kumquat-buildroot/boot/grub2/0143-shim_lock-Only-skip-loading-shim_lock-verifier-with-.patch

271 lines
9.6 KiB
Diff
Raw Normal View History

boot/grub2: Backport 2021/03/02 securify fixes Details: https://lists.gnu.org/archive/html/grub-devel/2021-03/msg00007.html As detailed in commit 7e64a050fbd9add07ed84d48054ffee1b659d079, it is difficult to utilize the upstream patches directly, so a number of patches include changes to generated files so that we don't need invoke the gentpl.py script. In addition to the security fixes, these required patches has been backported: f76a27996 efi: Make shim_lock GUID and protocol type public 04ae030d0 efi: Return grub_efi_status_t from grub_efi_get_variable() ac5c93675 efi: Add a function to read EFI variables with attributes d7e54b2e5 efi: Add secure boot detection The following security issues are fixed: CVE-2020-14372 grub2: The acpi command allows privileged user to load crafted ACPI tables when Secure Boot is enabled CWE-184 7.5/CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:H/PR:H/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:H/A:H GRUB2 enables the use of the command acpi even when Secure Boot is signaled by the firmware. An attacker with local root privileges to can drop a small SSDT in /boot/efi and modify grub.cfg to instruct grub to load said SSDT. The SSDT then gets run by the kernel and it overwrites the kernel lock down configuration enabling the attacker to load unsigned kernel modules and kexec unsigned code. Reported-by: Máté Kukri ******************************************************************************* CVE-2020-25632 grub2: Use-after-free in rmmod command CWE-416 7.5/CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:H/PR:H/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:H/A:H The rmmod implementation for GRUB2 is flawed, allowing an attacker to unload a module used as dependency without checking if any other dependent module is still loaded. This leads to an use-after-free scenario possibly allowing an attacker to execute arbitrary code and by-pass Secure Boot protections. Reported-by: Chris Coulson (Canonical) ******************************************************************************* CVE-2020-25647 grub2: Out-of-bound write in grub_usb_device_initialize() CWE-787 6.9/CVSS:3.1/AV:P/AC:H/PR:H/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:H/A:H grub_usb_device_initialize() is called to handle USB device initialization. It reads out the descriptors it needs from the USB device and uses that data to fill in some USB data structures. grub_usb_device_initialize() performs very little bounds checking and simply assumes the USB device provides sane values. This behavior can trigger memory corruption. If properly exploited, this would lead to arbitrary code execution allowing the attacker to by-pass Secure Boot mechanism. Reported-by: Joseph Tartaro (IOActive) and Ilja van Sprundel (IOActive) ******************************************************************************* CVE-2020-27749 grub2: Stack buffer overflow in grub_parser_split_cmdline CWE-121 7.5/CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:H/PR:H/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:H/A:H grub_parser_split_cmdline() expands variable names present in the supplied command line in to their corresponding variable contents and uses a 1kB stack buffer for temporary storage without sufficient bounds checking. If the function is called with a command line that references a variable with a sufficiently large payload, it is possible to overflow the stack buffer, corrupt the stack frame and control execution. An attacker may use this to circumvent Secure Boot protections. Reported-by: Chris Coulson (Canonical) ******************************************************************************* CVE-2020-27779 grub2: The cutmem command allows privileged user to remove memory regions when Secure Boot is enabled CWE-285 7.5/CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:H/PR:H/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:H/A:H The GRUB2's cutmem command does not honor Secure Boot locking. This allows an privileged attacker to remove address ranges from memory creating an opportunity to circumvent Secure Boot protections after proper triage about grub's memory layout. Reported-by: Teddy Reed ******************************************************************************* CVE-2021-3418 - grub2: GRUB 2.05 reintroduced CVE-2020-15705 CWE-281 6.4/CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:H/PR:H/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H The GRUB2 upstream reintroduced the CVE-2020-15705. This refers to a distro specific flaw which made upstream in the mentioned version. If certificates that signed GRUB2 are installed into db, GRUB2 can be booted directly. It will then boot any kernel without signature validation. The booted kernel will think it was booted in Secure Boot mode and will implement lock down, yet it could have been tampered. This flaw only affects upstream and distributions using the shim_lock verifier. Reported-by: Dimitri John Ledkov (Canonical) ******************************************************************************* CVE-2021-20225 grub2: Heap out-of-bounds write in short form option parser CWE-787 7.5/CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:H/PR:H/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:H/A:H The option parser in GRUB2 allows an attacker to write past the end of a heap-allocated buffer by calling certain commands with a large number of specific short forms of options. Reported-by: Daniel Axtens (IBM) ******************************************************************************* CVE-2021-20233 grub2: Heap out-of-bound write due to mis-calculation of space required for quoting CWE-787 7.5/CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:H/PR:H/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:H/A:H There's a flaw on GRUB2 menu rendering code setparam_prefix() in the menu rendering code performs a length calculation on the assumption that expressing a quoted single quote will require 3 characters, while it actually requires 4 characters. This allow an attacker to corrupt memory by one byte for each quote in the input. Reported-by: Daniel Axtens (IBM) ******************************************************************************* Signed-off-by: Stefan Sørensen <stefan.sorensen@spectralink.com> Signed-off-by: Yann E. MORIN <yann.morin.1998@free.fr>
2021-03-11 10:53:06 +01:00
From 968de8c23c1cba0f18230f778ebcf6c412ec8ec5 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Dimitri John Ledkov <xnox@ubuntu.com>
Date: Sat, 20 Feb 2021 17:10:34 +0000
Subject: [PATCH] shim_lock: Only skip loading shim_lock verifier with explicit
consent
Commit 32ddc42c (efi: Only register shim_lock verifier if shim_lock
protocol is found and SB enabled) reintroduced CVE-2020-15705 which
previously only existed in the out-of-tree linuxefi patches and was
fixed as part of the BootHole patch series.
Under Secure Boot enforce loading shim_lock verifier. Allow skipping
shim_lock verifier if SecureBoot/MokSBState EFI variables indicate
skipping validations, or if GRUB image is built with --disable-shim-lock.
Fixes: 132ddc42c (efi: Only register shim_lock verifier if shim_lock
protocol is found and SB enabled)
Fixes: CVE-2020-15705
Fixes: CVE-2021-3418
Reported-by: Dimitri John Ledkov <xnox@ubuntu.com>
Signed-off-by: Dimitri John Ledkov <xnox@ubuntu.com>
Reviewed-by: Daniel Kiper <daniel.kiper@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: Stefan Sørensen <stefan.sorensen@spectralink.com>
---
docs/grub.texi | 5 ++++-
grub-core/kern/efi/sb.c | 17 ++++++++++++++++-
include/grub/kernel.h | 3 ++-
include/grub/util/install.h | 7 +++++--
util/grub-install-common.c | 12 +++++++++---
util/grub-mkimage.c | 8 +++++++-
util/mkimage.c | 15 ++++++++++++++-
7 files changed, 57 insertions(+), 10 deletions(-)
diff --git a/docs/grub.texi b/docs/grub.texi
index bff6dfc..e302797 100644
--- a/docs/grub.texi
+++ b/docs/grub.texi
@@ -5787,7 +5787,10 @@ secure boot chain.
The GRUB, except the @command{chainloader} command, works with the UEFI secure
boot and the shim. This functionality is provided by the shim_lock verifier. It
is built into the @file{core.img} and is registered if the UEFI secure boot is
-enabled.
+enabled. The @samp{shim_lock} variable is set to @samp{y} when shim_lock verifier
+is registered. If it is desired to use UEFI secure boot without shim, one can
+disable shim_lock by disabling shim verification with MokSbState UEFI variable
+or by building grub image with @samp{--disable-shim-lock} option.
All GRUB modules not stored in the @file{core.img}, OS kernels, ACPI tables,
Device Trees, etc. have to be signed, e.g, using PGP. Additionally, the commands
diff --git a/grub-core/kern/efi/sb.c b/grub-core/kern/efi/sb.c
index 5d7210a..41dadcd 100644
--- a/grub-core/kern/efi/sb.c
+++ b/grub-core/kern/efi/sb.c
@@ -21,9 +21,11 @@
#include <grub/efi/efi.h>
#include <grub/efi/pe32.h>
#include <grub/efi/sb.h>
+#include <grub/env.h>
#include <grub/err.h>
#include <grub/file.h>
#include <grub/i386/linux.h>
+#include <grub/kernel.h>
#include <grub/mm.h>
#include <grub/types.h>
#include <grub/verify.h>
@@ -160,14 +162,27 @@ struct grub_file_verifier shim_lock_verifier =
void
grub_shim_lock_verifier_setup (void)
{
+ struct grub_module_header *header;
grub_efi_shim_lock_protocol_t *sl =
grub_efi_locate_protocol (&shim_lock_guid, 0);
+ /* shim_lock is missing, check if GRUB image is built with --disable-shim-lock. */
if (!sl)
- return;
+ {
+ FOR_MODULES (header)
+ {
+ if (header->type == OBJ_TYPE_DISABLE_SHIM_LOCK)
+ return;
+ }
+ }
+ /* Secure Boot is off. Do not load shim_lock. */
if (grub_efi_get_secureboot () != GRUB_EFI_SECUREBOOT_MODE_ENABLED)
return;
+ /* Enforce shim_lock_verifier. */
grub_verifier_register (&shim_lock_verifier);
+
+ grub_env_set ("shim_lock", "y");
+ grub_env_export ("shim_lock");
}
diff --git a/include/grub/kernel.h b/include/grub/kernel.h
index 133a37c..abbca5e 100644
--- a/include/grub/kernel.h
+++ b/include/grub/kernel.h
@@ -29,7 +29,8 @@ enum
OBJ_TYPE_CONFIG,
OBJ_TYPE_PREFIX,
OBJ_TYPE_PUBKEY,
- OBJ_TYPE_DTB
+ OBJ_TYPE_DTB,
+ OBJ_TYPE_DISABLE_SHIM_LOCK
};
/* The module header. */
diff --git a/include/grub/util/install.h b/include/grub/util/install.h
index 8cb5056..11a8df8 100644
--- a/include/grub/util/install.h
+++ b/include/grub/util/install.h
@@ -65,6 +65,8 @@
N_("embed FILE as public key for signature checking"), 0}, \
{ "sbat", GRUB_INSTALL_OPTIONS_SBAT, N_("FILE"), 0, \
N_("SBAT metadata"), 0 }, \
+ { "disable-shim-lock", GRUB_INSTALL_OPTIONS_DISABLE_SHIM_LOCK, 0, 0, \
+ N_("disable shim_lock verifier"), 0 }, \
{ "verbose", 'v', 0, 0, \
N_("print verbose messages."), 1 }
@@ -125,7 +127,8 @@ enum grub_install_options {
GRUB_INSTALL_OPTIONS_GRUB_MKIMAGE,
GRUB_INSTALL_OPTIONS_INSTALL_CORE_COMPRESS,
GRUB_INSTALL_OPTIONS_DTB,
- GRUB_INSTALL_OPTIONS_SBAT
+ GRUB_INSTALL_OPTIONS_SBAT,
+ GRUB_INSTALL_OPTIONS_DISABLE_SHIM_LOCK
};
extern char *grub_install_source_directory;
@@ -187,7 +190,7 @@ grub_install_generate_image (const char *dir, const char *prefix,
const struct grub_install_image_target_desc *image_target,
int note,
grub_compression_t comp, const char *dtb_file,
- const char *sbat_path);
+ const char *sbat_path, const int disable_shim_lock);
const struct grub_install_image_target_desc *
grub_install_get_image_target (const char *arg);
diff --git a/util/grub-install-common.c b/util/grub-install-common.c
index 1fcccd2..13d9fe9 100644
--- a/util/grub-install-common.c
+++ b/util/grub-install-common.c
@@ -308,6 +308,7 @@ handle_install_list (struct install_list *il, const char *val,
static char **pubkeys;
static size_t npubkeys;
static char *sbat;
+static int disable_shim_lock;
static grub_compression_t compression;
int
@@ -344,6 +345,9 @@ grub_install_parse (int key, char *arg)
sbat = xstrdup (arg);
return 1;
+ case GRUB_INSTALL_OPTIONS_DISABLE_SHIM_LOCK:
+ disable_shim_lock = 1;
+ return 1;
case GRUB_INSTALL_OPTIONS_VERBOSITY:
verbosity++;
@@ -506,10 +510,11 @@ grub_install_make_image_wrap_file (const char *dir, const char *prefix,
" --output '%s' "
" --dtb '%s' "
"--sbat '%s' "
- "--format '%s' --compression '%s' %s %s\n",
+ "--format '%s' --compression '%s' %s %s %s\n",
dir, prefix,
outname, dtb ? : "", sbat ? : "", mkimage_target,
- compnames[compression], note ? "--note" : "", s);
+ compnames[compression], note ? "--note" : "",
+ disable_shim_lock ? "--disable-shim-lock" : "", s);
free (s);
tgt = grub_install_get_image_target (mkimage_target);
@@ -519,7 +524,8 @@ grub_install_make_image_wrap_file (const char *dir, const char *prefix,
grub_install_generate_image (dir, prefix, fp, outname,
modules.entries, memdisk_path,
pubkeys, npubkeys, config_path, tgt,
- note, compression, dtb, sbat);
+ note, compression, dtb, sbat,
+ disable_shim_lock);
while (dc--)
grub_install_pop_module ();
}
diff --git a/util/grub-mkimage.c b/util/grub-mkimage.c
index 75b8847..c0d5599 100644
--- a/util/grub-mkimage.c
+++ b/util/grub-mkimage.c
@@ -82,6 +82,7 @@ static struct argp_option options[] = {
{"format", 'O', N_("FORMAT"), 0, 0, 0},
{"compression", 'C', "(xz|none|auto)", 0, N_("choose the compression to use for core image"), 0},
{"sbat", 's', N_("FILE"), 0, N_("SBAT metadata"), 0},
+ {"disable-shim-lock", GRUB_INSTALL_OPTIONS_DISABLE_SHIM_LOCK, 0, 0, N_("disable shim_lock verifier"), 0},
{"verbose", 'v', 0, 0, N_("print verbose messages."), 0},
{ 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0 }
};
@@ -126,6 +127,7 @@ struct arguments
char *config;
char *sbat;
int note;
+ int disable_shim_lock;
const struct grub_install_image_target_desc *image_target;
grub_compression_t comp;
};
@@ -233,6 +235,10 @@ argp_parser (int key, char *arg, struct argp_state *state)
arguments->sbat = xstrdup (arg);
break;
+ case GRUB_INSTALL_OPTIONS_DISABLE_SHIM_LOCK:
+ arguments->disable_shim_lock = 1;
+ break;
+
case 'v':
verbosity++;
break;
@@ -319,7 +325,7 @@ main (int argc, char *argv[])
arguments.npubkeys, arguments.config,
arguments.image_target, arguments.note,
arguments.comp, arguments.dtb,
- arguments.sbat);
+ arguments.sbat, arguments.disable_shim_lock);
if (grub_util_file_sync (fp) < 0)
grub_util_error (_("cannot sync `%s': %s"), arguments.output ? : "stdout",
diff --git a/util/mkimage.c b/util/mkimage.c
index b354ec1..a26cf76 100644
--- a/util/mkimage.c
+++ b/util/mkimage.c
@@ -870,7 +870,7 @@ grub_install_generate_image (const char *dir, const char *prefix,
size_t npubkeys, char *config_path,
const struct grub_install_image_target_desc *image_target,
int note, grub_compression_t comp, const char *dtb_path,
- const char *sbat_path)
+ const char *sbat_path, int disable_shim_lock)
{
char *kernel_img, *core_img;
size_t total_module_size, core_size;
@@ -929,6 +929,9 @@ grub_install_generate_image (const char *dir, const char *prefix,
if (sbat_path != NULL && image_target->id != IMAGE_EFI)
grub_util_error (_(".sbat section can be embedded into EFI images only"));
+ if (disable_shim_lock)
+ total_module_size += sizeof (struct grub_module_header);
+
if (config_path)
{
config_size = ALIGN_ADDR (grub_util_get_image_size (config_path) + 1);
@@ -1065,6 +1068,16 @@ grub_install_generate_image (const char *dir, const char *prefix,
offset += dtb_size;
}
+ if (disable_shim_lock)
+ {
+ struct grub_module_header *header;
+
+ header = (struct grub_module_header *) (kernel_img + offset);
+ header->type = grub_host_to_target32 (OBJ_TYPE_DISABLE_SHIM_LOCK);
+ header->size = grub_host_to_target32 (sizeof (*header));
+ offset += sizeof (*header);
+ }
+
if (config_path)
{
struct grub_module_header *header;
--
2.14.2