fontaine.fabrice@gmail.com> [yann.morin.1998@free.fr: - keep the hunk about patching gentpl.py - make it a git-formatted patch - add the touch - drastically expand the commit log ] Signed-off-by: Yann E. MORIN <yann.morin.1998@free.fr>
2020-05-28 23:50:15 +02:00
endef
GRUB2_POST_PATCH_HOOKS += GRUB2_AVOID_AUTORECONF
HOST_GRUB2_POST_PATCH_HOOKS += GRUB2_AVOID_AUTORECONF
boot/grub2: Backport Boothole securify fixes Details: https://lists.gnu.org/archive/html/grub-devel/2020-07/msg00034.html Fixes the following security issues: * CVE-2020-10713 A flaw was found in grub2, prior to version 2.06. An attacker may use the GRUB 2 flaw to hijack and tamper the GRUB verification process. This flaw also allows the bypass of Secure Boot protections. In order to load an untrusted or modified kernel, an attacker would first need to establish access to the system such as gaining physical access, obtain the ability to alter a pxe-boot network, or have remote access to a networked system with root access. With this access, an attacker could then craft a string to cause a buffer overflow by injecting a malicious payload that leads to arbitrary code execution within GRUB. The highest threat from this vulnerability is to data confidentiality and integrity as well as system availability. * CVE-2020-14308 In grub2 versions before 2.06 the grub memory allocator doesn't check for possible arithmetic overflows on the requested allocation size. This leads the function to return invalid memory allocations which can be further used to cause possible integrity, confidentiality and availability impacts during the boot process. * CVE-2020-14309 There's an issue with grub2 in all versions before 2.06 when handling squashfs filesystems containing a symbolic link with name length of UINT32 bytes in size. The name size leads to an arithmetic overflow leading to a zero-size allocation further causing a heap-based buffer overflow with attacker controlled data. * CVE-2020-14310 An integer overflow in read_section_from_string may lead to a heap based buffer overflow. * CVE-2020-14311 An integer overflow in grub_ext2_read_link may lead to a heap-based buffer overflow. * CVE-2020-15706 GRUB2 contains a race condition in grub_script_function_create() leading to a use-after-free vulnerability which can be triggered by redefining a function whilst the same function is already executing, leading to arbitrary code execution and secure boot restriction bypass * CVE-2020-15707 Integer overflows were discovered in the functions grub_cmd_initrd and grub_initrd_init in the efilinux component of GRUB2, as shipped in Debian, Red Hat, and Ubuntu (the functionality is not included in GRUB2 upstream), leading to a heap-based buffer overflow. These could be triggered by an extremely large number of arguments to the initrd command on 32-bit architectures, or a crafted filesystem with very large files on any architecture. An attacker could use this to execute arbitrary code and bypass UEFI Secure Boot restrictions. This issue affects GRUB2 version 2.04 and prior versions. Signed-off-by: Stefan Sørensen <stefan.sorensen@spectralink.com> Signed-off-by: Peter Korsgaard <peter@korsgaard.com>
2020-08-03 10:00:25 +02:00
# 0002-yylex-Make-lexer-fatal-errors-actually-be-fatal.patch
GRUB2_IGNORE_CVES += CVE-2020-10713
# 0005-calloc-Use-calloc-at-most-places.patch
GRUB2_IGNORE_CVES += CVE-2020-14308
# 0006-malloc-Use-overflow-checking-primitives-where-we-do-.patch
GRUB2_IGNORE_CVES += CVE-2020-14309 CVE-2020-14310 CVE-2020-14311
# 0019-script-Avoid-a-use-after-free-when-redefining-a-func.patch
GRUB2_IGNORE_CVES += CVE-2020-15706
# 0028-linux-Fix-integer-overflows-in-initrd-size-handling.patch
GRUB2_IGNORE_CVES += CVE-2020-15707
boot/grub2: Backport 2021/03/02 securify fixes Details: https://lists.gnu.org/archive/html/grub-devel/2021-03/msg00007.html As detailed in commit 7e64a050fbd9add07ed84d48054ffee1b659d079, it is difficult to utilize the upstream patches directly, so a number of patches include changes to generated files so that we don't need invoke the gentpl.py script. In addition to the security fixes, these required patches has been backported: f76a27996 efi: Make shim_lock GUID and protocol type public 04ae030d0 efi: Return grub_efi_status_t from grub_efi_get_variable() ac5c93675 efi: Add a function to read EFI variables with attributes d7e54b2e5 efi: Add secure boot detection The following security issues are fixed: CVE-2020-14372 grub2: The acpi command allows privileged user to load crafted ACPI tables when Secure Boot is enabled CWE-184 7.5/CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:H/PR:H/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:H/A:H GRUB2 enables the use of the command acpi even when Secure Boot is signaled by the firmware. An attacker with local root privileges to can drop a small SSDT in /boot/efi and modify grub.cfg to instruct grub to load said SSDT. The SSDT then gets run by the kernel and it overwrites the kernel lock down configuration enabling the attacker to load unsigned kernel modules and kexec unsigned code. Reported-by: Máté Kukri ******************************************************************************* CVE-2020-25632 grub2: Use-after-free in rmmod command CWE-416 7.5/CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:H/PR:H/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:H/A:H The rmmod implementation for GRUB2 is flawed, allowing an attacker to unload a module used as dependency without checking if any other dependent module is still loaded. This leads to an use-after-free scenario possibly allowing an attacker to execute arbitrary code and by-pass Secure Boot protections. Reported-by: Chris Coulson (Canonical) ******************************************************************************* CVE-2020-25647 grub2: Out-of-bound write in grub_usb_device_initialize() CWE-787 6.9/CVSS:3.1/AV:P/AC:H/PR:H/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:H/A:H grub_usb_device_initialize() is called to handle USB device initialization. It reads out the descriptors it needs from the USB device and uses that data to fill in some USB data structures. grub_usb_device_initialize() performs very little bounds checking and simply assumes the USB device provides sane values. This behavior can trigger memory corruption. If properly exploited, this would lead to arbitrary code execution allowing the attacker to by-pass Secure Boot mechanism. Reported-by: Joseph Tartaro (IOActive) and Ilja van Sprundel (IOActive) ******************************************************************************* CVE-2020-27749 grub2: Stack buffer overflow in grub_parser_split_cmdline CWE-121 7.5/CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:H/PR:H/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:H/A:H grub_parser_split_cmdline() expands variable names present in the supplied command line in to their corresponding variable contents and uses a 1kB stack buffer for temporary storage without sufficient bounds checking. If the function is called with a command line that references a variable with a sufficiently large payload, it is possible to overflow the stack buffer, corrupt the stack frame and control execution. An attacker may use this to circumvent Secure Boot protections. Reported-by: Chris Coulson (Canonical) ******************************************************************************* CVE-2020-27779 grub2: The cutmem command allows privileged user to remove memory regions when Secure Boot is enabled CWE-285 7.5/CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:H/PR:H/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:H/A:H The GRUB2's cutmem command does not honor Secure Boot locking. This allows an privileged attacker to remove address ranges from memory creating an opportunity to circumvent Secure Boot protections after proper triage about grub's memory layout. Reported-by: Teddy Reed ******************************************************************************* CVE-2021-3418 - grub2: GRUB 2.05 reintroduced CVE-2020-15705 CWE-281 6.4/CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:H/PR:H/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H The GRUB2 upstream reintroduced the CVE-2020-15705. This refers to a distro specific flaw which made upstream in the mentioned version. If certificates that signed GRUB2 are installed into db, GRUB2 can be booted directly. It will then boot any kernel without signature validation. The booted kernel will think it was booted in Secure Boot mode and will implement lock down, yet it could have been tampered. This flaw only affects upstream and distributions using the shim_lock verifier. Reported-by: Dimitri John Ledkov (Canonical) ******************************************************************************* CVE-2021-20225 grub2: Heap out-of-bounds write in short form option parser CWE-787 7.5/CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:H/PR:H/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:H/A:H The option parser in GRUB2 allows an attacker to write past the end of a heap-allocated buffer by calling certain commands with a large number of specific short forms of options. Reported-by: Daniel Axtens (IBM) ******************************************************************************* CVE-2021-20233 grub2: Heap out-of-bound write due to mis-calculation of space required for quoting CWE-787 7.5/CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:H/PR:H/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:H/A:H There's a flaw on GRUB2 menu rendering code setparam_prefix() in the menu rendering code performs a length calculation on the assumption that expressing a quoted single quote will require 3 characters, while it actually requires 4 characters. This allow an attacker to corrupt memory by one byte for each quote in the input. Reported-by: Daniel Axtens (IBM) ******************************************************************************* Signed-off-by: Stefan Sørensen <stefan.sorensen@spectralink.com> Signed-off-by: Yann E. MORIN <yann.morin.1998@free.fr>
2021-03-11 10:53:06 +01:00
# 2021/03/02 security fixes - patches 0029-0149
GRUB2_IGNORE_CVES += CVE-2020-25632 CVE-2020-25647 CVE-2020-27749 \
CVE-2020-27779 CVE-2021-3418 CVE-2021-20225 CVE-2021-20233
# 0039-acpi-Don-t-register-the-acpi-command-when-locked-dow.patch
GRUB2_IGNORE_CVES += CVE-2020-14372
# CVE-2019-14865 is about a flaw in the grub2-set-bootflag tool, which
# doesn't exist upstream, but is added by the Redhat/Fedora
# packaging. Not applicable to Buildroot.
GRUB2_IGNORE_CVES += CVE-2019-14865
# CVE-2020-15705 is related to a flaw in the use of the
# grub_linuxefi_secure_validate(), which was added by Debian/Ubuntu
# patches. The issue doesn't affect upstream Grub, and
# grub_linuxefi_secure_validate() is not implemented in the grub2
# version available in Buildroot.
GRUB2_IGNORE_CVES += CVE-2020-15705
boot/grub2: Backport Boothole securify fixes Details: https://lists.gnu.org/archive/html/grub-devel/2020-07/msg00034.html Fixes the following security issues: * CVE-2020-10713 A flaw was found in grub2, prior to version 2.06. An attacker may use the GRUB 2 flaw to hijack and tamper the GRUB verification process. This flaw also allows the bypass of Secure Boot protections. In order to load an untrusted or modified kernel, an attacker would first need to establish access to the system such as gaining physical access, obtain the ability to alter a pxe-boot network, or have remote access to a networked system with root access. With this access, an attacker could then craft a string to cause a buffer overflow by injecting a malicious payload that leads to arbitrary code execution within GRUB. The highest threat from this vulnerability is to data confidentiality and integrity as well as system availability. * CVE-2020-14308 In grub2 versions before 2.06 the grub memory allocator doesn't check for possible arithmetic overflows on the requested allocation size. This leads the function to return invalid memory allocations which can be further used to cause possible integrity, confidentiality and availability impacts during the boot process. * CVE-2020-14309 There's an issue with grub2 in all versions before 2.06 when handling squashfs filesystems containing a symbolic link with name length of UINT32 bytes in size. The name size leads to an arithmetic overflow leading to a zero-size allocation further causing a heap-based buffer overflow with attacker controlled data. * CVE-2020-14310 An integer overflow in read_section_from_string may lead to a heap based buffer overflow. * CVE-2020-14311 An integer overflow in grub_ext2_read_link may lead to a heap-based buffer overflow. * CVE-2020-15706 GRUB2 contains a race condition in grub_script_function_create() leading to a use-after-free vulnerability which can be triggered by redefining a function whilst the same function is already executing, leading to arbitrary code execution and secure boot restriction bypass * CVE-2020-15707 Integer overflows were discovered in the functions grub_cmd_initrd and grub_initrd_init in the efilinux component of GRUB2, as shipped in Debian, Red Hat, and Ubuntu (the functionality is not included in GRUB2 upstream), leading to a heap-based buffer overflow. These could be triggered by an extremely large number of arguments to the initrd command on 32-bit architectures, or a crafted filesystem with very large files on any architecture. An attacker could use this to execute arbitrary code and bypass UEFI Secure Boot restrictions. This issue affects GRUB2 version 2.04 and prior versions. Signed-off-by: Stefan Sørensen <stefan.sorensen@spectralink.com> Signed-off-by: Peter Korsgaard <peter@korsgaard.com>
2020-08-03 10:00:25 +02:00
ifeq ($(BR2_TARGET_GRUB2_INSTALL_TOOLS),y)
GRUB2_INSTALL_TARGET = YES
else
GRUB2_INSTALL_TARGET = NO
endif
GRUB2_CPE_ID_VENDOR = gnu
GRUB2_BUILTIN_MODULES = $(call qstrip,$(BR2_TARGET_GRUB2_BUILTIN_MODULES))
GRUB2_BUILTIN_CONFIG = $(call qstrip,$(BR2_TARGET_GRUB2_BUILTIN_CONFIG))
GRUB2_BOOT_PARTITION = $(call qstrip,$(BR2_TARGET_GRUB2_BOOT_PARTITION))
ifeq ($(BR2_TARGET_GRUB2_I386_PC),y)
GRUB2_IMAGE = $(BINARIES_DIR)/grub.img
GRUB2_CFG = $(TARGET_DIR)/boot/grub/grub.cfg
GRUB2_PREFIX = ($(GRUB2_BOOT_PARTITION))/boot/grub
GRUB2_TUPLE = i386-pc
GRUB2_TARGET = i386
GRUB2_PLATFORM = pc
else ifeq ($(BR2_TARGET_GRUB2_I386_EFI),y)
GRUB2_IMAGE = $(BINARIES_DIR)/efi-part/EFI/BOOT/bootia32.efi
GRUB2_CFG = $(BINARIES_DIR)/efi-part/EFI/BOOT/grub.cfg
GRUB2_PREFIX = /EFI/BOOT
GRUB2_TUPLE = i386-efi
GRUB2_TARGET = i386
GRUB2_PLATFORM = efi
else ifeq ($(BR2_TARGET_GRUB2_X86_64_EFI),y)
GRUB2_IMAGE = $(BINARIES_DIR)/efi-part/EFI/BOOT/bootx64.efi
GRUB2_CFG = $(BINARIES_DIR)/efi-part/EFI/BOOT/grub.cfg
GRUB2_PREFIX = /EFI/BOOT
GRUB2_TUPLE = x86_64-efi
GRUB2_TARGET = x86_64
GRUB2_PLATFORM = efi
else ifeq ($(BR2_TARGET_GRUB2_ARM_UBOOT),y)
GRUB2_IMAGE = $(BINARIES_DIR)/boot-part/grub/grub.img
GRUB2_CFG = $(BINARIES_DIR)/boot-part/grub/grub.cfg
GRUB2_PREFIX = ($(GRUB2_BOOT_PARTITION))/boot/grub
GRUB2_TUPLE = arm-uboot
GRUB2_TARGET = arm
GRUB2_PLATFORM = uboot
else ifeq ($(BR2_TARGET_GRUB2_ARM_EFI),y)
GRUB2_IMAGE = $(BINARIES_DIR)/efi-part/EFI/BOOT/bootarm.efi
GRUB2_CFG = $(BINARIES_DIR)/efi-part/EFI/BOOT/grub.cfg
GRUB2_PREFIX = /EFI/BOOT
GRUB2_TUPLE = arm-efi
GRUB2_TARGET = arm
GRUB2_PLATFORM = efi
else ifeq ($(BR2_TARGET_GRUB2_ARM64_EFI),y)
GRUB2_IMAGE = $(BINARIES_DIR)/efi-part/EFI/BOOT/bootaa64.efi
GRUB2_CFG = $(BINARIES_DIR)/efi-part/EFI/BOOT/grub.cfg
GRUB2_PREFIX = /EFI/BOOT
GRUB2_TUPLE = arm64-efi
GRUB2_TARGET = aarch64
GRUB2_PLATFORM = efi
endif
# Grub2 is kind of special: it considers CC, LD and so on to be the
# tools to build the host programs and uses TARGET_CC, TARGET_CFLAGS,
# TARGET_CPPFLAGS, TARGET_LDFLAGS to build the bootloader itself.
#
# NOTE: TARGET_STRIP is overridden by !BR2_STRIP_strip, so always
# use the cross compile variant to ensure grub2 builds
HOST_GRUB2_CONF_ENV = \
CPP="$(HOSTCC) -E"
GRUB2_CONF_ENV = \
CPP="$(TARGET_CC) -E" \
TARGET_CC="$(TARGET_CC)" \
TARGET_CFLAGS="$(TARGET_CFLAGS)" \
TARGET_CPPFLAGS="$(TARGET_CPPFLAGS) -fno-stack-protector" \
TARGET_LDFLAGS="$(TARGET_LDFLAGS)" \
TARGET_NM="$(TARGET_NM)" \
TARGET_OBJCOPY="$(TARGET_OBJCOPY)" \
TARGET_STRIP="$(TARGET_CROSS)strip"
GRUB2_CONF_OPTS = \
--target=$(GRUB2_TARGET) \
--with-platform=$(GRUB2_PLATFORM) \
--prefix=/ \
--exec-prefix=/ \
--disable-grub-mkfont \
--enable-efiemu=no \
ac_cv_lib_lzma_lzma_code=no \
--enable-device-mapper=no \
--enable-libzfs=no \
--disable-werror
HOST_GRUB2_CONF_OPTS = \
--disable-grub-mkfont \
--enable-efiemu=no \
ac_cv_lib_lzma_lzma_code=no \
--enable-device-mapper=no \
--enable-libzfs=no \
--disable-werror
ifeq ($(BR2_TARGET_GRUB2_I386_PC),y)
define GRUB2_IMAGE_INSTALL_ELTORITO
cat $(HOST_DIR)/lib/grub/$(GRUB2_TUPLE)/cdboot.img $(GRUB2_IMAGE) > \
$(BINARIES_DIR)/grub-eltorito.img
endef
endif
define GRUB2_INSTALL_IMAGES_CMDS
mkdir -p $(dir $(GRUB2_IMAGE))
$(HOST_DIR)/usr/bin/grub-mkimage \
-d $(@D)/grub-core/ \
-O $(GRUB2_TUPLE) \
-o $(GRUB2_IMAGE) \
-p "$(GRUB2_PREFIX)" \
$(if $(GRUB2_BUILTIN_CONFIG),-c $(GRUB2_BUILTIN_CONFIG)) \
$(GRUB2_BUILTIN_MODULES)
mkdir -p $(dir $(GRUB2_CFG))
$(INSTALL) -D -m 0644 boot/grub2/grub.cfg $(GRUB2_CFG)
$(GRUB2_IMAGE_INSTALL_ELTORITO)
endef
ifeq ($(GRUB2_PLATFORM),efi)
define GRUB2_EFI_STARTUP_NSH
echo $(notdir $(GRUB2_IMAGE)) > \
$(BINARIES_DIR)/efi-part/startup.nsh
endef
GRUB2_POST_INSTALL_IMAGES_HOOKS += GRUB2_EFI_STARTUP_NSH
endif
$(eval $(autotools-package))
$(eval $(host-autotools-package))